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Amica Mutual Insurance Co. v. Vernon

United States District Court, D. Idaho

April 17, 2015



B. LYNN WINMILL, Chief District Judge.


The Court has before it cross motions for summary judgment. The motions were argued on March 16, 2015, and taken under advisement. For the reasons expressed below, the Court will grant the Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, and deny the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.


Defendant Russell Vernon and now deceased Roberta McIntire worked at Century Link in Boise, Idaho. The two employees rarely interacted with each other. Several months before Vernon retired in May 2011, and while at work in the break room, Vernon asked Roberta how she made her coffee. She responded, "What f*cking business is that of yours?" Def's Dep., Dkt. 17, Ex. 3, at 21. The two co-workers had little further interaction until December 2011, when Vernon mailed an anonymous card with an enclosed letter to Roberta. The front of the card read, "F*** You, You F***ing F***." The letter inside the card contained four paragraphs of insults, some of which read: "It goes without saying that you undoubtedly must know by now how much you are disliked by the techs here...;" "Hopefully someday R(redacted) will wise up and dump you for something worth having. It's funny how many of us like R(redacted) yet would laugh ourselves silly if you were to get run over by a train;" and "Every year we hope that this will be your last one here but every year you stay." Pl.'s Compl., Dkt. 1, Ex. 1, ΒΆ 29-32.

Roberta committed suicide five days after receiving the card and enclosed letter. Roberta's Estate and her mother, Jessica Grable, sued Vernon in state court for negligence, wrongful death, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Vernon sought coverage under his homeowner's insurance policy with Amica Mutual Insurance Company. Specifically, he demanded that Amica defend the underlying action and indemnify any judgment rendered against him. In response, Amica filed a complaint, seeking a declaration that Amica is not under a duty to defend or indemnify Vernon. This Court is now faced with cross motions for summary judgment.


Summary judgment is appropriate where a party can show that, as to any claim or defense, "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). One of the principal purposes of the summary judgment "is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986). It is "not a disfavored procedural shortcut, " but is instead the "principal tool[ ] by which factually insufficient claims or defenses [can] be isolated and prevented from going to trial with the attendant unwarranted consumption of public and private resources." Id. at 327. "[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). There must be a genuine dispute as to any material fact - a fact "that may affect the outcome of the case." Id. at 248.

The evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and the Court must not make credibility findings. Id. at 255. On the other hand, the Court is not required to adopt unreasonable inferences from circumstantial evidence. McLaughlin v. Liu, 849 F.2d 1205, 1208 (9th Cir. 1988).

When cross-motions for summary judgment are filed, the Court must independently search the record for factual disputes. Fair Hous. Council of Riverside Cnty., Inc. v. Riverside Two, 249 F.3d 1132, 1136 (9th Cir. 2001). The filing of cross-motions for summary judgment - where both parties essentially assert that there are no material factual disputes - does not vitiate the court's responsibility to determine whether disputes as to material fact are present. Id.

The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine dispute as to material fact. Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1076 (9th Cir. 2001)(en banc). To carry this burden, the moving party need not introduce any affirmative evidence (such as affidavits or deposition excerpts) but may simply point out the absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. Fairbank v. Wunderman Cato Johnson, 212 F.3d 528, 532 (9th Cir. 2000).

This shifts the burden to the non-moving party to produce evidence sufficient to support a jury verdict in her favor. Deveraux, 263 F.3d at 1076. The non-moving party must go beyond the pleadings and show "by her [ ] affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, or admissions on file" that a genuine dispute of material fact exists. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324.


1. Idaho Supreme Court Precedent on ...

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