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Thomason v. Moeller
United States District Court, D. Idaho
August 29, 2017
MARILYNN THOMASON, Plaintiff,
GREGORY W. MOELLER an individual in his personal capacity, DARREN B. SIMPSON an individual in his personal capacity, JIM JONES an individual in his personal capacity, ROGER S. BURDICK an individual in his personal capacity, DANIEL T. EISMAN an individual in his personal capacity, JOEL D. HORTON an individual in his personal capacity, WARREN E. JONES an individual in his personal capacity, KAREN L. LANSING an individual in her personal capacity, DAVID W. GRATTON an individual in his personal capacity, SERGIO A. GUTIERRAZ an individual in his personal capacity, PITE DUNCAN, LLP a California, USA Limited Liability Partnership aka ALDRIDGE PITE, LLP a Georgia, USA Limited Liability Partnership, aka ALDRIDGE CONNORS, LLP., aka BENEFICIAL FINANCIAL I INC, ELISA S. MAGUNSON as an individual, PETER J. SALMON as an individual, CASPER J. RANKIN, as an individual, WILLIAM FORSBERG, JR. as an individual, ESTATE OF COLLEEN FORSBERG, JR., MADISON REAL PROPERTY, LLC., as an Idaho USA Limited Liability Corporation, THOMAS LUTHY as an individual, LAURA LUTHY as an individual, ABUNDANT LAND HOLDINGS, LLC as an Idaho USA Limited Liability Corporation, LANCE SCHUSTER as an individual, BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA, as an Idaho USA Partnership, JOHN K. BAGLEY as an individual and a married man, LUELLA BAGLEY as an individual and a married woman, TERRENCE BAGLEY as an individual and a married man, ELIZABETH BAGLEY a married woman and as an individual, BAGLEY ENTERPRISE John Bagley, Luella Bagley, Elizabeth Bagley and Terrence Bagley dba in Idaho RIVER BOTTOM, LLP an Idaho Limited partnership, SHERRY ARNOLD as an individual in her personal capacity, TROY EVANS as an individual in his personal capacity, WASHINGTON FEDERAL SAVINGS aka Washington Federal savings and Loan as a Washington State USA corporation, SUZANNE BAGLEY as an individual in her personal capacity, LIBERTY PARK IRRIGATION, INC. an Idaho USA Corporation, RIGBY ANDRUS RIGBY, CHTD aka RIGBY ANDRUS MOELLER, CHTD Chartered under Idaho, USA, DOES 1 THROUGH 20 INCLUSIVE, Defendants.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
Lynn Winmill Chief Judge United States District Court
before the Court is Plaintiff Marilynn Thomason's
“Motion and Objections, ” (Dkt. 84), which the
Court will construe as a motion to reconsider. For the
reasons explained below, the Court will deny this motion.
January of this year, the Court dismissed plaintiff's
complaint in its entirety. See Jan. 19, 2017 Mem.
Decision & Order, Dkt. 83. The Court allowed
plaintiff a chance to amend some of her claims, but the
dismissal order expressly informed plaintiff that if she
failed to file an amended complaint within 30 days, her
entire complaint would be dismissed with prejudice. See
Jan. 19, 2017 Order, Dkt. 83, at 47.
did not file an amended complaint. Instead, she filed the
pending motion, asking the Court to set aside the January
2017 decision in its entirety. Within this motion, plaintiff
also asks the undersigned judge to recuse himself
“based upon bias and errors in facts, errors in law and
fabrication of facts within the MEMO [i.e., the January 2017
decision at Dkt. 83], under 28 USC 455(a) and (b)(1).”
Motion, Dkt. 84, at 3.
Court will address each request in turn, beginning with the
motion for reconsideration.
Motion for Reconsideration
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not expressly authorize a
motion for reconsideration, but a “district court has
the inherent power to reconsider and modify its interlocutory
orders prior to entry of judgment . . . .” Smith v.
Massachusetts, 543 U.S. 462, 475 (2005) (internal
quotations omitted). Nevertheless, reconsideration is
“an extraordinary remedy, to be used sparingly.”
Absent highly unusual circumstances, a motion for
reconsideration will not be granted “unless the
district court is presented with newly discovered evidence,
committed clear error, or if there is an intervening change
in controlling law.” Kona Enters., Inc v. Estate of
Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000).
has not satisfied this standard. Instead, her request for
reconsideration mainly restates arguments addressed in the
Court's earlier decision. The Court will not rehash those
arguments here, as its earlier, 49-page opinion explains in
detail why those arguments fail.
Court also notes that at times, plaintiff does not
necessarily restate arguments, but instead offers the classic
ipse dixit argument: “The Court is wrong
because I say it is wrong.” For example, in taking
issue with the Court's conclusion that plaintiff's
complaint does not satisfy basic pleading standards,
plaintiff makes the following assertion:
The Complaint is not filled with legal conclusions or lack
factual allegation, the complaint does not fail to state a
claim, the complaint does not lack sufficient factual content
to permit the court to reasonabl[y] infer that defendants are
liable for any of the civil rights or RICO violation
asserted, seeing there are no arguments, references ...