United States District Court, D. Idaho
SECURITY TICKETING CORPORATION, a California corporation, Plaintiff,
HAMMERDOG, INC., d/b/a WESTERN TAG & PRINTING CO., an Idaho corporation; TIM RESLER, an individual, Defendants.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
EDWARD J. LODGE, District Judge.
Pending before the Court in the above-entitled matter is Plaintiff Security Ticketing Corporation's ("STC") Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 18). Having fully reviewed the record, the Court finds that the facts and legal arguments are adequately presented in the briefs and record. Accordingly, in the interest of avoiding further delay, and because the Court conclusively finds that the decisional process would not be significantly aided by oral argument, this matter shall be decided on the record before this Court without oral argument.
STC and Defendant Hammerdog, Inc ("Hammerdog") entered into an Asset Purchase Agreement to sell STC business to Hammerdog or November 1, 2007. Hammerdog agreed to purchase the STC assets for $5, 250, 000 plus a total of $266, 931.54 as payment of Hot topic Eas Inventory. Partial funding of the purchase included financing by STC. Hammerdog executed two promissory notes in favor of STC. The first note was for $1, 000, 000 and had a maturity date with a large balloon payment of $862, 566 due on December 1, 2012. Upon agreement of the parties the maturity date was extended to January 15, 2013. The second note was for $500, 000 with a maturity date of December 1, 2008. Upon agreement of the parties the maturity date on the second note was extended numerous times with the final extension of the maturity date being January 15, 2012.
Hammerdog defaulted on the payments due on January 15, 2013 for the two promissory notes. It is undisputed that Hammerdog had made the required monthly payments for both notes prior to defaults in January of 2013. Defendant Tim Resler ("Resler") personally guaranteed both promissory notes.
On April 3, 2013, STC filed the Complaint alleging breach of contract by Hammerdog due to the defaults on the promissory notes. On May 24, 2014, Hammerdog and Resler filed an Answer and Counterclaim. The Answer included no affirmative defenses, but did include a Counterclaim for Fraud in the Inducement based on alleged misrepresentations regarding the credit worthiness of various customers who were in default and the over valuation of certain inventory.
On October 1, 2013, STC moved for summary judgment on the breach of contract claim based on Hammerdog's failure to pay the two promissory notes Hammerdog and the personal guaranty claims against Resler. Hammerdog and Resler concede Hammerdog defaulted on the payments due under the promissory notes on January 15, 2013 and that Resler signed personal guaranties for the promissory notes. However, Defendants argue that summary judgment is not appropriate due to the disputed issues related to the counterclaim for fraud in the inducement. STC responded that the counterclaim is a separate cause of action and is not STC's burden to disprove the fraud in the inducement claim before summary judgment can be granted on the undisputed breaches by Hammerdog and undisputed personal guaranty by Resler.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is appropriate where a party can show that, as to any claim or defense, "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). One of the principal purposes of the summary judgment "is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims...." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986). It is "not a disfavored procedural shortcut, " but is instead the "principal tool by which factually insufficient claims or defenses [can] be isolated and prevented from going to trial with the attendant unwarranted consumption of public and private resources." Id. at 327.
"[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). Material facts are those that may affect the outcome of the case. See id. at 248.
The moving party is entitled to summary judgment if that party shows that each issue of material fact is not or cannot be disputed. To show the material facts are not in dispute, a party may cite to particular parts of materials in the record, or show that the materials cited do not establish the presence of a genuine dispute, or that the adverse party is unable to produce admissible evidence to support the fact. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1)(A)&(B); see T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322). The Court must consider "the cited materials, " but it may also consider "other materials in the record." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(3).
Material used to support or dispute a fact must be "presented in a form that would be admissible in evidence." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(2). Affidavits or declarations submitted in support of or opposition to a motion "must be made on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant or declarant is competent to testify on the matters stated." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(4).
The Court does not determine the credibility of affiants or weigh the evidence set forth by the non-moving party. All inferences which can be drawn from the evidence must be drawn in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 630-31 (internal citation omitted).
Rule 56(e)(3) authorizes the Court to grant summary judgment for the moving party "if the motion and supporting materials-including the facts considered undisputed-show that the movant is entitled to it." The existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the non-moving party's position is insufficient. Rather, "there must be evidence on which the jury ...