The opinion of the court was delivered by: B. Lynn Winmill Chief Judge United States District Court
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
The Court has before it Defendant Clement's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' complaint in its entirety, with prejudice. The Court has read and fully considered the briefing and related materials submitted by the parties, and now issues the following Memorandum Decision and Order granting Clement's motion, but with leave for Plaintiffs to file an amended complaint within thirty days.
Plaintiffs belong to a class of private businesses which, under Idaho's implementation of the Medicaid provisions of the Social Security Act, contract with the state to provide "affiliation" services to persons or entities providing residential habilitation to eligible low-income individuals with significant developmental disabilities. 42 U.S.C. § 1396 et seq. "Affiliation" includes provision of "oversight, training, and quality assurance" to such persons or entities. IDAPA 16.03.10.705.01. Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Clement, in connection with her role as Medicaid Division Administrator for the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare (IDHW), unlawfully retaliated against them in response to their previous lawsuit naming Clement as a defendant (Case No. 1:09-cv-00149-BLW) by replacing Plaintiffs with a cheaper contractor. No breach of contract is alleged by either side. Clement insists the change was wholly lawful and not the result of any animus towards Plaintiffs.
The parties agree as to most of the material facts contained in Plaintiffs' Complaint. In early January of 2009, IDHW issued an information release stating that, in response to the State's demand for withholdings from agency budgets, it would change the compensation scheme applicable to affiliation service providers. Compl. at 5, Dkt 1. Responding to the threat of heavy losses to their businesses, Plaintiffs filed suit to enjoin the change, and won a permanent injunction, dated January 22, 2010, on the ground that IDHW failed to consider non-budgetary factors in making its changes, and hence failed to comply with the requirements of the Medicaid Act. Affiliates v. Armstrong, D. Idaho, Case No. 1:09-cv-00149-BLW ("Affiliates I").
Of course, the injunction issued in Affiliates I was not the end of the matter. According to the Complaint, on March 9, 2010, Clement "revealed for the first time" that she and IDHW were considering the implementation of so-called "selective contracts," which would potentially result in the replacement of Plaintiffs as affiliation service providers for the state with a single provider, or with several regional providers. Compl. at 5-6, Dkt. 1. The record is silent as to any details concerning this revelation, such as how and to whom it was delivered, and evidently IDHW did not act upon it until February of 2011, following a 2010 directive of the Idaho Legislature to review and implement selective contracts. At that time, IDHW began to solicit bids from prospective affiliation service providers interested in taking over the affiliation function on a statewide or regional basis. Compl. at 6-7, Dkt. 1; Def. Mot. at 21,Dkt. 4. As a result, on June 6, 2011, IDHW selected Community Partnerships of Idaho, Inc. to provide statewide affiliation services, replacing Plaintiffs in that capacity. Id. There is no indication in the record that any Plaintiff attempted to bid on the contract.
On July 4 and 5, 2011, this Court heard the motions for preliminary injunction against Plaintiffs here as well as non-party plaintiffs in a related case, Knapp v. Armstrong, Case No. 1:11-cv-00307-BLW. The Court granted the injunctions in relevant part because IDHW's contract with Community Partnerships amounted to a compensation rate change, thus raising many of the same concerns as found in Affiliates I, and because it was executed prior to securing a required waiver amendment from CMS (the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services). Affiliates I, Dkt. 69. Accordingly, the Court made the injunction terminable upon a showing by the Defendants that the amendment was approved by CMS. Id. The waiver amendment was granted on October 17, 2011. Def. Mot., Dkt. 4, Withroe Decl. at 2, ¶ 5 & Ex. D. On December 9, 2011, the Court granted the defendant's motion in Affiliates I to vacate the injunction, and on January 19, 2012, the Court dismissed the case in its entirety. Affiliates I, Dkts. 76, 79. Thus, there is not currently any legal bar to the implementation of IDHW's contract with Community Partnerships.*fn1
The present action, a First Amendment retaliation claim brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, attacks Clement's attempt to implement the Community Partnerships contract as an effort to punish Plaintiffs for petitioning the government in Affiliates I, and to discourage or prevent future exercises of that Constitutional right under like circumstances. Clement moves to dismiss the Complaint on grounds of sovereign immunity under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or, in the alternative, under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim for which relief may be granted.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," in order to "give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964 (2007). While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss "does not need detailed factual allegations," it must set forth "more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Id. at 555. To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id. at 570. A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Id. at 556. The plausibility standard is not akin to a "probability requirement," but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Id. Where a complaint pleads facts that are "merely consistent with" a defendant's liability, it "stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of 'entitlement to relief.' " Id. at 557.
In a more recent case, the Supreme Court identified two "working principles" that underlie Twombly. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). First, the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Id. "Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure from the hyper-technical, code-pleading regime of a prior era, but it does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions." Id. at 1950. Second, only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss. Id. "Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id.
A dismissal without leave to amend is improper unless it is beyond doubt that the complaint "could not be saved by any amendment." Harris v. Amgen, Inc., 573 F.3d 728, 737 (9th Cir. 2009)(issued 2 months after Iqbal).*fn2 The Ninth Circuit has held that "in dismissals for failure to state a claim, a district court should grant leave to amend even if no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts." Cook, Perkiss and Liehe, Inc. v. Northern California Collection Service, Inc., 911 F.2d 242, 247 (9th Cir. 1990). The issue is not whether plaintiff will prevail but whether it "is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims." Diaz v. Int'l Longshore and Warehouse Union, Local 13, 474 F.3d 1202, 1205 (9th Cir. 2007)(citations omitted).
Because the Court decides this motion under the pleading standards set forth in Twombly and Iqbal, it need not decide the sovereign immunity issues raised by the Defendant's Rule 12(b)(1) argument, and ...