United States District Court, D. Idaho
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
Lynn Winmill Chief Judge.
Court has before it Defendant's Motion to Dismiss or for
an Order for More Definite Statement (Dkt. 9). For the
reasons explained below, the Court will grant the motion in
part and deny the motion in part.
is a Physician's Assistant. He asserts that he applied
for medical staff privileges at the Kootenai Hospital
District (“Kootenai Health”). He claims that the
credentialing committee unanimously recommended that his
application be approved by the board, but the board
thereafter met and denied his request. Amended
Compl. ¶ 7-8. Biondo filed this lawsuit alleging
due process and antitrust violations.
Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief, ” in order to “give the
defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atlantic Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964
(2007). While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion
to dismiss “does not need detailed factual allegations,
” it must set forth “more than labels and
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action will not do.” Id. at 555. To
survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Id. at 570. A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged. Id. at 556. The
plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability
requirement, ” but it asks for more than a sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.
Id. Where a complaint pleads facts that are
“merely consistent with” a defendant's
liability, it “stops short of the line between
possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to
relief.' ” Id. at 557.
Supreme Court identified two “working principles”
that underlie Twombly in Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). First, the court need not accept as
true, legal conclusions that are couched as factual
allegations. Id. Rule 8 does not “unlock the
doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more
than conclusions.” Id. at 678-79. Second, to
survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must state a
plausible claim for relief. Id. at 679.
“Determining whether a complaint states a plausible
claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific task that
requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial
experience and common sense.” Id.
dismissal without leave to amend is improper unless it is
beyond doubt that the complaint “could not be saved by
any amendment.” Harris v. Amgen, Inc., 573
F.3d 728, 737 (9th Cir. 2009) (issued 2 months after
Iqbal). The Ninth Circuit has held that “in
dismissals for failure to state a claim, a district court
should grant leave to amend even if no request to amend the
pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading
could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other
facts.” Cook, Perkiss and Liehe, Inc. v. Northern
California Collection Service, Inc., 911 F.2d 242, 247
(9th Cir. 1990). The issue is not whether plaintiff will
prevail but whether he “is entitled to offer evidence
to support the claims.” Diaz v. Int'l Longshore
and Warehouse Union, Local 13, 474 F.3d 1202, 1205 (9th
Cir. 2007)(citations omitted).
Rule 12(b)(6), the Court may consider matters that are
subject to judicial notice. Mullis v. United States
Bank, 828 F.2d 1385, 1388 (9th Cir. 1987). The Court may
take judicial notice “of the records of state agencies
and other undisputed matters of public record” without
transforming the motions to dismiss into motions for summary
judgment. Disabled Rights Action Comm. v. Las Vegas
Events, Inc., 375 F.3d 861, 866, n.1 (9th Cir.
2004). The Court may also examine documents
referred to in the complaint, although not attached thereto,
without transforming the motion to dismiss into a motion for
summary judgment. See Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d
1068, 1076 (9th Cir. 2005).
to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(e), a “party may move for a more
definite statement of a pleading to which a responsive
pleading is allowed but which is so vague or ambiguous that
the party cannot reasonably prepare a response.” A
motion for more definite statement must “point out the
defects complained of and the details desired.”
asserts four claims in his Amended Complaint: (1) Due process
violation of both State and Federal law; (2) Violation of the
Clayton Antitrust Act; (3) Violation of the Sherman Antitrust
Act; and (4) Violation of the Idaho Competition Act. Only the
due process claim survives the motion to dismiss.