United States District Court, D. Idaho
JOHN N. BACH, Plaintiff,
PAULA EHRLER, et. al., Defendants.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
Lynn Winmill, United States District Court Chief Judge.
Court has before it the Stipulation for Dismissal with
Prejudice (Dkt. 54), asking the Court to dismiss
Plaintiff's claims against defendants Tony Liford and
Teton County. Good cause appearing, the Court will grant the
stipulation. In turn, the Court will deem moot defendants
Liford and Teton County's motion for sanctions (Dkt. 51)
and motion for extension of time (Dkt. 52).
Motion to Substitute
Hopkins, Chapter 7 Trustee, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §
541(a) and FRCP 25(c) asks the Court to substitute Mr.
Hopkins as the real party in interest on the claims against
Teton County and Liford to carry out the terms of the
settlement (Dkt. 53). No response to the motion has been
filed, and the deadline for filing a response has passed.
filed a petition for bankruptcy under Chapter 7 on February
9, 2016 in the United States Bankruptcy Court, District of
Idaho. Thus, his claims in this proceeding became property of
the bankruptcy estate under 11 U.S.C. § 541(a). The
Trustee may substitute as a party in place of Bach under FRCP
April 29, 2016, the Trustee, Teton County, and Tony Liford,
filed a stipulation for settlement in the bankruptcy
proceeding, agreeing that Teton County and Tony Liford would
pay the Trustee $5, 000.00 to compromise all claims in this
proceeding against Teton County and Tony Liford, and all
claims against Teton County and Tony Liford would be
dismissed with prejudice. On July 7, 2016, the Bankruptcy
Court entered the Order Approving Settlement with Teton
County and Teton County Sheriff Tony Liford. Dkt. 53, Ex. A.
7, 2016, the Bankruptcy Court entered the Order Allowing
Trustee to Abandon Federal Lawsuit, authorizing the Trustee
to abandon his interest on all claims against the remaining
Defendants besides Teton County and Tony Liford. Dkt. 53, Ex.
B. Accordingly, the Court will grant the motion.
Motion to Dismiss
Court also has before it defendants Alva Harris and Sapient
Trading, LLC's motion to dismiss (Dkt. 46). The motion
asks the Court to dismiss the complaint against these two
defendants because the complaint is unintelligible. Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief, ” in order to “give the
defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atlantic Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964
(2007). While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion
to dismiss “does not need detailed factual allegations,
” it must set forth “more than labels and
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action will not do.” Id. at 555. To
survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Id. at 570. A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged. Id. at 556. The
plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability
requirement, ” but it asks for more than a sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.
Id. Where a complaint pleads facts that are
“merely consistent with” a defendant's
liability, it “stops short of the line between
possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to
relief.' ” Id. at 557.
Supreme Court identified two “working principles”
that underlie Twombly in Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). First, the court need not accept as
true, legal conclusions that are couched as factual
allegations. Id. Rule 8 does not “unlock the
doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more
than conclusions.” Id. at 678-79. Second, to
survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must state a
plausible claim for relief. Id. at 679.
“Determining whether a complaint states a plausible
claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific task that
requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial
experience and common sense.” Id.
too much in the complaint may also be fatal to a plaintiff.
Dismissal may be appropriate when the plaintiff has included
sufficient allegations disclosing some absolute defense or
bar to recovery. See Weisbuch v. County of L.A., 119
F.3d 778, 783, n. 1 (9th Cir. 1997) (stating that “[i]f
the pleadings establish facts compelling a decision one way,
that is as good as if depositions and other . . . evidence on
summary judgment establishes the identical facts”).
dismissal without leave to amend is improper unless it is
beyond doubt that the complaint “could not be saved by
any amendment.” Harris v. Amgen, Inc., 573
F.3d 728, 737 (9th Cir. 2009) (issued 2 months after
Iqbal). The Ninth Circuit has held that “in
dismissals for failure to state a claim, a district court
should grant leave to amend even if no request to amend the
pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading
could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other
facts.” Cook, Perkiss and Liehe, Inc. v. Northern
California Collection Service, Inc., 911 F.2d 242, 247
(9th Cir. 1990). The issue is not whether plaintiff will
prevail but whether he “is entitled to offer evidence
to support the claims.” Diaz v. Int'l Longshore
and Warehouse Union, Local 13, 474 F.3d 1202, 1205 (9th
Cir. 2007)(citations omitted).
Rule 12(b)(6), the Court may consider matters that are
subject to judicial notice. Mullis v. United States
Bank, 828 F.2d 1385, 1388 (9th Cir. 1987). The Court may
take judicial notice “of the records of state agencies
and other undisputed matters of public record” without
transforming the motions to dismiss into motions for summary
judgment. Disabled Rights Action Comm. v. Las Vegas
Events, Inc.,375 F.3d 861, 866, n.1 (9th Cir.
2004). The Court may also examine documents
referred to in the complaint, although not attached ...