The opinion of the court was delivered by: Honorable Candy W. Dale Chief United States Magistrate Judge
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER RE: Dkt. 46 Dkt. 61 Dkt. 66 Dkt. 68 Dkt. 70 Dkt. 96
This case arises from an employment dispute between Ronald Warnecke and his former business associate, William Rigby. Warnecke and his wife brought this action against Rigby, Ribgy's daughter Diane Kiehn, and three companies that Warnecke founded and worked at with Rigby -- Nitrocision, LLC ("Nitrocision"), TruTech, L.L.C. ("TruTech"), and Nitrocision Hanford LLC.*fn1 Plaintiffs generally allege that Warnecke was wrongfully forced out of his position with Nitrocision by Rigby at the behest of Kiehn, and that Warnecke is owed payment for personal loans made to the company, reimbursement for expenses incurred on behalf of the company under his employment contract, and payment for vacation time accrued during his time with Nitrocision. Plaintiffs also allege that Defendants wrongfully terminated their health insurance benefits three months after Warnecke's employment ended in violation of the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act.
There are six motions before the Court: (1) Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Dkt. 46); (2) Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike, (Dkt. 61), which asks the Court to strike the affidavit of David Smith, Defendants' forensic accountant; (3) Defendants' Motion in Limine, (Dkt. 66), seeking exclusion of testimony concerning the valuation of any business entity at issue in this litigation; (4) Plaintiffs' Motion in Limine, (Dkt. 68), seeking exclusion of testimony or evidence concerning Warnecke's income after his termination from Nitrocision and seeking the exclusion of Defendants' Counterclaims; (5) Defendant Kiehn's Motion to Amend Answer and Remove Joinder in Counterclaim and Motion in Limine (Dkt. 70); and (6) Defendant Kiehn's Motion in limine Re: Tortious Interference and Value of Plaintiff's Interest in Nitrocision at the Time of Dissociation. (Dkt. 96.)
The parties presented oral argument on the motions on November 1, 2012. During the hearing, the Court ruled from the bench on two of the motions -- denying Defendants' Motion in Limine, (Dkt. 66), and granting Defendant Kiehn's motion for leave to file an amended answer. (Dkt. 70.) The remaining motions were taken under advisement and the Court ordered supplemental briefing on certain issues. The supplemental briefing has been received and reviewed and the Court is prepared to rule on the remaining pending motions.
In 1998, Warnecke started a business called TruTech, a consulting firm specializing in hazardous waste clean-up operations. According to Warnecke, TruTech grew quickly, but could not obtain traditional financing because it was a new business. To meet growing expenses, Warnecke received financing from The Idaho Company, a company owned by Defendant Rigby, which provided loans to startup companies such as TruTech. Within six months, TruTech was able to discontinue its line of credit with The Idaho Company and received a line of credit through the Bank of Idaho (also owned by Rigby) at a lower interest rate.
The above interactions between Warnecke and Rigby led to a business relationship that lasted several years. Warnecke served on the boards of The Idaho Company and Bank of Idaho and Rigby served on the board at Nitrocision and TruTech for many years.
In 2001, Warnecke founded Nitrocision. According to Warnecke, the start-up costs for Nitrocision were obtained from loans made by TruTech. TruTech purchased a license for technology created at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, which culminated in the creation of a technology called NitroJet, a liquid nitrogen-based precision cutting and cleaning technology used for precision cutting, cleaning, removing coatings, and nuclear waste decontamination. With the NitroJet technology, Nitrocision secured contracts with petroleum companies and government entities such as NASA and the military. From December of 2001, when the company was founded, until January of 2009, Warnecke was the managing member and CEO of Nitrocision.
Three years after Nitrocision was founded, Leadwood Capital purchased 50% of the company for $2.5 million. As part of the deal with Leadwood Capital, Warnecke became a full-time employee of Nitrocision and entered into a five year employment contract, which was extended at the conclusion of the five year term.
Rigby became involved with Nitrocision in 2005 in connection with Warnecke's efforts to repurchase Nitrocision from Leadwood Capital. In December of 2005, Warnecke borrowed $2,740,500 from Baxter State Bank ("Baxter") for the purpose of repurchasing Leadwood Capital's interest in Nitrocision. According to Rigby, he personally guaranteed Warnecke's loan from Baxter. Rigby also borrowed $300,000 from Baxter to assist in repurchasing Nitrocision. Ultimately, the funds borrowed by the Warneckes and Rigby were used to purchase Leadwood Capital's interest in Nitrocision for a total of $3,070,317.
Rigby alleges that the Warneckes personally, and Warnecke in his capacity as CEO of Nitrocision, defaulted on the loan to Baxter. Thereafter, the bank made a demand on Rigby based on his personal guaranty. Rigby states that he purchased the note and all rights to the collateral pledged by the Warneckes to avoid default with Baxter.
It is undisputed that, as Nitrocision grew, the company obtained financing from several sources. The nature and amount of these loans, however, is hotly disputed by the parties. Warnecke alleges that he and his wife personally loaned Nitrocision money and they are owed either $1,059,898 or $1,359,898. In contrast, Rigby alleges that Warnecke secured loans for $250,000 and $700,000 from Regional Development Alliance, Inc., and an open line of credit from Ireland Bank for $1.8 million, which was guaranteed by Warnecke and Rigby. Rigby also alleges that Warnecke borrowed money from Rigby himself and his daughter Kiehn, who loaned funds to Nitrocision from her Individual Retirement Account. The loans from Rigby and Kiehn, according to Rigby, were improperly entered into Nitrocision's records as loans from Warnecke to the company.
Rigby also alleges that Warnecke failed to make timely payments on the loans, both as CEO of Nitrocision and individually, and that nearly all of the loans became the responsibility of Rigby under the terms of his personal guarantees.
In an agreement dated December 31, 2008, Warnecke transferred all but 5% of his ownership interest in Nitrocision to Rigby. According to Warnecke, his understanding of the purpose for the transfer was to allow Rigby the opportunity to carry back losses and obtain a tax refund of approximately $800,000. Warnecke also alleges that he and Rigby had an oral agreement that they would ultimately combine The Idaho Company, TruTech, and Nitrocision and be 50/50 owners in the new entity.
According to Warnecke, by the beginning of 2009, his relationship with Rigby began to deteriorate. He alleges that, during a meeting on January 25, 2009, Kiehn accused Warnecke of jeopardizing her family's assets and threatened to kill Warnecke if any money was lost. At the time, Kiehn was not employed by Nitrocision.
In March of 2009, Warnecke resigned his position with Nitrocision at the request of Rigby. Warnecke's version is that he was forced out of the company.
It is undisputed that Nitrocision provided its employees with certain benefits, including health insurance under a plan jointly purchased by Nitrocision, TruTech, and Channel Blend.*fn2 When Warnecke's employment ended he was given the option to continue his participation in the plan pursuant to the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act ("COBRA"). 29 U.S.C. §§ 1161-1169. Nitrocision provided three months of coverage and the coverage was thereafter terminated.
Under the terms of his employment agreement with Nitrocision, it is undisputed that Warnecke was entitled to reimbursement for work related expenses. At the time his employment ended, Warnecke alleges that he was owed reimbursement for $164,801 in unpaid work related expenditures. He also claims that he accrued over 1,300 hours of Paid Time Off ("PTO"), which was not paid to him as it should have been at the time his employment ended.
On June 29, 2010, Warnecke and his wife Susan filed this action against his former companies -- Nitrocision, TruTech, and Nitrocision Hanford -- along with Rigby and his daughter Kiehn. (Dkt. 1.) In their Complaint, the Warneckes assert the following eight causes of action.
First, the Warneckes allege that Nitrocision violated COBRA by terminating health insurance coverage after three months and that they are entitled to damages in the amount of $6,850.80, which represents the difference between the Warneckes' purchase of comparable health insurance on the open market for the time period that they should have been allowed to continue their participation in Nitrocision's plan under COBRA.
Second, Warnecke alleges that he was entitled to reimbursement for business expenditures under the terms of his employment contract, and Nitrocision's failure to pay these expenditures constitute breach of contract.
Third, Warnecke alleges that PTO constitutes wages under Idaho law and that he is entitled to approximately 1,300 hours of PTO wages and treble damages for the failure to pay the PTO.
Fourth, Plaintiffs allege that they were not paid back the various loans made during Mr. Warnecke's tenure with Nitrocision and that Defendants' failure to repay the loans constitutes a breach of the loan agreements.
Fifth, Warnecke alleges that his force-out from his position in Nitrocision constituted a breach of the fiduciary duties owed by the defendants to Warnecke. He claims that this breach caused him damages in an amount to be proven at trial. He also claims that the allegedly wrongful acts of the defendants was done with malice and that he is therefore entitled to seek punitive damages.
Sixth, Warnecke alleges that he had arranged contracts with clients prior to his force-out and that the defendants actions constituted tortious interference with these contracts as well as interference with Warnecke's employment contract with Nitrocision.
Seventh, Warnecke claims that he remains a 50% shareholder in TruTech, that the defendants have asserted dominion over that company, and that such action constitutes conversion warranting the imposition of a constructive trust.
Warnecke's final cause of action alleges that he did not receive the fair value of his shareholder interest in Nitrocision and TruTech within a reasonable time from his dissociation and that he is entitled to a distribution under Idaho law.
1. Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
The Warneckes move the Court for summary judgment on five of the eight claims raised in their Complaint. (Pl.s' Mot. For Partial Summ. J., Dkt. 46.) They also seek summary judgment on Defendants' counterclaims. Each of the claims on which the Warneckes have moved for summary judgment are addressed below.
As a preliminary matter, the Warneckes cite Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) as the basis for their motion and quote the language from that provision. However, Rule 56 was amended in 2010, and that particular provision no longer exists although the substance of the rule remains the same. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, Advisory Committee Notes, 2010 Amendment ("Rule 56 is revised to improve the procedures for presenting and deciding summary-judgment motions and to make the procedures more consistent with those already used in many courts. The standard for granting summary judgment remains unchanged.").
Under the current version of Rule 56, "[a] party may move for summary judgment, identifying each claim or defense -- or the part of each claim or defense -- on which summary judgment is sought [and] [t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The amended rule also provides that, "[i]f the court does not grant all the relief requested by the motion, it may enter an order standing any material fact -- including an item of damages or other relief -- that is not genuinely in dispute and treating the fact as established in the case." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(g).
It is well established that the purpose of summary judgment "is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986). The rule, however, is not a "procedural shortcut," but a "principal tool by which factually insufficient claims or defenses [can] be isolated and prevented from going to trial with the attendant unwarranted consumption of public and private resources." Id. at 327.
The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine dispute as to material fact. Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1076 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc). To carry this burden, the moving party need not introduce any affirmative evidence (such as affidavits or deposition excerpts) but may simply point out the absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. Fairbank v. Wunderman Cato Johnson, 212 F.3d 528, 532 (9th Cir. 2000). However, in evaluating whether the moving party has met this burden, the court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). The court must not make credibility findings, id., and direct testimony of the non-movant must be believed, however implausible. Leslie v. Group ICA, 198 F.3d 1152, 1159 (9th Cir. 1999). On the other hand, the court is not required to adopt unreasonable inferences from circumstantial evidence. McLaughlin v. Liu, 849 F.2d 1205, 1208 (9th Cir. 1988).
If the moving party satisfies its initial burden, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to produce specific evidence to demonstrate the existence of a "genuine issue for trial." Matsushita Elec. Indust. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). "[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment." Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 247-48. There must be a genuine dispute as to any material fact -- a fact "that may affect the outcome of the case." Id. at 248. In determining whether a fact is material, the court is required to determine what facts under the substantive claim are necessary to sustain the cause of action. Id. The burden, however, always remains on the moving party to demonstrate that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, which in turn, requires the moving party provide the court with the legal authorities supporting the party's position.
B. Plaintiffs' COBRA Claim
Under the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act ("COBRA"), employers sponsoring health insurance plans are required to provide employees and their dependents who lose coverage "as a result of a qualifying event" with the option of purchasing the continuation of coverage without regard to insurability. 29 U.S.C. § 1161(a). COBRA mandates that employers provide 18 months of coverage to a former employee upon the separation of the employee from the employer. Id. at § 1162(2). Small businesses, however, are exempted from the above provisions, and the statute states that the above provisions "shall not apply to any group health plan for any calendar year if all employers maintaining such plan normally employed fewer than 20 employees on a typical business day during the preceding calendar year." Id. at § 1161(b).*fn3
The following facts are undisputed concerning this issue: Warnecke's termination from Nitrocision was a "qualifying event" under COBRA; upon Warnecke's termination, Nitrocision offered, and Warnecke accepted, the option of extended coverage under COBRA; the Warneckes' coverage was terminated after three months and the Warneckes obtained health insurance on the open market. It is also undisputed that, although Nitrocision employed less than twenty employees, Nitrocision obtained its insurance policy along with two other companies -- TruTech and Channel Blend -- and that, when the three companies are combined, they exceed the twenty employee requirement.
Based on these undisputed facts, the Warneckes' request that the Court grant summary judgment and find, as a matter of law, that Nitrocision was obligated to provide COBRA coverage to Plaintiffs for 18 months and the failure to do so violated COBRA. The Warneckes also request that the Court award them damages on this issue in the amount of $6,850.80, which represents the difference between the Warneckes' purchase of comparable health insurance on the open market at a cost of ...