The opinion of the court was delivered by: B. Lynn Winmill Chief Judge United States District Court
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
Before the Court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 5), and Defendant's unopposed Motion to Take Judicial Notice (Dkt. 6). The Court has determined that oral argument would not significantly assist the decisional process, therefore the matters will be considered on the record and pleadings, without a hearing. Having thoroughly reviewed the record and parties' pleadings, the Court will grant the Motions (Dkts. 5, 6) and dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint (Dkt. 1) with leave to amend, as more fully expressed below.
According to the Complaint (Dkt. 1), Plaintiffs Jalene and Tom Gilbert financed the purchase of real property at 11772 Purple Sage Road in Middleton, Idaho, 83644, on September 21, 2007, with a loan from Capital One Home Loans. Compl., at ¶¶ 1, 9-11. The loan was memorialized in a promissory note (Ex. A to Dina Aff., Dkt. 6-1), and secured by a Deed of Trust (Ex. B to Dina Aff., Dkt. 6-2). The Deed names Capital One as lender, Lawyers Title Realty Service as trustee, and MERS as the nominee of the beneficiary. Id. According to Plaintiffs, Capital One was acquired by Countrywide Home Loans, which was in turn acquired by Bank of America. Compl. at 9.
Plaintiffs acknowledge they defaulted on their mortgage payments, triggering the issuance of a Notice of Default on December 24, 2010, which indicated that as of December 28, 2010, they were $14,497.56 in arrears. Ex. A to Compl., Dkt. 1-1. Upon Plaintiffs' default, the beneficial interests in the Note and Deed were assigned to BAC Home Loan Servicing, and ReconTrust was appointed successor trustee. Exs. B & C to Compl., Dkts. 1-2, 1-3.
On June 10, 2011, Plaintiffs brought this action to quiet title to the property, to require Defendants to produce the Note, to determine Defendants' interest in the property, and for attorney fees and costs. Defendants now move to dismiss.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," in order to "give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964 (2007). While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss "does not need detailed factual allegations," it must set forth "more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Id. at 555. To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id. at 570. A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Id. at 556. The plausibility standard is not akin to a "probability requirement," but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Id. Where a complaint pleads facts that are "merely consistent with" a defendant's liability, it "stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of 'entitlement to relief.' " Id. at 557.
In a more recent case, the Supreme Court identified two "working principles" that underlie Twombly. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). First, the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Id. "Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure from the hyper-technical, code-pleading regime of a prior era, but it does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions." Id. at 1950. Second, only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss. Id. "Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id.
A dismissal without leave to amend is improper unless it is beyond doubt that the complaint "could not be saved by any amendment." Harris v. Amgen, Inc., 573 F.3d 728, 737 (9th Cir. 2009) (issued 2 months after Iqbal).*fn1 The Ninth Circuit has held that "in dismissals for failure to state a claim, a district court should grant leave to amend even if no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts." Cook, Perkiss and Liehe, Inc. v. Northern California Collection Service, Inc., 911 F.2d 242, 247 (9th Cir. 1990). The issue is not whether plaintiff will prevail but whether he "is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims." Diaz v. Int'l Longshore and Warehouse Union, Local 13, 474 F.3d 1202, 1205 (9th Cir. 2007)(citations omitted).
1. Motion To Take Judicial Notice
Under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court may consider matters that are subject to judicial notice. Mullis v. United States Bank, 828 F.2d 1385, 1388 (9th Cir. 1987). The Court may take judicial notice "of the records of state agencies and other undisputed matters of public record" without transforming the motions to dismiss into motions for summary judgment. Disabled Rights Action Comm. v. Las Vegas Events, Inc., 375 F.3d 861, 866 (9th Cir. 2004). Defendants move the Court to take judicial notice of certain documents recorded in public records of Canyon County, and relied upon by Plaintiffs in their Complaint. Motion, Dkt. 6. ...