United States District Court, D. Idaho
JONATHON G. PLASTER, JR., Petitioner,
ISCI WARDEN KEITH YORDY, Respondent.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
CANDY W. DALE, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
before the Court is Petitioner Jonathon G. Plaster, Jr.'s
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. (Dkt. 1.) Respondent has
filed a Motion for Summary Dismissal, arguing that all of
Petitioner's claims are procedurally defaulted and/or
noncognizable. (Dkt. 11.) The Motion is now ripe for
adjudication. The Court takes judicial notice of the records
from Petitioner's state court proceedings, which have
been lodged by Respondent. (Dkt. 10.) See Fed. R.
Evid. 201(b); Dawson v Mahoney, 451 F.3d 550, 551
(9th Cir. 2006).
parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a United States
Magistrate Judge to conduct all proceedings in this case in
accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). (Dkt. 8.) Having
carefully reviewed the record, including the state court
record, the Court finds that the parties have adequately
presented the facts and legal arguments in the briefs and
record and that oral argument is unnecessary. See D.
Idaho L. Civ. R. 7.1(d). Accordingly, the Court enters the
following Order granting the Motion and dismissing this case
2005, Petitioner was charged, in the Fifth Judicial District
Court in Cassia County, Idaho, with two counts of lewd
conduct with a child under the age of sixteen, in violation
of Idaho Code § 18-1508, and one count of sexual abuse
of a child under the age of sixteen years, in violation of
Idaho Code § 18-1506. (State's Lodging B-5 at 1.)
Pursuant to a binding plea agreement, Petitioner entered a
conditional Alford plea, to a single count of lewd
conduct. Even though the plea agreement called for a specific
sentence of thirty years in prison with seven years fixed,
the trial court ordered a psychosexual evaluation prior to
sentencing. (Id. at 1-2; State's Lodging A-5,
Plea Agreement, at 2.)
the psychosexual evaluation, Petitioner was advised by the
examiner “that he had the right to remain silent, that
anything he said could and would be used against him, that he
had the right to have an attorney present during the
assessment, and that he had the right to stop answering
questions at any time.” (State's Lodging B-5 at 2.)
Petitioner waived those rights. During the evaluation,
Petitioner “admitted to sex crimes . . . in addition to
those acts charged in the original information.”
later filed a motion to withdraw his plea in the 2005 case.
The trial court granted Petitioner's motion, rendering
the plea agreement void.
in 2008, before trial on the 2005 charges, the State charged
Petitioner with eight counts of lewd conduct and two counts
of sexual abuse, based primarily on Petitioner's
statements during the psychosexual evaluation conducted by
order of the court in the 2005 case. (Id.) The State
later amended the 2008 information to allege seven counts of
lewd conduct and one count of sexual abuse.
to trial, the prosecution filed a motion in limine regarding
the admissibility of the statements Petitioner made in the
course of the psychosexual evaluation. (Id.) The
trial court ruled that the statements were admissible in the
2008 case, and that case was consolidated with the 2005 case
for purposes of trial.
and the State again reached a plea agreement. Petitioner
entered a conditional Alford plea to seven counts of
lewd conduct and one count of sexual abuse, as alleged in the
amended information in the 2008 case, reserving the right to
appeal only the trial court's ruling on the motion in
limine. (Id.) The 2005 case was dismissed.
(State's Lodging A-4 at 27-28.) Petitioner was sentenced
to a total of forty years in prison with twenty years fixed.
(Id. at 33.)
direct appeal, Petitioner challenged the trial court's
ruling on the admissibility of Petitioner's statements
during the psychosexual evaluation in the 2008 case, arguing
that the admission of those statements was fundamentally
unfair. His entire argument was as follows:
Mindful of the fact that [Petitioner's] participation in
the psychosexual evaluation in the [2005 case] was not
required as part of the plea agreement with the State and
would not factor into his sentence in any way, and mindful of
the fact that [Petitioner] moved to withdraw his plea and,
thereby, knowingly withdrew from his plea agreement with the
State, [Petitioner] nevertheless contends that, because the
admissions made during the psychosexual evaluation were made
in reliance on the original plea agreement, it was
fundamentally unfair for the district court to have ruled
that the State could use those admissions against him even
after the plea agreement had been vacated.
(State's Lodging B-2 at 11.) Petitioner cited two federal
criminal cases in support of his argument: United States
v. Escamilla, 975 F.2d 568 (9th Cir. 1992), and
United States v. Ventura-Cruel, 356 F.3d 55 (1st
Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner's convictions,
holding that it was not fundamentally unfair to allow the
statements made during Petitioner's previous psychosexual
evaluation to be used against Petitioner in the later
prosecution. The court relied on the following facts: (1)
Petitioner was advised of his rights prior to making the
incriminating statements; (2) nothing in the plea agreement
induced Petitioner to make such statements; (3)
Petitioner-not the State-voluntarily withdrew from the plea
agreement; and (4) the statements were voluntary.
(State's Lodging B-5 at 4.) The court also noted that
Petitioner had not provided any “relevant
authority” in support of his claim of fundamental
filed a petition for review with the Idaho Supreme Court,
relying on the briefs reviewed by the Idaho Court of Appeals.
(State's Lodging B-6.) The Idaho Supreme Court denied the
petition for review without comment. (State's Lodging
later filed a pro se petition for state post-conviction
relief, in which he specified that he was not seeking counsel
to represent him. (State's Lodging C-1 at 25.) Petitioner
alleged ineffective assistance of counsel, prosecutorial
misconduct, and judicial misconduct. (Id. at 23.)
The state district court dismissed the petition, and
appeal from the dismissal of the postconviction petition,
Petitioner-now represented by counsel-raised a single issue:
whether the court improperly dismissed the petition without
granting Petitioner's requests for
discovery. (State's Lodging D-1.) Petitioner
cited the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments when
asserting that the denial of discovery violated
Petitioner's “right to access . . . the courts and
his right to due process.” (Id. at 1.) He
argued that the state district court abused its discretion by
denying the discovery requests and, in turn, dismissing the
petition. The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal
of the post-conviction petition, and the Idaho Supreme Court
denied review. (State's Lodging D-4, D-5, D-7.)
thereafter, Petitioner filed a pro se successive
post-conviction petition in the state district court.
(State's Lodging E-1 at 7-55.) The court dismissed the
petition, and Petitioner appealed. (Id. at 109-19.)
The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed. (State's Lodging
F-6.) Petitioner did not file a petition for review with the
Idaho Supreme Court, and the Idaho Court of Appeals issued
the remittitur. (State's Lodging F-7.)
instant federal habeas corpus petition, Petitioner asserts
the following claims:
Claim 1: Violation of the Fourth Amendment based on an
officer's entrance into Petitioner's home without
consent and without presenting a warrant.
Claim 2: Violation of the Fifth Amendment based on the
alleged denial of a grand jury.
Claim 3: Violation of due process based on allegedly
Claim 4: Violation of the Fifth Amendment based on alleged
Claim 5: Violations of the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth
Amendments based on an excessive bond.
Claim 6: Equal Protection violation of equal protection based
on the amount of the bond. Petitioner also cites the Fifth
and Eighth Amendments in this claim.
Claim 7: “Vindictive/Malicious Prosecution” in
violation of the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth
Claim 8: Ineffective assistance of counsel in the 2005 case.
Claim 10: Violations of “Due Process, Equal
Protection, Ineffective Assistance, Cruel &
Unusual” based on Petitioner's having to appear in
court in restraints and jail clothes.
Claim 11: Violation of Petitioner's Sixth Amendment right
to a speedy trial. Petitioner also cites the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments in support of this claim.
Claim 12: “Deliberate Indifference, ” in
violation of the Eighth Amendment,  based on Petitioner's
allegedly inadequate health care while in custody and
substandard conditions of confinement. Petitioner also cites
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments in support of this claim.
Claim 13: Cruel and unusual punishment, in violation of the
Eighth Amendment, based on Petitioner's placement in
segregation following a fight with another inmate in which
Petitioner was “defending himself.” Petitioner
also cites ...