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United States of America v. John Ernest Dade

December 16, 2011

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
v.
JOHN ERNEST DADE, DEFENDANT-MOVANT.



The opinion of the court was delivered by: Honorable B. Lynn Winmill Chief U. S. District Judge

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER

INTRODUCTION

Pending before the Court is John Ernest Dade's ("Dade") Amended Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 ("Amended § 2255 Motion") (Dkt. 29) and the Government's Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 45). Having reviewed the motions and the underlying record in the criminal and civil cases, the Court enters the following Order granting summary judgment in the Government's favor and dismissing the Amended § 2255 Motion.

BACKGROUND AND SUMMARY OF ISSUES

On September 16, 2002, Dade was convicted by a jury of Counts One, Two, Three, Four, and Six of the eight-count Second Superseding Indictment (Dkt. 43). More specifically, he was convicted of making threatening interstate communications, interstate stalking, interstate domestic violence on February 18, 2001, use of a firearm in relation to a violent crime, and interstate domestic violence on October 20, 2000. On October 23, 2003, the Court imposed a sentence of 336 months. Judgment, Dkt. 260 in criminal case. The Ninth Circuit affirmed his conviction, noting the "overwhelming" evidence of guilt. However, it vacated his sentence and remanded for resentencing in light of United States v. Ameline, 409 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 2005), given that the formerly mandatory sentencing guidelines had been effectively rendered advisory by United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). United States v. Dade, 136 Fed. Appx. 973 (9th Cir. 2005).

On August 31, 2006, despite being freed from the constraints of the formerly mandatory guidelines, the Court again imposed a 336-month sentence finding that it was the shortest sentence that would ensure that the victim and other women with whom Dade might become involved would be protected. Resent. Tr. at 92, Dkt. 387-2 at 12 in criminal case; Judgment, Dkt. 361 in criminal case. Dade then appealed his sentence and the Court's denial of his pro se Motion for New Trial (Dkt. 359 in criminal case).

On April 22, 2008, the Ninth Circuit affirmed both Dade's sentence and the denial of his new trial motion. United States v. Dade, 275 Fed. Appx. 600 (9th Cir. 2008). In affirming the denial of the new trial motion, the court stated, "Nothing in Dade's motion for a new trial . . . leads us to revisit our earlier conclusion that 'the evidence of guilt was overwhelming in this case.'" Id. at 601 (citing United States v. Dade ("Dade I"), 136 Fed. Appx. 973, 974 (9th Cir. 2005)).

Throughout the criminal case, Dade was represented by a succession of experienced counsel. Except for brief periods of self-representation, he was represented by Scott Hansen for approximately one month following his arraignment, by Steven Richert for the remaining pre-trial period through trial, by retained counsel David Finlayson for sentencing and his first appeal, by Kelly Kumm for resentencing, and by Greg Silvey for his second appeal. Nonetheless, Dade filed hundreds of letters and pro se motions both in this Court and at the Ninth Circuit claiming innocence, prosecutorial misconduct, and various instances of ineffective assistance of counsel. He also appealed virtually every order or decision of this Court and filed petitions for writs of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court following the Ninth Circuit's dismissal of his various appeals. These pro se filings continued well after the Ninth Circuit affirmed his sentence on resentencing.

Despite the Court's repeated instructions to file a short and concise § 2255 motion without argument, Dade filed a lengthy § 2255 motion including a substantial number of repetitive arguments and conclusory allegations raising more than sixty issues and sub-issues. Among these issues was a request for the appointment of counsel. The Court considered Dade's request for appointment of counsel (in which the Government joined) against the obvious resulting benefits to the Court given Dade's history of dissatisfaction with and disdain of appointed counsel.

Because of the sheer number of issues Dade raised, the Court determined that having counsel would benefit both Dade and the Court. The Court reasoned that counsel could evaluate the plausibility of Dade's various claims, narrow the issues, and present those issues in an orderly fashion. Therefore, the Court appointed counsel, Leo Griffard, and directed counsel to file an amended § 2255 motion setting forth any potentially meritorious claims. Order, Dkt. 11.

On May 16, 2010, counsel filed the pending Amended § 2255 Motion consisting of ineffective assistance of counsel claims alleging failure to investigate Dade's alibi defense, failure to communicate proposed plea offers, and failure to investigate audiotape evidence; denial of the right to self-representation; and ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failure to raise his Faretta claim. Counsel also incorporated by reference Dade's original pro se § 2255 Motion (Dkt. 1) and Dade's Declaration (Dkt. 1-2), and he filed a motion for discovery (Dkt. 32). The Government responded (Dkt. 38) seeking denial of counsel's motion for discovery and dismissal of all claims based on the existing record.

The Court subsequently granted in part counsel's motion for discovery. Order, Dkt. 40. The Court found it moot as to production of documents given the Government's standing offer of its entire file, but granted leave to depose attorney Steve Richert regarding the ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Following Richert's deposition, the Government filed the pending summary judgment motion on the ineffective assistance of counsel issues. Dade's counsel has not filed a reply to the Government's response to the Amended § 2255 Motion or a response to the summary judgment motion. Because Dade is represented by counsel in this proceeding, the Court will not consider any pro se filings received after counsel was appointed in reaching its determination on Dade's claims. The Court advised Dade on several occasions that it would not accept or consider pro se submissions after counsel was appointed. See, e,g., Orders, (Dkts. 6 and 44)

LEGAL STANDARD

1. § 2255 Standard

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2255 provides four grounds under which a federal court may grant relief to a federal prisoner who challenges the imposition or length of his or her incarceration: (1) "that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States;" (2) "that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence;" (3) "that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law;" and (4) that the sentence is otherwise "subject to collateral attack." 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). Rule 4(b) of the Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings provides that a federal district court judge must dismiss a § 2255 motion "[i]f it plainly appears from the motion, any attached exhibits, and the record of prior proceedings that the moving party is not entitled to relief."

If the Court does not dismiss pursuant to Rule 4(b), the Court shall order the Government "to file an answer, motion, or other response within a fixed time, or to take other action the judge may order."

The Court may dismiss a § 2255 motion at other stages of the proceeding such as pursuant to a motion by respondent, after consideration of the answer and motion, or after consideration of the pleadings and an expanded record. See Advisory Committee Notes following Rule 8 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Proceedings incorporated by reference into the Advisory Committee Notes following Rule 8 of the Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings.

If the Court does not dismiss the proceeding, the Court then proceeds to a determination under Rule 8 of whether an evidentiary hearing is required. The Court need not hold an evidentiary hearing if the issues can be conclusively decided on the basis of the evidence in the record. See Frazer v. United States, 18 F.3d 778, 781 (9th Cir. 1994).

2. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is proper if "the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

One of the principal purposes of the summary judgment "is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims . . . ." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986). It is "not a disfavored procedural shortcut," but is instead the "principal tool[ ] by which factually insufficient claims or defenses [can] be isolated and prevented from going to trial with the attendant unwarranted consumption of public and private resources." Id. at 327. "[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). In deciding a summary judgment motion, the court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, id. at 255, and the Court must not make credibility findings. Id.

The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1076 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc). To carry this burden, the moving party need not introduce any affirmative evidence (such as affidavits or deposition excerpts) but may simply point out the absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. Fairbank v. Wunderman Cato Johnson, 212 F.3d 528, 532 (9th Cir. 2000).

This shifts the burden to the non-moving party to produce evidence sufficient to support a jury verdict in his or her favor. Id. at 256-57. The non-moving party must go beyond the pleadings and show "by [his] affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, or admissions on file" that a genuine issue of material fact exists. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324.

However, the Court is "not required to comb through the record to find some reason to deny a motion for summary judgment." Carmen v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1029 (9th Cir.2001) (quoting Forsberg v. Pac. Northwest Bell Tel. Co., 840 F.2d 1409, 1418 (9th Cir. 1988)). Instead, the "party opposing summary judgment must direct [the Court's] attention to specific triable facts." Southern California Gas Co. v. City of Santa Ana, 336 F.3d 885, 889 (9th Cir. 2003).

ANALYSIS

The Government's summary judgment motion is based on the record, the deposition of Steve Richert, and the four exhibits admitted at the deposition: correspondence between Richert and AUSA Jim Peters regarding plea negotiations (Exhibit 1 (Dkt. 45-2, pp. 35-37)); a proposed plea agreement pursuant to which Dade would have pleaded guilty to Counts Two and Three of the Second Superseding Indictment alleging interstate stalking and interstate domestic violence (Exhibit 2 (Dkt.45-2, pp. 38-46)); a copy of the affidavit submitted in support of a search warrant containing Dade's comments and notations regarding the facts alleged in the affidavit (Exhibit 3 (Dkt. 45-2, pp. 47-70)); and Richert's billing records pertaining to his representation of Dade (Exhibit 4 (Dkt. 45-2, pp. 71-88)).

The Government's summary judgment motion is addressed to the three ineffective assistance of counsel claims in Dade's Amended § 2255 Motion. The Government relies on its Response in requesting dismissal of the remaining two claims without an evidentiary hearing.

Rule 7 of the Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings allows for depositions and provides an opportunity for the party against whom they are offered to admit or deny their correctness. As stated above, Dade has not responded to the summary judgment motion. Although the Amended § 2255 Motion was based on Dade's pro se Declaration (Dkt. 1-2) filed with his pro se § 2255 Motion, the Declaration contained primarily conclusory allegations and was obviously made before Richert's deposition was taken. Dade has not responded directly to Richert's deposition testimony.

1. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims

The well-established two-prong test for evaluating ineffective assistance of counsel claims is deficient performance and resulting prejudice. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 (1984). Mere conclusory allegations are insufficient to state a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. See Shah v. United States, 878 F.2d 1156, 1161 (9th Cir. 1989).

In order to establish deficient performance, a defendant must show that counsel's performance "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. Under the performance prong, there is a strong presumption that counsel's performance falls "within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance." Id. at 689. This is so because for the defendant, "[i]t is all too tempting . . . to second-guess counsel's assistance after conviction or adverse sentence. . . ." Id. For the court, "it is all too easy to conclude that a particular act or omission of counsel was unreasonable in the harsh light of hindsight." Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 702 (2002) (discussing Strickland).

In order to establish prejudice, a defendant must affirmatively prove by a reasonable degree of probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. The Strickland standard is "highly demanding." Kimmelman v. Morrision, 477 U.S. 365, 381-82; 386 (noting that the court should "assess counsel's overall performance throughout the case" when evaluating whether his assistance was reasonable).

Both prongs of the Strickland test must be met "before it can be said that a conviction (or sentence) 'resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that render[ed] the result [of the proceeding] unreliable' and thus in violation of the Sixth Amendment." United States v. Thomas, 417 F.3d 1053, 1056 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687).

A. Failure to Investigate Alibi Defense

Dade contends that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel because his appointed trial counsel, Scott Hansen and Steven Richert, failed to investigate his alibi defense concerning the night of October 20-21, 2000, which formed the basis of his conviction on one of the interstate domestic violence charges (Count 6). He contends that counsel failed to interview witnesses Brett and Mary Henderson, Tia McCleary, Wanda Hackman, and Charlie Saunders whom he claims would have all testified that he was not in Idaho on that evening.*fn1

The Court previously determined that Hansen's short and limited involvement in the case was not a sufficient basis for any ineffective assistance of counsel claims. See Order at 8, Dkt. 40 (noting that Hansen only represented Dade from January 14, 2002 to February 15, 2002). Even if Hansen's performance had been deficient during that time period, any prejudice from that performance would have been negligible and undoubtedly cured by Richert's involvement in the case.

As more fully set forth in the Government's summary judgment motion, Dade essentially admitted that he was with the victim in Idaho Falls on the night of October 20-21, 2000. In March of 2002, in preparation for filing a motion to suppress, Richert had sent Dade a copy of the affidavit on which the warrant for a search of his home had been based. Richert Dep. Tr. at 13-14; 24-25. Dade made handwritten comments on his copy of the affidavit noting several "corrections" to the agent's statements; his ability to offer "corrections" ...


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