Opinion No. 52
from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District,
State of Idaho, Boise County. Hon. Patrick H. Owen, District
denying motion to suppress, reversed and case
D. Fredericksen, Interim State Appellate Public Defender,
Boise, for appellant.
Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Kenneth K. Jorgensen,
Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.
Franklin appeals from the district court's order denying
her motion to suppress. We reverse the order and remand the
case for further proceedings.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Tatilian encountered Franklin walking across a street toward
a saloon. She appeared intoxicated and smelled of alcohol.
Later that day, Officer Tatilian responded to a report of an
intoxicated driver operating a 1990s Ford pickup and driving
away from the saloon where the officer had contacted
Franklin. Officer Tatilian located the pickup parked at a
local motel and found Franklin and her boyfriend, Jason
Snowball, in one of the motel's rooms. Franklin and
Snowball both admitted they were intoxicated and Officer
Tatilian warned them not to drive while they were
approximately 10:12 p.m., dispatch asked Officer Tatilian to
respond to a single-vehicle accident involving a 1990s Ford
pickup. When Officer Tatilian arrived at the scene of the
accident at 10:47 p.m., the fire chief was already there. The
fire chief informed Officer Tatilian that Franklin was
injured in the accident and taken to the hospital. The fire
chief also told Officer Tatilian that Franklin appeared
intoxicated, smelled of alcohol, and said she was the
vehicle's driver and only occupant.
Tatilian located Snowball's wallet at the scene. Thinking
Snowball may have been involved in the accident, Officer
Tatilian searched for other victims but did not find any
other victims at the scene. Officer Tatilian had radios in
his vehicle and on his person that were working while at the
scene of the accident. The officer left at approximately
11:55 p.m. and went back to the motel where he confirmed
Snowball was not involved in the accident. The district court
found that around midnight, Officer Tatilian asked dispatch
to send a phlebotomist and another officer to draw
Franklin's blood at the hospital.
phlebotomist and Officer Rogers were sent to the hospital to
obtain Franklin's blood. Franklin arrived at the hospital
at 12:20 a.m., shortly after Officer Rogers. At the hospital,
Franklin physically refused a blood draw for law enforcement
purposes. However, the hospital nurse was drawing
Franklin's blood for treatment purposes. Through the
phlebotomist, Officer Rogers had the hospital nurse fill two
tubes with Franklin's blood. The nurse completed the
blood draw at 12:40 a.m. The test of Franklin's blood
revealed a blood alcohol content (BAC) of .236.
State charged Franklin with felony driving under the
influence (DUI), Idaho Code §§ 18-8004 and
18-8005(6), and misdemeanor driving without privileges, I.C.
§ 18-8001(4). Franklin moved to suppress evidence of the
results of the blood test. The district court denied the
motion, holding implied consent and exigent circumstances
justified the warrantless blood draw. Franklin entered a
conditional guilty plea, reserving the right to appeal the
denial of her motion to suppress, and the State dismissed the
driving without privileges charge. Franklin timely appeals
from the denial of her motion to suppress.
argues the district court erred in denying her motion to
suppress. The standard of review of a suppression motion is
bifurcated. When a decision on a motion to suppress is
challenged, we accept the trial court's findings of fact
that are supported by substantial evidence, but we freely
review the application of constitutional principles to the
facts as found. State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559,
561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct. App. 1996). At a suppression
hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses,
resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual
inferences is vested in the trial court. State v.
Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997
(1995); State v. Schevers, 132 Idaho 786, 789, 979
P.2d 659, 662 (Ct. App. 1999).
raises three issues on appeal. First, she argues she withdrew
her consent under current Idaho law. Accordingly, she asserts
she did not impliedly consent to the warrantless blood draw.
The State concedes that Franklin withdrew her consent under
"recent Idaho Supreme Court decisions" and the
implied consent exception is "inapplicable under the
facts of this case." Therefore, we need not address this
issue. Second, Franklin argues the district court's
factual finding that Officer Tatilian requested the blood
draw around ...