United States District Court, D. Idaho
NATALE J. BIONDO, Plaintiff,
KOOTENAI HOSPITAL DISTRICT, d/b/a, KOOTENAI HEALTH Defendant.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
Lynn Winmill, Chief Judge United States District Judge
Court has before it Defendant Kootenai Hospital
District's Renewed Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 19). Having
reviewed the briefing and the record, the Court enters the
following Order granting Kootenai's motion.
J. Biondo was, and is, a licensed physician's assistant
in the State of Idaho. Second Amended Complaint
¶ 5, Dkt. 18. He applied for medical staff privileges at
Kootenai Health. Id. ¶ 7. Despite a positive
recommendation from the credentialing committee, the Kootenai
Hospital District Board denied Biondo's request for
medical staff privileges. Id. ¶¶ 7, 8.
They expressed the following reasons as their justification
for that decision:
- Documented poor clinical judgment.
- Documented unwillingness or inability to learn basic
- Termination of employment at Kootenai Health in September
2010 due to failure to maintain certification as required by
medical staff policy.
- Rehired by Kootenai Health in June 2013. “Notice of
Intent to Terminate” Issued and acknowledged by
[Biondo] October 2015 for failure to comply with performance
improvement plans. The letter resulted in [Biondo's]
- Not eligible for rehire at Kootenai Health due to the
reasons listed above.
Second Amended Complaint, Exhibit B, Dkt. 18. Biondo
then filed his complaint in this action, claiming that his
constitutional due process rights were violated, and that
Kootenai Health violated Idaho Code § 48-105, the
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§1-7, and the Clayton Act,
15 U.S.C. §§12-27. Id. ¶¶ 18-39.
The Court granted in part and denied in part Defendants'
first motion to dismiss - denying the motion as to the due
process claims, but granting it on all other claims (Sherman
Act, Clayton Act, and Idaho Competition Act claims) with
leave to amend. Biondo filed an amended complaint, which
Defendants have again asked the Court to dismiss.
Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief, ” in order to “give the
defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atlantic Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964
(2007). While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion
to dismiss “does not need detailed factual allegations,
” it must set forth “more than labels and
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action will not do.” Id. at 555. To
survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Id. at 570. A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged. Id. at 556. The
plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability
requirement, ” but it asks for more than a sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.
Id. Where a complaint pleads facts that are
“merely consistent with” a defendant's
liability, it “stops short of the line between
possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to
relief.'” Id. at 557.
Supreme Court identified two “working principles”
that underlie Twombly in Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). First, the court need not accept as
true, legal conclusions that are couched as factual
allegations. Id. Rule 8 does not “unlock the
doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more
than conclusions.” Id. at 678- 79. Second, to
survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must state a
plausible claim for relief. Id. at 679.
“Determining whether a complaint states a plausible