Appeal from the Industrial Commission of the State of Idaho.
The opinion of the court was delivered by: Horton, Justice
The matter is remanded for further proceedings.
This appeal arises from an order from the Idaho Industrial Commission (Commission). Appellant Svitlana Y. Simpson (Simpson) appeals the Commission's denial of her claim for unemployment insurance benefits after the termination of her employment with Trinity Mission Health & Rehab of Midland, L.P. (Trinity). Simpson alleges she was unjustly denied unemployment insurance benefits because the Commission's eligibility determination was based on inadequate and false statements. Simpson further alleges the Commission erred when it did not conduct a new hearing to allow her to submit evidence in support of her claim. We remand this matter to the Commission to determine whether the interests of justice require that Simpson be permitted to present additional evidence. Because we remand on those grounds, we do not decide whether the Commission's determination was supported by substantial and competent evidence.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Simpson worked as a certified nursing assistant for Trinity from October 4, 2006, until October 2, 2008. During Simpson's final week of employment with Trinity, an inspector observed her handle her cell phone while operating a lift. This violation of company policy was reported to Simpson's administrator, Mark Cenis (Cenis). Cenis called Simpson into work on her first of two consecutive scheduled days off, October 1st. During the impromptu meeting, Simpson signed a cell phone policy and agreed to attend a safety training on her second day off, October 2nd. However she did not attend the training, and did not return to work on October 3rd as scheduled. Simpson's employment was terminated, and she filed a claim for unemployment insurance benefits, which the Idaho Department of Labor (IDL) granted on October 20, 2008.
Trinity subsequently appealed the eligibility determination, and the IDL scheduled a December 3, 2008, telephone hearing before an appeals examiner to resolve the matter. On November 25, 2008, the IDL mailed notice of the hearing to the parties at their last known addresses. Simpson did not appear at the hearing before the appeals examiner, and no evidence was submitted on her behalf. At the hearing, Cenis testified that Simpson violated Trinity's cell phone policy, the missed training session was mandatory, and Simpson did not return for regularly-scheduled work. Cenis testified that because Simpson didn't appear at the training session, she was a "no call, no show," and the record included a document demonstrating the Trinity nursing staff had a "no call, no show, no job" policy. Cenis was not certain whether Simpson had any further contact with Trinity after the missed training. Based on the record before it, the appeals examiner concluded that the training session was a mandatory prerequisite to Simpson's return to her regular work schedule, that she did not attend the training session, and that following the training there was no contact between Trinity and Simpson. The appeals examiner thus held that Simpson voluntarily terminated her employment without good cause in connection to employment, and was therefore not eligible for unemployment benefits. Its decision was mailed to the parties on that day.
By way of a letter faxed on December 15, 2008, Simpson timely appealed the appeals examiner's decision, asserting she was fired. In a December 31, 2008 letter, she explained that she failed to participate in the hearing before the appeals examiner because she did not receive notice of the hearing. She had changed residences on November 21st, and had placed a forwarding request in her mailbox. However, the postal service did not receive the request because her landlord sealed her mailbox. Once she discovered the mailbox was sealed, Simpson provided the postal service with a change of address form. She began receiving mail on December 10th. Simpson also provided her version of the termination, stating that she was not aware that the training session was mandatory, but that she did agree to attend it on her day off. She explained that she forgot to attend the October 2nd session, but that she apologized and tried to reschedule the training when a Trinity employee called her that afternoon. However, Simpson alleged the call was transferred to her supervisor, who stated the session had been mandatory and that she was fired because she failed to attend it.
On January 23, 2009, the Commission issued a decision and order
affirming the appeals examiner's determination that Simpson
voluntarily quit her job without good cause. The Commission held that
although she did not actually receive advance notice of the hearing,
Simpson was afforded sufficient due process because the non-receipt
resulted from Simpson's failure to fulfill her continuing obligation
to update her mailing address. The Commission noted that although
Simpson explained her failure to appear, "she does not specifically
ask for a new hearing. Therefore, we conclude that no additional
hearing is necessary to further the interests of justice in this
matter." On February 5, 2009, Simpson moved for reconsideration,
contesting the Commission's findings and conclusions.*fn1
On February 6, 2009, Simpson filed a notice of appeal to this
Court. On March 3, 2009, Simpson filed an amended notice of appeal.
On appeal, Simpson argues the Commission should have ordered a new hearing to allow her to present additional evidence, and that the Commission's determination that she was ineligible for unemployment benefits was not supported by substantial competent evidence.
Whether the interests of justice require the admission of additional evidence is a matter left to the discretion of the Industrial Commission. Slaven v. Road to Recovery, 143 Idaho 483, 484, 148 P.3d 1229, 1230 (2006). This Court will affirm the Commission's determinations unless there is an abuse of that discretion. Uhl v. Ballard Med. Prods., Inc., 138 Idaho 653, 657, 67 P.3d 1265, 1269 (2003). The test is "(1) whether the Commission correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion, (2) whether it acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it, ...