United States District Court, D. Idaho
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
C. NYE U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE.
LHP Pocatello, LLC and Pocatello Hospital, LLC have filed a
Motion for Summary Judgment in this wrongful termination
case. Dkt. 32. The Motion is fully briefed and ripe for
decision. Having reviewed the record and briefs, the Court
finds that the facts and legal arguments are adequately
presented. Accordingly, in the interest of avoiding further
delay, and because the Court finds that the decisional
process would not be significantly aided by oral argument,
the Court will decide the motion without oral argument. Dist.
Idaho Loc. Civ. R. 7.1(d)(2)(ii). For the reasons set forth
below, the Court grants the Motion in part and dismisses the
remainder of the claims for lack of subject matter
Sue Ellen Curtis filed this suit on September 23, 2015. In
her Complaint Curtis asserted four causes of action: (1) age
discrimination in violation of Idaho and federal law; (2) sex
discrimination in violation of Idaho and federal law; (3)
religious discrimination in violation of Idaho and federal
law; and (4) wrongful termination in violation of public
filed the pending motion for summary judgment on April 24,
2017. In her reply brief, Curtis “concede[d] that she
has insufficient facts to support her age, gender, and
religious discrimination claims.” Dkt. 33, at 9.
Summary judgment is, therefore, appropriate on these three
causes of action. Accordingly, the Court dismisses those
claims with prejudice. The only claim that remains is
Curtis's claim for wrongful termination in violation of
public policy, which is “a state-based claim”
actionable under Idaho law. See Harris v. Treasure Canyon
Calcuim Co., 132 F.Supp.3d 1228, 1239 (D. Idaho 2015).
the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter
jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3). It is appropriate for the Court to
“raise the question of subject matter jurisdiction,
sua sponte, at any time during the pendency of the
action.” Snell v. Cleveland, Inc., 316 F.3d
822, 826 (9th Cir. 2002). In her Complaint, Curtis asserted
that this Court had federal question and supplemental
jurisdiction over her claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1331, 1343(4), and 1367. Dkt. 1, at 2. After
dismissing all of Curtis's federal claims, this Court no
longer has federal question jurisdiction, and, in turn,
supplemental jurisdiction, over any of the claims in this
case. The Court, therefore, must dismiss this case for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction unless it has diversity
jurisdiction over the remaining claim. See Peralta v.
Hispanic Bus., Inc., 419 F.3d 1064, 1068 (9th Cir. 2005)
(“In civil cases, subject matter jurisdiction is
generally conferred upon federal district courts either
through diversity jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1332, or
federal question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. §
jurisdiction exists when there is complete diversity of
citizenship between the parties, and the amount in
controversy exceeds $75, 000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1);
Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 68 (1996).
Complete diversity exists if none of the plaintiffs is a
citizen of the same state as any of the defendants.
Caterpillar, 519 U.S. at 68; Lincoln Prop. Co.
v. Roche, 546 U.S. 81, 89 (2005). A corporation is a
citizen of the state “by which it has been
incorporated” and the state “where is has its
principal place of business.” 28 U.S.C. §
1332(c)(1); Montrose Chem. Corp. of Cal. v. Am. Motorists
Ins. Co., 117 F.3d 1128, 1134 (9th Cir. 1997).
Complaint, Curtis asserted that “at all times relevant
to [her] claims, [she] was a resident of Bannock County,
Idaho.” Dkt. 1, at 2. She also asserted that
“Defendant LHP Pocatello, LLC d/b/a Portneuf Medical
Center, is a Delaware limited liability company, with its
principal place of business in Pocatello, Idaho.”
Id. Both Curtis and at least one Defendant are both
citizens of Idaho. Therefore, complete diversity does not
exist in this case. Accordingly, the Court does not have
diversity jurisdiction over this case and must dismiss it for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
1. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 32) is
GRANTED as to Counts One, Two, and Three, and those claims
are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
2. Count Four is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction.
3. The Motion Hearing set for November 13, 2017, at 1:30 PM
before Judge David C. Nye is VACATED.
4. The Motion for Extension of Time (Dkt. 34) is DISMISSED AS
5. The Court will enter judgment separately in accordance