United States District Court, D. Idaho
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
EDWARD J. LODGE, District Judge.
Currently pending before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion to Alter, Amend or Reconsider Memorandum Decision and Sealed Order and Order F.R.C.P. Notice of Appeal with Request for Certificate of Appealability (Dkt. 64) and Plaintiff's Request for Refund of Initial Filing Fees (Dkt. 66). Plaintiff, a prisoner in the custody of the Idaho Department of Correction (IDOC), is proceeding pro se in this civil rights action. Having fully reviewed the record, the Court finds that the facts and legal arguments are adequately presented in the briefs and record and that the decisional process would not be significantly aided by oral argument. Accordingly, the Court will decide this matter on the record without oral argument. D. Idaho L. R. 7.1.
In this action, Plaintiff sued several IDOC officials, alleging that they were unconstitutionally infringing upon Plaintiff's right to practice his religion, Odhinnishm/Asatru. Plaintiff and Defendants entered into a settlement agreement and on February 13, 2012, the parties filed a stipulation of dismissal (Dkt. 48) and an Order of Dismissal was entered on February 14, 2012 (Dkt. 49).
In June and July 2013, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Relief from Judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b) (Dkt. 54) and a Motion for Contempt (Dkt. 56) for Defendants' alleged failure to comply with the settlement agreement, both of which the Court denied on January 28, 2014 (Dkt. 58.) On February 7, 2014, a final judgment was entered dismissing the case with prejudice. (Dkt. 59.)
On February 18, 2014, Plaintiff filed the pending Motion to Alter, Amend or Reconsider Memorandum Decision and Sealed Order in reference to the Court's January 28, 2014 Order (Dkt. 58.)
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO ALTER, AMEND OR RECONSIDER
Plaintiff's Motion is brought pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b). Under Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a court may grant a party relief from a final judgment for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence; (3) fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged; or (6) any other reason that justifies relief. Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b). The last catch-all provision should only be granted "sparingly as an equitable remedy to prevent manifest injustice." United States v. Washington, 98 F.3d 1159, 1163 (9th Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted).
In its prior Order (Dkt. 58), the Court found that relief under Rule 60(b)(3) was unwarranted because there was no "clear and convincing evidence" of fraud that induced Plaintiff to enter into the settlement agreement. (Dkt. 58, p. 7.) Additionally, the Court denied Plaintiff's request for contempt because the Court did not retain jurisdiction over the case (Dkt. 58, p. 10.) Plaintiff has filed a Motion to Reconsider. (Dkt. 64.) However, the majority of Plaintiff's motion takes issue with whether the Defendants are complying with the terms of settlement agreement, not whether there is a reason for the Court to reconsider its January 28, 2014 Order. The Court addresses Plaintiff's arguments below.
1. Rule 60(b) Standard and Discussion
The "mistake" provision of Rule 60(b)(1) provides for reconsideration of judgments only where: (1) a party has made an excusable litigation mistake or an attorney has acted without authority from a party or (2) where the judge has made a substantive mistake of law or fact in the final judgment or order. Cashner v. Freedom Stores, 98 F.3d 572, 577 (10th Cir. 1999). It does not provide relief for mistakes made in the negotiation of a contract or stipulation. Id.
Plaintiff claims his "mistake" was "believing IDOC staff and their contractors would comply with a common sense agreement" to allow him to practice his religion. (Dkt. 64, p. 9.) These are not the types of mistakes envisioned by Rule 60(b)(1). Rule 60(b) is not intended to be a substitute for a direct appeal nor is it available to reargue an issue previously addressed by the court. Id . See also Latshaw v. Trainer Wortham & Co., Inc., 452 F.3d 1097, 1101 (9th Cir. 2006) (noting that Rule 60(b)(1) is not intended to remedy the effects of a litigation decision that a party later comes to regret). The Court has addressed Plaintiff's arguments regarding the settlement agreement in its prior order (Dkt. 54).
To show fraud under Rule 60(b)(3), a party must come forward with evidence demonstrating an unconscionable scheme to improperly influence the Court's decision. England v. Doyle, 281 F.2d 304, 309 (9th Cir. 1960). "Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(3) require[s] that fraud be proven by clear and convincing evidence, be not discoverable by due diligence before or during the proceeding, and be materially related to the submitted issue." Pacific & Arctic Ry. and Nav. Co. v. United Transp. Union, 952 F.2d 1144, 1148 (9th Cir. 1991). In the context of a settlement agreement, the party making the allegation of fraud must bring forward clear and convincing evidence that the other party "acted fraudulently prior to the execution of the Consent Judgment." Chao v. Welliver, 2005 WL 1630537, at *2 (D. Minn. 2005). Mere "unsubstantiated assertions" of fraud are insufficient to meet the burden under Rule 60(b)(3), and "post-judgment conduct" is not enough. Id.
Plaintiff sets forth nothing new to demonstrate that he was fraudulently induced to enter into the settlement agreement. Plaintiff argues that defense counsel's April 2, 2012 letter ( See Dkt.51-1), which the Court referenced in its January 28, 2014 Order (Dkt. 58, p. 6), "without confirmation by the Plaintiff, constitutes misrepresentation, constituting misconduct." (Dkt. 64, p. 4.) In making this argument, Plaintiff is again challenging Defendants' compliance with the settlement agreement. He argues that Defendants misrepresented that the settlement agreement was being complied with and therefore relief is warranted under Rule 60(b)(3). (Dkt. 64, p. 4.) While the Court did note in its prior order that it appeared Defendants had satisfied most, but not all, of the terms of the settlement agreement (Dkt. 58, p. 7), that determination did not impact the Court's holding that Plaintiff had not shown he was fraudulently induced to enter into the settlement agreement, precluding relief under Rule 60(b)(3). In ...