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Adams v. United States
United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit
June 29, 2017
DEWAYNE F. ADAMS, BRIAN S. ALSBAUGH, DAVID W. BROTHERS, JEREMY S. BUCHANAN, GEORGE D. BULLOCK, WILLIAM G. CLARE, DENNIS M. COCHRAN, KEVIN M. COTTER, JONATHAN DIGUGLIELMO, SCOTT P. DOMBO, MICHELANGELO M. DOTIMAS, KEVIN R. DZIEGIEL, REYES C. FIGUEROA, OWEN HAMMETT, TODD A. HILL, KYLE JAEGER, WAYNE S. JANES, ROGER N. KAMMERDEINER, II, JEFFREY H. KEYSER, ADAM LINDER, RICKEY L. MILLER, CHARLES S. NEWSOME, RICARDO A. PHANG, TRAVIS J. PIRKL, SEAN PATRICK CONROY, CHRISTOPHER COOPER, TOM W. DE ARMOND, REYNALDO J. GARCIA, ERIC S. HOOKS, KENNETH L. JEWELL, TIMOTHY J. KEENER, STEVEN K. KOSCIUSKO, JOHN E. KRAWIEC, RAYMOND E. LONG, MICHAEL LORKIEWICZ, JEFFREY S. PATTON, MICHAEL J. REYNOLDS, JOHN P. SANTOS, STEVEN L. SHAMON, LOREN A. SHARP, CONSTANTINE C. SIDERIS, ANDREW J. TURCOTTE, HECTOR A. VEGA, MYRON C. WADE, LARRY W. WARLITNER, STEVEN J. WILLIAMS, JOHN D. WILLS, KRISTIN WILSON, DONALD P. WISNIEWSKI, JOEL G. WOOD, Plaintiffs-Appellants
UNITED STATES, Defendant-Appellee
from the United States Court of Federal Claims in No.
1:15-cv-00069-EDK, Judge Elaine Kaplan.
Edward Griffin, James & Hoffman, PC, Washington, DC,
argued for plaintiffs-appellants. Also represented by Edgar
N. James; Linda Lipsett, Jules Bernstein, Bernstein &
Lipsett, P.C., Washington, DC.
K. Hogan, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division,
United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, argued
for defendant-appellee. Also represented by Benjamin C.
Mizer, Robert E. Kirschman, Jr., Reginald T. Blades, Jr.,
Prost, Chief Judge, O'Malley and Wallach, Circuit Judges.
Dewayne F. Adams et al. (collectively,
"Appellants"), appeal from the order of the United
States Court of Federal Claims ("Claims Court")
granting the government's partial motion to dismiss
pursuant to Court of Federal Claims Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. For the reasons set forth in the
thorough and well-reasoned opinion of the Claims Court, we
are current and former employees of the United States Secret
Service. Adams v. United States, 125 Fed.Cl. 608,
609 (2016). They alleged that, as a result of new practices,
the government denied them the two consecutive days off from
work to which they were statutorily entitled under 5 U.S.C.
§ 6101(a)(3)(B). The Claims Court concluded that it was
without jurisdiction because this provision is not
appeal, Appellants first argue that §
6101(a)(3)(B)'s scheduling mandate constitutes a money
mandate because it entitles employees to work, and thus
receive compensation for such work. The Claims Court
concluded that this subsection is not money-mandating because
it only concerns work scheduling practices and does not
address employees' entitlement to pay. Id. at
611. We agree with the Claims Court. "At most, "
the court properly concluded, § 6101(a)(3)(B) entitles
employees to "have their basic 40-hour workweek
scheduled in a particular fashion . . . . But whether
Plaintiffs' basic 40hour workweek is Monday through
Friday with Saturday and Sunday off, or Monday through
Saturday with Wednesday and Sunday off, does not-in and of
itself- affect employees' statutory entitlement to
pay." Id. There is "no statutory
entitlement, " the court continued, "to be paid [a]
regular salary on a day [employees] do not work (such as on a
mid-week flex day). Nor do they have any statutory
entitlement to receive overtime pay for Saturday if they do
not put in overtime hours on Saturday." Id. at
also argue that, even if § 6101(a)(3)(B) alone does not
mandate the payment of money damages, the Back Pay Act
establishes a money mandate with respect to their § 6101
claim. As the Claims Court correctly explained, we
"ha[ve] made clear, [u]nless some other provision of law
commands payment of money to the employee for the unjustified
or unwarranted personnel action, the Back Pay Act is
inapplicable." Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Spagnola v. Stockman, 732 F.2d
908, 912 (Fed. Cir. 1984)). Because § 6101(a)(3)(B) does
not "'command payment of money to the employee,
'" nor is it "reasonably amenable to the
reading that it mandates a right to money damages, "
violations of the subsection do not implicate the remedies
prescribed in the Back Pay Act. Id. at 613.
"Thus, " the court properly concluded, "the
Back Pay Act cannot supply this Court with
for the reasons it articulated, the Claims Court lacked
jurisdiction and properly granted the government's
partial motion to dismiss.
 The Claims Court, in its opinion,
discussed both §§ 6101(a)(3)(A) and (a)(3)(B).
Adams, 125 Fed.Cl. at 611. On appeal, however,
Appellants argue only that § ...