United States District Court, D. Idaho
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
Honorable Ronald E. Bush United States Magistrate Judge.
is a prisoner in the custody of the Idaho Department of
Correction (“IDOC”) and is proceeding pro se in
this civil rights matter. Currently pending before the Court
are the following motions: (1) Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment (Dkt. 16), in which Defendants seek
dismissal of two claims; (2) Plaintiff's Motion to Amend
(Dkt. 26); (3) Plaintiff's Request for Disclosure (Dkt.
30); and (4) Plaintiff's Motion for Injunctive Relief
(Dkt. 34). Also pending are several motions for extensions of
time filed by Plaintiff. (Dkt. 20, 23, 25, 33.)
parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a United States
Magistrate Judge to conduct all proceedings in this case in
accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 73.
fully reviewed the record, the Court finds that the facts and
legal arguments are adequately presented in the briefs and
record and that oral argument is unnecessary. See D.
Idaho Loc. Civ. R. 7.1. Accordingly, the Court enters the
Complaint and proposed amended complaint allege the following
facts, which are taken in the light most favorable to
Plaintiff. Although Plaintiff is currently incarcerated at
the Idaho State Correctional Institution
(“ISCI”), his claims arose when he was housed in
the Idaho State Correctional Center (“ISCC”). On
December 3, 2014, Plaintiff was attacked at ISCC by members
of his former gang. (Compl., Dkt. 3, at 2.) He fought back.
Although Plaintiff states that acted in self-defense, he was
issued a Disciplinary Offense Report (“DOR”) for
fighting. (Dkt. 19-2 at 9.) Plaintiff was then
transferred to ISCI. However, on August 28, 2015, Plaintiff
was transferred back to ISCC, where he was again attacked.
(Dkt. 3 at 2.)
filed his initial Complaint in January 2016. On April 7,
2016, the Court reviewed the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915 and 1915A and allowed Plaintiff to proceed
on Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claims based on the
two incidents. (Dkt. 8 at 6-7.)
to Plaintiff's proposed amended complaint, on April 27,
2016, Plaintiff was transferred to the Idaho Maximum Security
Institution (“IMSI”). (Dkt. 26-1 at 5.) Even
though IMSI is a different prison from where Plaintiff was
previously attacked, Plaintiff states that the same
individuals, or at least members of the same gang, attacked
him a third time at IMSI. (Id.)
now move for summary judgment, arguing that Plaintiff did not
exhaust available administrative remedies as to the December
2014 and August 2015 incidents. (Dkt. 16.) After filing a motion
to stay and multiple motions for extensions of time to file
his response, Plaintiff filed his Motion to Amend. (Dkt. 26.)
Plaintiff later submitted an untimely opposition to
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. (Dkt. 29, filed
November 17, 2016; see also Dkt. 25, requesting an
extension until October 21, 2016.)
MOTIONS FOR EXTENSIONS OF TIME
first three requests for extensions of time will be granted.
(Dkt. 20, 23, 25.) Even with those extensions,
Plaintiff's response to the Motion for Summary Judgment
was still filed nearly a month late. (Dkt. 29.) However, the
Court will exercise its discretion to consider
Plaintiff's untimely response.
latest request seeks an extension of time to file a sur-reply
in opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment. (Dkt. 33.)
However, because sur-replies are not authorized by the Local
Rules, Plaintiff's motion for an extension for that
purpose will be denied as moot. See Dist.
Id. Loc. Civ. R. 7.1.
MOTION TO AMEND
partially oppose Plaintiff's Motion to Amend, asserting
that the amendment is futile and creates undue delay with
respect to Plaintiff's claims arising from the first two
to pleadings are governed by Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. The Court “should freely give leave
when justice so requires.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2). The
Ninth Circuit has explained the reasoning behind allowing the
opportunity to amend:
In exercising its discretion with regard to the amendment of
pleadings, a court must be guided by the underlying purpose
of Rule 15-to facilitate decision on the merits rather than
on the pleadings or technicalities. This court has noted on
several occasions that the Supreme Court has instructed the
lower federal courts to heed carefully the command of Rule
15(a) . . . by freely granting leave to amend when justice so
requires. Thus Rule 15's policy of favoring amendments to
pleadings should be applied with extreme liberality.
Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.2d 1132, 1135 (9th Cir.
1987) (internal citations, quotation marks, and alterations
omitted). “In the absence of any apparent or declared
reason-such as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on
the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies
by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the
opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment,
futility of amendment, etc., ” it is appropriate for a
court to grant leave to amend. Foman v. Davis, 371
U.S. 178, 182 (1962). Although all of these factors
contribute to the analysis of whether a plaintiff should be
allowed an opportunity to amend, futility alone justifies
denying such an opportunity. Johnson v. Buckley, 356
F.3d 1067, 1077 (9th Cir. 2004).
addition, the Court retains its screening responsibility
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), which requires that
the Court review all complaints filed by prisoners against a
governmental entity or an officer or employee of a
governmental entity. The Court must dismiss any such
complaint, “or any portion of the complaint, ”
that fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
Id. § 1915A(b).
with respect to Plaintiff's claims arising from the first
two attacks, in December 2014 and August 2015, is futile
because, as explained below, Plaintiff did not exhaust
available administrative remedies as to those claims.
Therefore, Plaintiff's Motion to Amend will be denied in
part. The Motion will be granted with respect to
Plaintiff's claim based on the April 2016 incident, as
Defendants do not oppose amendment for that purpose. (Dkt. 28
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Standard of Law Governing Summary Judgment
judgment is appropriate where a party can show that, as to
any claim or defense, “there is no genuine dispute as
to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). One of the
principal purposes of the summary judgment rule “is to
isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims or
defenses.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 323-24 (1986). It is not “a disfavored procedural
shortcut, ” but is instead the “principal tool
by which factually insufficient claims or defenses [can] be
isolated and prevented from going to trial with the attendant
unwarranted consumption of public and private
resources.” Id. at 327.
mere existence of some alleged factual dispute
between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly
supported motion for summary judgment . . . .”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
247-48 (1986). Rather, there must be no genuine
dispute as to any material fact in order for a case
to survive summary judgment. Material facts are those
“that might affect the outcome of the suit.”
Id. at 248. “Disputes over irrelevant or
unnecessary facts will not preclude a grant of summary
judgment.” T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec.
Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir.
moving party is entitled to summary judgment if that party
shows that each material fact cannot be disputed. To show
that the material facts are not in dispute, a party may cite
to particular parts of materials in the record, or show that
the adverse party is unable to produce admissible evidence to
support the fact. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1)(A) & (B). The Court
must consider “the cited materials, ” but it may
also consider “other materials in the record.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(3). The Court is “not required to
comb through the record to find some reason to deny a motion
for summary judgment.” Carmen v. San Francisco
Unified Sch. Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1029 (9th Cir. 2001)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Instead, the “party
opposing summary judgment must direct [the Court's]
attention to specific triable facts.” So. Ca. Gas
Co., 336 F.3d at 889.
moving party meets its initial responsibility, then the
burden shifts to the opposing party to establish that a
genuine dispute as to any material fact actually does exist.
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). The existence of a scintilla of
evidence in support of the non-moving party's position is
insufficient. Rather, “there must be evidence on which
[a] jury could reasonably find for the [non-moving
party].” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.
used to support or dispute a fact should be “presented
in a form that would be admissible in evidence, ” or it
may be subject to being stricken. Fed.R.Civ.P.
56(c)(2). Affidavits or declarations submitted in
support of or in opposition to a motion “must be made
on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible
in evidence, and show that the affiant or declarant is
competent to testify on the matters stated.”
party “fails to properly support an assertion of fact
or fails to properly address another party's assertion of
fact, ” the Court may consider that fact to be
undisputed. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)(2). The Court may grant
summary judgment for the moving party “if the motion
and supporting materials-including the facts considered
undisputed-show that the movant is entitled to it.”
Court does not determine the credibility of affiants or weigh
the evidence set forth by the parties. Although all
reasonable inferences which can be drawn from the evidence
must be drawn in a light most favorable to the non-moving
party, T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc., 809 F.2d at 630-31,
the Court is not required to adopt unreasonable ...