Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Elmore County. Hon. Michael E. Wetherell, District Judge.
The opinion of the court was delivered by: Gutierrez, Judge
Orders relinquishing jurisdiction, affirmed.
In these consolidated cases, Justin W. Goodgion appeals from orders relinquishing jurisdiction, arguing that the district court abused its discretion in refusing to grant probation following periods of retained jurisdiction. We affirm.
In the first of two cases, Goodgion was charged with rape, but pled guilty to one count of aggravated battery, Idaho Code §§ 18-907(a), 18-903. Following his plea, Goodgion was sentenced to a unified term of fifteen years, with a minimum period of confinement of five years. The district court retained jurisdiction for 180 days, and Goodgion was sent to begin the rider program.
While Goodgion was in the rider program, he was charged in a second case with two additional counts of statutory rape. I.C. § 18-6101(1). Goodgion pled guilty to one count, and the remaining count was dismissed. The district court sentenced Goodgion to a unified term of twenty-five years, with a minimum period of confinement of ten years, to run concurrent with his aggravated battery sentence. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the district court retained jurisdiction in his second case and, after a brief period of probation, ordered that Goodgion serve an additional rider in his first case.
After Goodgion completed his concurrent riders, the jurisdictional review committee recommended relinquishment largely because Goodgion failed a disclosure polygraph while on the rider. The district court relinquished jurisdiction in both cases. However, the district court reduced Goodgion's sentence for statutory rape to a unified term of twenty-five years, with a minimum period of confinement of six years.
Goodgion appeals from the district court's orders relinquishing jurisdiction. On appeal, Goodgion asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it relinquished jurisdiction over him instead of placing him on probation. The state counters that because the district court did not enter an affirmative order extending its jurisdiction beyond 180 days within the 180 days of retaining jurisdiction, the district court's jurisdiction over Goodgion lapsed by operation of law on the 180th day, and everything the district court did thereafter was void.
We begin by addressing the jurisdictional issue. On Monday, July 7, 2008, the district court granted Goodgion 180-day riders in both of his cases. On Monday, January 5, 2009, the district court held a review hearing. This was 182 days after Goodgion had been placed on his rider. However, the district court could not hold a review hearing on the 180th day, January 3, 2009, because it fell on a Saturday. At the review hearing, defense counsel requested that the district court extend its jurisdiction for an additional thirty days because the defense was in discussions with the prosecutor to allow Goodgion to take another polygraph in which he would be given use immunity against prosecution for anything disclosed in the polygraph. The prosecutor made no objection to this request for a thirty-day extension of the court's jurisdiction. The district court granted the request. On February 2, 2009, twenty-eight days after the district court entered its order extending its jurisdiction, and a total of 210 days after Goodgion had been placed on his concurrent riders, the district court resumed the review hearing and relinquished jurisdiction over Goodgion.
The state asserts that the district court was without jurisdiction when it ultimately decided to relinquish jurisdiction over Goodgion because the court did not take action within the initial 180-day statutorily authorized review period to extend jurisdiction. The statute authorizing a thirty-day extension of retained jurisdiction provides in relevant part:
In extraordinary circumstances, where the court concludes that it is unable to obtain and evaluate the relevant information within the one hundred eighty (180) day period of retained jurisdiction, or where the court concludes that a hearing is required and is unable to obtain the defendant's presence for such a hearing within such period, the court may decide whether to place the defendant on probation or release jurisdiction within a reasonable time, not to exceed thirty (30) days, after the one hundred eighty (180) day period of retained jurisdiction has expired. Idaho Code § 19-2601(4) (emphasis added).
The critical question raised by the state's argument is what is the effect of the 180th day falling on a Saturday. Interestingly, I.C. § 73-109 provides: "The time in which any act provided by law is to be done is computed by excluding the first day, and including the last unless the last is a holiday and then it is also excluded." The definition of holiday, for purposes of time computation, explicitly includes Sundays, but does not mention Saturdays. See I.C. § 73-108. Therefore, Idaho statutes are ...