2013 Unpublished Opinion No. 603
Appeal from the District Court of the Third Judicial District, State of Idaho, Canyon County. Hon. Renae J. Hoff, District Judge.
Order denying I.C.R. 35 motion for correction of illegal sentence, affirmed.
Rosendo Lopez Guevara, Boise, pro se appellant.
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Lori A. Fleming, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.
Rosendo Lopez Guevara appeals from the district court's order denying his I.C.R. 35 motion for correction of an illegal sentence. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
In 2001, Guevara was charged with lewd conduct with a minor under the age of sixteen, I.C. § 18-1508, with enhancements for being a repeat offender and being a persistent violator. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Guevara pled guilty to the lewd conduct charge and the state dismissed the enhancements. The district court imposed a unified sentence of life imprisonment, with a minimum period of confinement of fifteen years. Guevara's judgment of conviction was entered on October 30, 2001, and Guevara filed an I.C.R. 35 motion for reduction of his sentence, which the district court denied. Guevara appealed, but the appeal was dismissed after Guevara failed to pay for the preparation of the clerk's record and transcripts. The Idaho Supreme Court issued a remittitur on July 8, 2002. On October 27, 2011, Guevara filed an I.C.R. 35 motion for relief from an illegal sentence, which the district court denied. Guevara appeals.
On appeal, Guevara asserts that his sentence is illegal and should be vacated. Pursuant to I.C.R. 35, the district court may correct an illegal sentence at any time. In an appeal from the denial of a motion under I.C.R. 35 to correct an illegal sentence, the question of whether the sentence imposed is illegal is a question of law freely reviewable by the appellate court. State v. Josephson, 124 Idaho 286, 287, 858 P.2d 825, 826 (Ct. App. 1993); State v. Rodriguez, 119 Idaho 895, 897, 811 P.2d 505, 507 (Ct. App. 1991).
Guevara first argues the district court erred by applying the I.C.R. 35(b) limitation period of 120 days to deny his claim. The record demonstrates that the district court did not deny Guevara's motion based on the 120-day limitation period. Rather, the district court stated as follows:
In this case, the matter comes back before me on a Rule 35 motion, which normally must be pled within 120 days, seeking leniency. The defendant in this case has elected to assert that there was a manifest injustice, and, therefore, I have set the matter for hearing today.
The district court analyzed the merits of each of Guevara's claims. Thus, the district court did not err, as it did not treat Guevara's claims as time barred. 
Guevara next argues the district court impermissibly enhanced his sentence pursuant to the repeat sexual offender and persistent violator enhancements. A review of the record demonstrates that both enhancement charges were dismissed and that Guevara was sentenced upon the lewd conduct charge that he plead guilty to. Guevara's claim here appears to be based on the district court's choice of words when describing Guevara's increasingly egregious conduct in this case. Guevara was on parole at the time this crime occurred, and at sentencing the district court stated, "The parole violation was caused as soon as you started drinking, and then enhanced when you allowed the juvenile to come in there, and then enhanced when you touched the juvenile." A review of the record demonstrates the district court's use ...