United States District Court, D. Idaho
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
Lynn Winmill Chief Judge United States District Court
Court has before it Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment (Dkt. 11). The Court conducted a hearing on the
motion on July 18, 2016. At the hearing, the Court denied
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to
Castillo’s § 1983 claim, as well as qualified
immunity for Officer Klitch. The Court took the rest of the
motion under advisement, and now issues the following
Jose Castillo is an Arizona resident who suffers from
Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (“OCD”). Pl.
Response at 2 (Dkt. 13). His OCD causes him to use
various sanitizing products on his body and possessions,
including his vehicle. Although Castillo previously worked as
a park ranger for many years, his OCD has prevented him from
working recently. Castillo therefore receives full disability
benefits from the Social Security Administration.
2014, Castillo travelled from Arizona to Oregon to visit an
acquaintance. During the trip, Officer Klitch stopped
Castillo just outside of Boise, Idaho. Officer Klitch claims
that he pulled Castillo over for swerving in his lane and for
failing to move over or slow down for an emergency vehicle.
Def. Memo. at 7 (Dkt.11-1). Officer Klitch began the
traffic stop by inquiring about Castillo’s trip.
Officer Klitch eventually asked Castillo about his shorts
which had unusual snaps attached to them. Pl. Resp.
at 5 (Dkt. 13). Castillo explained to Officer Klitch that he
suffered from OCD, and that he did not want his pants to
touch the ground. Id.
Klitch also smelled Lysol disinfectant emanating from the
vehicle and inquired about it. Klitch Dep. p. 45
(Dkt. 13-4). Castillo explained that he used Lysol because of
his OCD. Id. at 45-45. Wary of this explanation,
Office Klitch believed that Castillo used Lysol to mask the
smell of drugs or other substances. Id. at 48-49.
Officer Klitch then called in Officer Cottrell to conduct a
drug dog sniff. Id. at 49. Officer Cottrell arrived
approximately three minutes after the initial stop occurred.
Pl. Memo. at 6 (Dkt. 13).
Officer Cottrell arrived, Officer Klitch ordered Castillo out
of the car and told him that the officers were going to
conduct a drug sniff. Id. Officer Cottrell then ran
the dog around the vehicle. Id. The dog alerted to
Castillo’s passenger side door. Klitch Dep. at
52-53. Officer Klitch then frisk searched Castillo. Pl.
Memo. at 6. Officer Klitch then searched
Castillo’s vehicle. Id. During the search,
Officer Klitch made a series of what can only be described as
insulting or derogatory statements related to germs and
Castillo’s OCD. The stop lasted about 25 minutes.
Officers Cottrell and Klitch found no drugs or other
contraband in Castillo’s vehicle and did not issue any
traffic citations. Id. at 7. Castillo later filed
his complaint, alleging § 1983 violations and ADA
violations against the Idaho State Police and officers Klitch
and Cottrell. Id.
judgment is appropriate where a party can show that, as to
any claim or defense, “there is no genuine dispute as
to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). One of the
principal purposes of the summary judgment “is to
isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims . . .
.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
323-24 (1986). It is “not a disfavored procedural
shortcut, ” but is instead the “principal tool[ ]
by which factually insufficient claims or defenses [can] be
isolated and prevented from going to trial with the attendant
unwarranted consumption of public and private
resources.” Id. at 327. “[T]he mere
existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties
will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for
summary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). There must be a
genuine dispute as to any material fact - a fact
“that may affect the outcome of the case.”
Id. at 248.
evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party, and the Court must not make credibility
findings. Id. at 255. Direct testimony of the
non-movant must be believed, however implausible. Leslie
v. Grupo ICA, 198 F.3d 1152, 1159 (9th Cir. 1999). On
the other hand, the Court is not required to adopt
unreasonable inferences from circumstantial evidence.
McLaughlin v. Liu, 849 F.2d 1205, 1208 (9th Cir.
moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the
absence of a genuine dispute as to material fact.
Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1076 (9th Cir.
2001)(en banc). To carry this burden, the moving party need
not introduce any affirmative evidence (such as affidavits or
deposition excerpts) but may simply point out the absence of
evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.
Fairbank v. Wunderman Cato Johnson, 212 F.3d 528,
532 (9th Cir.2000).
shifts the burden to the non-moving party to produce evidence
sufficient to support a jury verdict in her favor.
Deveraux, 263 F.3d at 1076. The non-moving party
must go beyond the pleadings and show “by her [ ]
affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to
interrogatories, or admissions on ...