The opinion of the court was delivered by: Mr. Justice Story delivered the opinion of the Court
This cause was argued by Mr. Webster and Mr. Taylor for the plaintiffs in error, and by the Attorney General and Mr. Swann for the defendant in error.
This is a writ of error to the Circuit Court of the District of Columbia, sitting at Alexandria.
The original action was upon a policy of insurance, dated the 6th of February, 1822, whereby the Columbian Insurance Company insured the plaintiff ten thousand dollars, lost or not lost, at and from Alexandria to St. Thomas, and two other ports in the West Indies, and back to her port of discharge in the United States, upon all kinds of lawful goods and merchandise, laden or to be laden on board the ship called the Commerce, &c.; beginning the adventure upon the said goods and merchandise from the loading at Alexandria, and continuing the same until the said goods and merchandise shall be safely landed at St. Thomas, &c. and the United States. The goods and merchandise to be valued, as interest may appear. The policy contained the usual risks; and the premium agreed on was three and three quarters per cent., to return half per cent. for each port not used or attempted, and no loss happens. There are other provisions in the policy, which will be hereafter commented on. The breach alleged in the declaration is a total loss by perils of the seas, with the usual averments of notice and non-payment.
The trial was had upon the general issue, and a verdict found by consent for the plaintiff, for 10,000 dollars, subject to the opinion of the Court upon the demurrer to evidence filed in the case. It was farther agreed, that if it should be the opinion of the Court, that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover the full amount of the insurance, but is entitled to an average loss, then a reference to ascertain that average, or to modify the amount of the verdict in any other respect as to the sum, should be made to an auditor, and judgment should be given for the sum finally reported and confirmed by the Court, subject, however, to the exceptions of either party to any opinion of the Court on that subject. The reference was accordingly made, and, upon the coming in of the auditor's report, the Court pronounced its opinion, and gave judgment for the plaintiff for $7,656 57 cents, with interest, from the 14th of October, 1822.
From the demurrer to evidence, it appeared, that the ship sailed from Alexandria on her voyage about the 14th of February, 1822, having on board a cargo of 2,297 1/2 barrels of flour of the invoice price of $16,887 32 cents, both ship and cargo being owned by the plaintiff. On the 21st of March she arrived in safety with her cargo at St. Thomas, having met with no accident; and she continued at that port until the 30th of May following, for the purpose of selling her cargo, and for no other cause. During this period the master, who was also consignee, sold by retail 509 1/2 barrels; being limited, by his instructions, to eight dollars per barrel, and not being able to procure that price for the residue of the cargo, he sailed on the 31st of May for Cape Haytien with it, and had also on board some doubloons, amounting to $480, part of the proceeds of the former sales. He might have sold his whole cargo at from $7,50, to $7,75 at St. Thomas. The 509 1/2 barrels of flour sold at St. Thomas, according to the invoice price, amounted to $3,512 99, leaving the value of the cargo on board, exclusive of the doubloons, at the time of sailing from that port, according to the invoice, at $12,328 25 cents.
On the 6th of June the ship, with her cargo, arrived off Cape Haytien, and the captain having gone on shore, the ship stretching too far in, took the ground and was wrecked. In consequence of this disaster, 155 barrels of flour were totally lost, 1,633 were got on shore, part without injury, but the greater part damaged, and the whole was sold. The gross amount of the sales at Cape Haytien was $9,391 34 cents, the expenses of salvage, including commissions on sales, $4124,72 cents; the proportion of the captain's expenses attaching on the cargo, $285 78 cents. Of the proceeds of the sales at Cape Haytien, the sum of $4,953 89 was invested in coffee, which was shipped to Baltimore, where it produced only $3,517 40 cents. The plaintiff makes a claim for freight of the outward cargo of $2,104 25 cents, as a proper deduction from the proceeds.
As soon as the plaintiff heard of the loss, he sent the following letter to the Insurance Company, under date of the 5th July, 1822: 'Gentlemen, having received a letter from captain M'Knight, (the master,) informing me that the ship Commerce was lost, I abandon the proportion of the cargo that your office was interested in. Respectfully, &c.' The captain's protest, and the survey of the ship, were also exhibited to the Company on the 14th of August. The abandonment was never finally accepted by the directors, but sundry negotiations took place between them and the plaintiff, which, however, led to no effectual arrangement.
The first question arising in this case, is upon the true construction of the policy itself as to the voyage insured. Is it an insurance upon the original cargo only from the time of its loading until its final discharge, or is it an insurance upon every successive cargo, which is taken on board in the course of the voyage out and home, so as to cover the risk of a return cargo, the proceeds of the sales of the outward cargo? The argument in behalf of the defendant is, that the risk applies upon the terms of the policy only to the original cargo, laden at Alexandria. The terms of the policy are, on a voyage, 'at and from Alexandria to St. Thomas and two other ports in the West Indies, and back to her port of discharge in the United States, upon all lawful goods and merchandise laden or to be laden on board the ship, &c.; beginning the adventure upon the said goods and merchandise, from the lading at Alexandria, and continuing the same until the said goods and merchandise shall be safely landed at St. Thomas, &c. and the United States aforesaid.' It is supposed that those words tie up the adventure to the original cargo shipped at Alexandria, because the risk is to attach on the same at that port, and to continue on the same until safely landed at St. Thomas, &c., and the United States. Perhaps a very strict grammatical construction might lead to such a conclusion. But policies have never been construed in such a strict and rigid manner. The instrument itself is somewhat loose in its form, and has always received a liberal construction with reference to the nature of the voyage and the manifest intent of the parties. What is the nature of the present voyage? It is upon the face of the policy plainly an insurance upon all lawful goods, not only for the outward voyage to the West Indies, but for the homeward voyage to the United States. The underwriters must be presumed, equally with the assured, to know the nature and course of such a voyage. It is for the purpose of trade, and the exchange of the outward cargo, by sale or barter, for a return cargo of West India productions. If we could shut our eyes to the knowledge of this fact, belonging, as it does, intimately to the history and commercial policy of the nation itself, as disclosed in its laws, the whole evidence in the case furnishes abundant proofs of its notoriety. The true meaning of the policy is to be sought in an exposition of the words, with reference to this known course and usage of the West India trade. The parties must be supposed to contract with a tacit adoption of it as the basis of their engagements. The object of the clause under consideration may be thus rationally expounded, as intended only to point out the time of the commence ment and termination of the risk on the goods, successively, and at different periods of the voyage, constituting the cargo. It would be pushing the argument to a most unreasonable extent, to suppose that the parties deliberately contracted for risks on a homeward voyage, on goods which, according to the known course of the trade, and the very nature of the commodities, were not, and could not be, intended to be brought back to the United States. We are of opinion, that the policy was for the whole voyage round, and covered any return cargo taken on board at any of the designated ports in the West Indies. This is not like the cases cited at the bar, where a policy on goods at and from a particular port, beginning the adventure from the loading thereof, has been held not to cover goods taken on board at an antecedent port. Those are all cases of insurance upon a single passage, unaffected by any known course or usage of trade to explain the intentions of the parties.
The next question is, whether the delay at St. Thomas for seventy days was not so unreasonable as to constitute a deviation. Without question, any unreasonable delay in the ordinary progress of the voyage avoids the policy on this account. But what delay will constitute such a deviation, depends upon the nature of the voyage, and the usage of the trade. It may be a very justifiable delay, to wait in port, and sell by retail, if that be the course of business, when such delay would be inexcusable in a voyage requiring or authorizing no such delay. The parties, in entering into the contract of insurance, are always supposed to be governed in the premium by the ordinary length of the voyage, and the course of the trade. That delay, therefore, which is necessary to accomplish the objects of the voyage according to the course of the trade, if bona fide made, cannot be admitted to avoid the insurance. In the present case, it is proved, that the stay at St. Thomas was solelv for the purpose of selling the cargo, and for no other cause. But, it is said, that a sale might have taken place at St. Thomas of the whole cargo, if the orders of the owner had not contained a direction to the master limiting the sale at St. Thomas to the price of eight dollars, and that this limitation was the sole cause of the delay, and was unreasonable; that the master ought, under the circumstances, to have sold at a lower price, or have immediately elected to go to another port. We are of a different opinion. In almost every voyage undertaken of this nature, where different ports are to be visited for the purposes of trade, and to seek markets, it is almost universal for the owner to prescribe limits of price to the sales. Such limitations have never hitherto been supposed to vary the insurance, or the rights of the party under it. It cannot be, that the master, if entitled to go to a single port only, is bound to sell at whatever sacrifice, as soon as he arrives at that port, and within the period at which he may unload, and sell, and reload a return cargo. He must, from the very nature of the case, have a discretion on this subject. If he arrives at a bad market, he must have a right to wait a reasonable time for a rise of the market, to make suitable inquiries, and to try the effect of partial and limited sales. He is not bound to sell the whole cargo at once, whatever be the sacrifice, and thus frustrate the projected adventure. In short, he must exercise in this, as in all other cases, a sound discretion for the interest of all concerned; and if it be fairly and reasonably exercised, it ought not to be deemed injurious to rights secured by the policy. It is as much the true interest of the owner to sell in a reasonable time, and with all proper despatch, as it is for the underwriters. To be sure, if the owner should limit the price to an extravagant sum, or the master should delay after all reasonable expectations of a change of market were extinguished, such circumstances might properly be left to a jury to infer a delay amounting to a deviation. And here, again, as on the former point, it may be remarked, that every underwriter is presumed to know the ordinary course of the trade, and to regulate his proceedings accordingly.
But, it is said, that there is no sufficient evidence of the usage of trade in the present case. It is to be remembered that this is a case which comes before this Court upon a demurrer to evidence. The plaintiff was not bound to have joined in the demurrer without the defendant's having distinctly admitted, upon the record, every fact which the evidence introduced on his behalf conduced to prove; and that when the joinder was made, without insisting on this preliminary, the Court is at liberty to draw the same inferences in favour of the plaintiff, which the jury might have drawn from the facts stated. The evidence is taken most strongly against the party demurring to the evidence. This is the settled doctrine in this Court, as recognised in Pawling v. The United States, (4 Cranch's Rep. 219.) and Fowle v. The Common Council of Alexandria, (11 Wheat. Rep. 320.) The testimony in the present case, does not, in direct terms, (as has been justly stated at the bar,) establish the general usage of the West India trade. The witnesses do not, generally, speak to a usage, eo nomine. But it cannot be denied, that its scope and object are to establish the usage by an enumeration of facts, and voyages, by persons experienced in the trade, and referring to their own knowledge and general information. It thus conduces, indirectly, to prove the usage; and as it is altogether one way, it is certainly such that a jury might infer a usage from it. And if so, this Court may infer it. We consider it, then, as a fair deduction from this testimony, that considerable delays in port in the West India trade are not uncommon, for the purpose of taking the advantages of the market, and that sales by retail are within the usage. There are no facts from which this Court can infer, that the delay in the present case was unreasonable or unusual; and, consequently, we cannot admit, that the delay amounted to a deviation. The case of Oliver v. The Marytand Insurance Company, (7 Cranch's Rep. 487.) is in no respect inconsistent with this doctrine. One question in that case was, whether the delay at Barcelona, for the purpose of taking in a return cargo, was a deviation. The Court below instructed the jury, that it was not, if the vessel did not remain longer in that port than the usage and custom of trade at that place rendered necessary to complete her cargo. This Court was of opinion, that the instruction was, in substance, correct. The only difficulty which arose was from the terms of the instruction, which seemed to limit the right, not to the time necessary to take in the cargo, but to a particular period, regulated by the usage of trade. The Chief Justice there said, 'There is some doubt spread over the opinion in this case, in consequence of the terms in which it is expressed. The vessel might certainly remain as long as was necessary to complete her cargo, but it is scarcely to be supposed this was regulated by usage and custom. The usages and customs of a port, or of a trade, are peculiar to a port or trade. But the necessity of waiting, where a cargo is to be taken on board, until it can be obtained, is common to all ports, and all trades. The length of time frequently employed in selling one cargo and procuring another, may assist in proving, that a particular vessel has, or has not, practised unnecessary delays in port, but can establish no usage by which the time of remaining in port is fixed. The substantial part of the opinion, however, appears to have been, and seems so to have been understood, that the plaintiff could not recover, unless the jury should be of opinion, that the vessel did not remain longer at Barcelona than was necessary to complete her cargo, of which necessity the time usually employed for that purpose might be evidence.' This case, therefore, recognises the right to wait in port for the purpose of selling one cargo and procuring another; and the reasoning is employed solely to avoid a criticism founded upon some ambiguity of phrase peculiar to that case. On the other hand, the cases cited at the bar abundantly prove, that the usage and course of trade are very material to determine whether the delay be unreasonable or not.*fn1 a
The next question is, whether there has been a total loss. And this divides itself into two distinct considerations; first, whether the facts of the case created a right of abandonment as for a technical total loss; and, secondly, if so, whether there has been a legal abandonment by the assured.
Upon the first point there is not much room for difficulty. The insurance was not for a single passage, but for the round voyage out and home. The cargo, in the course of the outward voyage, and before it was terminated, (for the master had still an election to go to another port after his arrival at Cape Haytien,) was permanently separated from the ship by the total wreck of the latter. It was a perishable cargo, and much injured by the accident, though it does not appear to be to the amount of one half its value; and it was liable to still farther deterioration. There was a necessity, then, for an immediate sale at Cape Haytien, and the farther prosecution of the voyage with that ship, or that cargo, became impracticable. It was completely frustrated. Under such circumstances, we are of opinion, that, according to the established doctrine of the commercial law, it was a clear case of a technical total loss, on account of the breaking up of the voyage. It is a much stronger case than that of Dorr v. The New-England Insurance Company, (4 Mass. Rep. 232.) or Hudson v. Harrison, (3 Brod. & Bing. 364.) where the Court held the losses total.
Was there, then, a due and legal abandonment? The letter of abandonment is admitted to have been sent in due season, and, in its terms, it amounts to a cession of the property. Under ordinary circumstances, it would furnish nothing upon which to suspend a doubt. The difficulty arises from two clauses in the particular form of policy used by this company. One is in the following terms: 'In case of loss, the same shall be paid in sixty days after proof and adjustment thereof, without any deduction, except the amount of the premium, if then unpaid.' The other, is, 'it is hereby agreed, that the insured shall not abandon to the insurers until sixty days have elapsed after having given notice to them of his intention so to do, and of the loss or event which may entitle the insured thereto.' The suit was not brought until after more than one hundred and twenty days had elapsed from the abandonment made by the letter of the 5th of July. No question, therefore, arises on this head. But the argument is, that the notice of abandonment must, by the terms of the policy, precede the actual abandonment sixty days; and that, in the present case, either no notice at all of such intention has been given, or there has been no actual abandonment at the end of that period. The letter of the 5th of July must either operate as a notice of abandonment, or as actual abandonment; if the former, then there has been no act of abandonment following up the notice; if the latter, then it was made too soon, and contrary to the terms of the stipulation. Such is the stress of the argument.
In construing these clauses, it is material to consider the intention of the parties, as expounded by the general principles of law applicable to the contract. By these principles, the assured, upon an abandonment in due season, for a technical total loss, acquires an immediate right of recovery against the underwriters. He is not bound to wait until they have signified their acceptance or refusal of the abandonment, if it be valid, nor, if accepted, is he bound to wait for payment, but he may immediately commence an action against them. The object of the first clause is, in the case of an undisputed loss, to obtain a delay of payment for sixty days after the adjustment. But, from its very terms, it can only apply to the case where there has been proof of loss, and also an adjustment. If proof of the loss has been offered, and no adjustment made, as in case of a disputed loss, the clause has been supposed, in the cases cited at the bar, not to apply.*fn2 b
The underwriter is, then, understood to waive the privilege. The true object of the second clause is, to postpone the absolute right of abandonment until sixty days after notice of the loss, so as to enable the underwriters to have time for deliberation upon the acceptance or rejection of it, when made, and to avail themselves of all intermediate events for their benefit. It is wholly unnecessary to consider whether the assured, after a notice of abandonment, can retract, if the underwriters choose to insist upon accepting it; or whether, if, instead of a mere notice, he tenders an unequivocal abandonment, which is accepted by the underwriters within the sixty days, he has, nevertheless, a right to withdraw it, if, within the same period, events turn up in his favour. The present case does not present any facts leading to such a question. The clause is manifestly introduced into the policy for the advantage of the underwriters, and not of the assured. But there is no necessity for giving any very strict interpretation to it to accomplish the fair objects of its provisions. If Mr. Catlett had written a letter to the company, stating to them, that he thereby gave notice to them of the loss, and his intention to abandon, and had then added therein, that at the termination of the sixty days they were to deem that letter an absolute abandonment, there could scarcely be a doubt that such a letter would have been sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the clause. It would give to the underwriters the full benefit of it. If he had written, at the same time, two letters, one containing a notice of his intention to abandon, and the other that he made an abandonment, to take effect at the end of the sixty days after the notice, the same legal result would seem to be justified. The clause does not insist upon an abandonment being made in presenti, by an instrument dated at the expiration of the sixty days; but only that it shall not, in point of law, be obligatory as an abandonment until that period. This seems to us a fair and rational exposition of the intention of the clause. In what respect does the letter of the 5th of July differ from the legal results above stated? It is written with reference to the known language and stipulations of the policy, and it must now be interpreted as it must have been understood, and, indeed, looking to the subsequent proceedings of the company, we may say, as it was understood by both parties. Neither of them seems to have acted upon the supposition, that any other, or more formal act of abandonment, was necessary. The letter gives notice of an intention to abandon, because, in its terms, it includes an actual abandonment. It has a tacit reference to the clause in the policy, and must be deemed as a notice to abandon, and, at the same time, a declaration that it shall operate as an abandonment in the case, as soon as by law it may. In our judgment, it was a continuing act of abandonment, and became absolute at the end of the sixty days. It was an abandonment in presenti, to take effect in futuro. Neither the form of the notice, nor the abandonment, is prescribed in the clause. They may be in one or two instruments; they may be in direct terms, or by fair and natural inference. It matters not how they are given or executed; it is sufficient, in point of fact, that they have been given or executed. Our opinion accordingly is, that upon the true interpretation of this last clause in the policy, the letter of the 5th of July was a sufficient notice of an intention to abandon, and that, at the expiration of the sixty days, it operated as an actual abandonment.
The abandonment, then, having been duly made, the next question that arises is, how the loss is to be apportioned. The argument on behalf of the Company is, that as part of the cargo was landed at St. Thomas, the amount risked by them is to be diminished by their proportion of the cargo so landed. In short, that the loss is now to be made up by them with reference to the value of the whole cargo on board, when the risk first attached, and not with reference to the value on board at the time of the loss, notwithstanding it exceeded the amount insured. We are of a different opinion. We think the true intent and object of the policy was to cover an insurance of 10,000 dollars during the whole voyage out and home, so long as the assured had that amount of property on board. This is not a policy for a voyage to St. Thomas only, in which case the argument might justly apply. But it is a policy to two other ports on the outward voyage, and also for the homeward voyage. The language of the policy is, that the underwriters insure 10,000 dollars at and from Alexandria, and two other ports in the West Indies, and back to the United States. The premium is apportioned accordingly, for a half per cent. is to be returned 'for each port not used or attempted;' and the contemplation of the parties manifestly is, that the premium should be paid during the round voyage upon the full sum insured, and that the assured should have the full benefit of the insurance, so long as he had 10,000 dollars on board. The intermediate landing of a portion of the cargo in the course of the voyage was wholly immaterial in the understanding of the parties, so long as the value on board was sufficient to cover the insurance. If the clause, usual in policies in the eastern States, as to priority of insurance, had been here incorporated, and there had been a subsequent insurance, this, as the prior policy, must have first attached to the extent of the sum insured during the whole voyage. If there had been a subsequent insurance without any such clause, it might form a case for contribution among the various underwriters; but would in no shape affect the rights of the assured. The loss, therefore, must be apportioned between the parties in the proportion which the sum insured bears to the amount of value on board at the time of the loss, that is, as 10,000 dollars bears to 12,328 35/100 dollars.
The next question is, whether the freight for the outward voyage is to be deducted from the salvage, and allowed the assured, who was owner of the ship as well as the cargo. The amount reported by the auditor is not disputed, and the controversy is, whether it is a charge upon the salvage in the hands of the underwriters. In point of fact, no freight was or could be payable in this case, for the plain reason, that the assured was owner of the ship, and there could, therefore, be no lien upon the cargo or its proceeds for the same. But in point of law the case is not supposed to be varied by this circumstance; for if the freight would be a proper charge on the salvage, if a third person were owner of the ship, in the hands of the assured, there is no reason why it should not be allowed when the assured is owner. We consider the law on this point as conclusively settled. As between the owner of the ship and the owner of the cargo, the former has a lien upon the cargo for all the freight which becomes due and payable to him, whether it be a full or pro rata freight. But freight is a charge upon the cargo, against which the underwriters do not, in any event, whether of abandonment with salvage, or of partial loss, undertake to indemnify the owner of the cargo. In order to obtain the salvage, when in the hands of the ship owner, it may become necessary for the underwriters to pay the amount of the freight, for which they have a lien, as it may to pay any other charge created by the act of the owner of the cargo. But this does not change the nature or extent of the responsibility of the underwriters. As between themselves and the assured, they have a right to deduct the amount so paid from the loss, or to recover it in any other manner, as money paid for the use of the latter. This doctrine was expressly held by the Court of King's Bench, in Baillie v. Modigliani, (Marshall. Ins. 728.) and was confirmed in the fullest manner in this Court, in Caze & Richaud v. the Baltimore Insurance Company, (7 Cranch, 358.)
It only remains to notice an objection made to the form of the declaration. It is said, that there is no averment in the declaration, that any preliminary proofs of loss were offered to the Company, nor of any promise to pay in sixty days after such proofs, according to the terms of the policy, nor that any abandonment, or notice, was given to the underwriters. It was, in our judgment, wholly unnecessary to ave the latte facts. The abandonment and notice thereof are but matters of evidence to establish the fact of a total loss, which is expressly averred in the declaration. As to the other part of the objection, it proceeds upon a mistake of the terms of the declaration. There is an express averment, after the allegation of the loss, that the Company, on, &c. at, &c. and notice thereof, and by means thereof became liable, &c. and in consideration thereof promised, that they would pay the plaintiff the sum due, ...