Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Hehr v. City of McCall

Supreme Court of Idaho, Boise

July 11, 2013

Richard I HEHR and Greystone Village LLC, Plaintiffs-Appellants-Cross Respondents,
v.
CITY OF McCALL, Defendant-Respondent-Cross Appellant.

Page 537

Borton & Lakey, Boise, for appellants. Victor S. Villegas argued.

Givens Pursley, LLP, Boise, for respondents. Christopher H. Meyer argued.

BURDICK, Chief Justice.

Appellants Richard Hehr and Greystone Villages, LLC (collectively " Greystone" ) appeal from the Valley County district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Respondent City of McCall. Greystone's claims arose out of its development agreement with McCall. Greystone alleges that it deeded nine lots to McCall in lieu of paying the required community housing fee, which was later declared unconstitutional in a separate proceeding. Greystone brought inverse condemnation claims against McCall alleging that the conveyance of the nine lots and the improvements made to those lots constituted an illegal taking under both the Idaho Constitution and the United States Constitution. McCall moved for summary judgment, which the district court granted and Greystone now appeals. We affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment.

Page 538

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Greystone filed applications for a subdivision and planned unit development on January 12, 2005. At that time, McCall had no community housing requirements. Subsequent to Greystone's application, McCall passed Ordinance Nos. 819 and 820, which went into effect on March 9, 2006. Ordinance No. 819 required developers to contribute community housing units upon submitting a subdivision request, while Ordinance No. 820 required developers to pay a community housing fee upon issuance of a building permit.

Greystone's subdivision was not subject to Ordinance No. 819 because it filed its applications before the ordinance's enactment. However, because Greystone had not yet obtained a building permit when McCall enacted Ordinance No. 820, it applied to Greystone. Although Ordinance No. 819 did not apply to Greystone's subdivision, Greystone still contributed nine lots within the subdivision valued at $1,117,000 to McCall. Greystone and McCall agreed that the value of these lots would serve as a credit in the event that any future community housing fees were assessed. The parties signed a Development Agreement on May 3, 2006. In accordance with this agreement, Greystone conveyed the nine lots to McCall on July 31, 2006. After the conveyance, McCall required Greystone to construct roads and utility improvements servicing the nine lots, a requirement Greystone contends was never contemplated in the Development Agreement.

Almost two years after the parties signed the Development Agreement, a district court invalidated both Ordinance Nos. 819 and 820 as invalid taxes. Following the decision, McCall repealed both ordinances on April 24, 2008. As of that date, McCall had accepted the lots from Greystone and Greystone had constructed community housing on the lots and conveyed them to qualified low income families and individuals.

After McCall repealed the ordinances, it passed Resolution 08-11 to refund the fees paid pursuant to Ordinance No. 820. McCall later passed Resolution 09-10, which set a December 31, 2009 deadline for refund requests under Resolution 08-11. On November 12, 2009, Greystone submitted a refund request to recover for the value of the nine lots. McCall denied this request finding that the lots were not subject to either Ordinance No. 819 or No. 820.

Greystone filed a Complaint against McCall on July 15, 2010, and an Amended Complaint the following day stating claims for inverse condemnation. After some discovery, McCall filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, which the district court granted on June 16, 2011. Greystone then filed a Motion for Reconsideration in which Greystone argued that the district court did not fully dispose of all of its takings claims because the court did not address its claim to recover the cost of constructing improvements to the nine lots. The district court issued a second memorandum decision denying this motion and ruling that Greystone's claim to recover for the improvements was encompassed in its claim to recover the value of the nine lots. The district court entered a judgment on November 22, 2011. Greystone timely filed this appeal and McCall then filed a cross-appeal.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

When reviewing a ruling on a summary judgment motion, this Court applies the same standard used by the district court. Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. The burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact is on the moving party. This Court liberally construes all disputed facts in favor of the nonmoving party, and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record are drawn in favor of the nonmoving party. Summary judgment is improper if reasonable persons could reach differing conclusions or draw conflicting inferences from the evidence presented.
Harris v. State, ex rel. Kempthorne, 147 Idaho 401 210 P.3d 86

Page ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.