MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
Now pending before the Court is Bruce White's Petition for Review (Docket No. 1), seeking review of the Social Security Administration's final decision to deny his application for disability insurance benefits. The action is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Having carefully reviewed the record and otherwise being fully advised, the Court enters the following Memorandum Decision and Order:
I. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS
On June 30, 2006, Bruce White ("Petitioner") applied for Disability Insurance Benefits (AR 96-101). Petitioner's claim was initially denied on September 28, 2006 and, again, on reconsideration on December 29, 2006. (AR 56-58). On January 5, 2007, Petitioner timely filed a Request for Hearing before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"). (AR 72). On November 17, 2008, ALJ R.S. Chester held a hearing in Clarkston, Washington, at which time Petitioner, represented by attorney Clifford K. B'Hymer, appeared and testified. (AR 8). A vocational expert, Tom L. Moreland, also appeared and testified during the same November 17, 2008 hearing. (AR 46-55).
On December 19, 2008, the ALJ denied Petitioner's claims, finding that Petitioner was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. (AR 8-20). Petitioner timely requested review from the Appeals Council on January 15, 2009 (AR 90-95). On June 10, 2009, the Appeals Council denied Petitioner's request for review (AR 1-3), making the ALJ's decision the final decision on the Commissioner of Social Security.
Having exhausted his administrative remedies, Petitioner timely files the instant action, arguing that "the medical evidence... fully supports his disability claim." See Pet.'s Brief in Supp. of Pet. for Review, p. 9 (Docket No. 12). Although not altogether clear, Petitioner appears to assert that the ALJ (1) failed to analyze properly whether Petitioner's condition met or equaled Listing 1.04; (2) committed legal error by not scheduling a medical expert at Petitioner's hearing; and (3) erred in rejecting Petitioner's testimony. See id. Petitioner requests that the Court reverse the ALJ's decision and order the immediate payment of benefits or, alternatively, remand the case for further proceedings. See id.; but see infra at p. 8, n. 3.
To be upheld, the Commissioner's decision must be supported by substantial evidence and based on proper legal standards. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Matney ex. rel. Matney v. Sullivan, 981 F.2d 1016, 1019 (9th Cir. 1992); Gonzalez v. Sullivan, 914 F.2d 1197, 1200 (9th Cir. 1990). Findings as to any question of fact, if supported by substantial evidence, are conclusive. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). That is, if there is substantial evidence to support the ALJ's factual decisions, they must be upheld, even when there is conflicting evidence. Hall v. Sec'y of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 602 F.2d 1372, 1374 (9th Cir. 1979).
"Substantial evidence" is defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Tylitzki v. Shalala, 999 F.2d 1411, 1413 (9th Cir. 1993); Flatten v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 44 F.3d 1453, 1457 (9th Cir. 1995). The standard requires more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance of evidence (see Sorenson v. Weinberger, 514 F.2d 1112, 1119 n. 10 (9th Cir. 1975); Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 1989)), and "does not mean a large or considerable amount of evidence." Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988).
With respect to questions of fact, the role of the Court is to review the record as a whole to determine whether it contains evidence that would allow a reasonable mind to accept the conclusions of the ALJ. See Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401; see also Matney, 981 F.2d at 1019. The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility and resolving conflicts in medical testimony, Allen v. Heckler, 749 F.2d 577, 579 (9th Cir. 1984), resolving ambiguities, see Vincent ex. rel. Vincent v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1393, 1394-95 (9th Cir. 1984), and drawing inferences logically flowing from the evidence, Sample v. Schweiker, 694 F.2d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 1982). Where the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation in a disability proceeding, the reviewing court may not substitute its judgment or interpretation of the record for that of the ALJ. Flatten, 44 F.3d at 1457; Key v. Heckler, 754 F.2d 1545, 1549 (9th Cir. 1985).
With respect to questions of law, the ALJ's decision must be based on proper legal standards and will be reversed for legal error. Matney, 981 F.2d at 1019. The ALJ's construction of the Social Security Act is entitled to deference if it has a reasonable basis in law.
See id. However, reviewing federal courts "will not rubber-stamp an administrative decision that is inconsistent with the statutory mandate or that frustrates the congressional purpose underlying the statute." Smith v. Heckler, 820 F.2d 1093, 1094 (9th Cir. 1987).
In evaluating the evidence presented at an administrative hearing, the ALJ must follow a sequential process in determining whether a person is disabled in general (see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920) - or continues to be disabled (see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1594, 416.994) - within the meaning of the Social Security Act.
The first step requires the ALJ to determine whether the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity ("SGA"). 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(I), 416.920(a)(4)(I). SGA is defined as work activity that is both substantial and gainful. "Substantial work activity" is work activity that involves doing significant physical or mental activities. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1572(a), 416.972(a). "Gainful work activity" is work that is usually done for pay or profit, whether or not a profit is realized. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1572(b), 416.972(b). If the claimant has engaged in SGA, disability benefits are denied, regardless of how severe his physical/mental impairments are and regardless of his age, education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b), 416.920(b). If the claimant is not engaged in SGA, the analysis proceeds to the second step. Here, the ALJ found that Petitioner "did not engage in substantial gainful activity during the period from his alleged onset date of April 3, 2004 though his date last insured of March 31, 2007." (AR 10).
The second step requires the ALJ to determine whether the claimant has a medically determinable impairment, or combination of impairments, that is severe and meets the duration requirement. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). An impairment or combination of impairments is "severe" within the meaning of the Social Security Act if it significantly limits an individual's ability to perform basic work activities. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). An impairment or combination of impairments is "not severe" when medical and other evidence establish only a slight abnormality or a combination of slight abnormalities that would have no more than a minimal effect on an individual's ability to work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1521, 416.921. If the claimant does not have a severe medically determinable impairment or combination of impairments, disability benefits are denied. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). Here, the ALJ found that Petitioner had the following severe impairment - "degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine, status-post two surgeries including fusion." (AR 10-13).
The third step requires the ALJ to determine the medical severity of any impairments; that is, whether the claimant's impairments meet or equal a listed impairment under 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(a)(4)(iii). If the answer is yes, the claimant is considered disabled under the Social Security Act and benefits are awarded. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d). If the claimant's impairments neither meet nor equal one of the listed impairments, the claimant's case cannot be resolved at step three and the evaluation proceeds to step four. Id. Here, the ALJ concluded that Petitioner does not have an impairment (or combination of impairments) that meets or medically equals a listed impairment (AR 13-14).
The fourth step of the evaluation process requires the ALJ to determine whether the claimant's residual functional capacity is sufficient for the claimant to perform past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(a)(4)(iv). An individual's residual functional capacity is his ability to do physical and mental work activities on a sustained basis despite limitations from his impairments. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545, 416.945. Likewise, an individual's past relevant work is work performed within the last 15 years or 15 years prior to the date that disability must be established; also, the work must have lasted long enough for the claimant to learn to do the job and be engaged in substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1560(b), 404.1565, 416.960(b), 416.965. Here, the ALJ determined that Petitioner has the residual functional capacity to perform light work with the following limitations: (1) Petitioner would need to alternate sitting and standing every 1.5 hours; (2) Petitioner could occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, crawl, and climb stairs and ramps; (3) Petitioner would need to avoid concentrated exposure to vibration; (4) Petitioner would need to avoid hazards such as machinery and heights; and (5) Petitioner would need to avoid climbing ladders, ropes, and scaffolding. (AR 14-18). In doing so, the ALJ further found that Petitioner was capable of performing past relevant work as a sales person because "[t]his work does not require the performance of work-related activities precluded by the claimant's residual functional capacity." (AR 18).
In the fifth and final step, if it has been established that a claimant can no longer perform past relevant work because of his/her impairments, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show that the claimant retains the ability to do alternate work and to demonstrate that such alternate work exists in significant numbers in the national economy. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v), 404.1520(f), 416.920(f); see also Matthews v. Shalala, 10 F.3d 678, 681 (9th Cir. 1993). If the claimant is able to do other work, he/she is not disabled; if the claimant is not able to do other work and meets the duration requirement, he/she is disabled.
Here, as discussed above, the ALJ determined that Petitioner could perform past relevant work as a sales person. Additionally, the ALJ also identified the following occupations, available in significant numbers in the national economy, that Petitioner is able to perform: (1) Cashier II; (2) Ticket Seller; and (3) Electronic Assembly. (AR 19).
Preliminarily, the scope of Petitioner's objections is not obvious. After spending the first eight pages of his 11-page brief outlining the procedural background, the law to be applied, and the alleged facts, Petitioner devotes one page to the "issues raised." See Pet.'s Brief in Supp. of Pet. for Review, pp. 8-9 (Docket No. 12). While these highlighted "issues" could be interpreted as a simultaneous challenge to the ALJ's decision (and, thus, argument), there are no references to the administrative record ...