United States District Court, D. Idaho
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
B.
LYNN WINMILL, CHIEF JUDGE.
INTRODUCTION
The
Court has before it Plaintiffs' Motion to Consolidate
Cases in Case Nos. 1:13-cv-00275-BLW (Dkt. 207)
(“Doe I”) and 1:17-00184-BLW (Dkt. 14)
(“Doe XX”). For the reasons explained
below, the Court will deny Plaintiffs' motion.
BACKGROUND
In June
2013, a set of Plaintiffs filed a case alleging that the BSA
and the Church Defendants made material misrepresentations
about the safety of scouting, upon which Plaintiffs relied in
deciding to participate in Boy Scouts. Doe I Compl.,
Dkt.1. In May 2017, a separate set of Plaintiffs filed a
second case involving similar allegations against the
Defendants. Doe XX Compl., Dkt. 1.[1] As a result of
the alleged misrepresentations, Plaintiffs in both Doe
I and Doe XX claim they suffered serious
physical, mental, and emotional injuries from abuse they
suffered at the hands of their Scoutmasters. Id.;
Doe I Compl., Dkt. 1. In Doe I, Plaintiffs
only bring claims for constructive fraud against the
Defendants. In Doe XX, Plaintiffs bring claims for
both constructive and actual fraud. The parties are
represented by the same attorneys in each case.
Doe
I has been pending for nearly four-and-a-half years, and
deadline to file motions to amend the pleadings was April 21,
2014. From the time in which the Complaint in Doe I
was filed up until the April 21, 2014 deadline, Plaintiffs in
that case filed one amendment as a matter of right, two
motions to amend the first Amended Complaint, and a motion to
amend the Second Amended Complaint (Doe I, Dkts. 5,
23, 30, and 63). In these motions, Plaintiffs sought to join
additional plaintiffs. Each motion was granted. Two years
after the deadline passed, Plaintiffs in Doe I
sought to amend their Complaint to add a claim for actual
fraud. (Doe I, Dkt, 69). The Court denied that
motion. (Doe I, Dkt. 119).
Early
in the Doe I litigation, the Church Defendants filed
a motion to sever Plaintiffs' claims, in which BSA
joined. (Doe I, Dkts. 10, 16). The Court ordered
that twelve of the Plaintiffs' claims be severed for the
purposes of trial, but that all the claims remain joined
during the pre-trial phase. (Doe I, Dkt. 37). The
Court may reconsider this ruling after discovery and the
filing of dispositive motions.
When
Plaintiffs filed Doe XX, the case was initially
assigned to a magistrate judge. Plaintiffs filed a motion to
consolidate both cases in front of this Court for “case
management and scheduling purposes.” Pl.'s
Br. at 4, Dkts. 207-1, 14-1. Plaintiffs acknowledged
that Doe I had “progressed too far in the
discovery process for consolidation of discovery or pre-trial
motions, ” and that they were not seeking to
consolidate these cases for trial at this time. Id.,
Pl.'s Reply at 2, Dkts. 216, 21. On August 2,
2017, Doe XX was reassigned to this Court for all
further proceedings.
LEGAL
STANDARD
For
cases involving a common question of law or fact, a court may
“(1) join the cases for hearing or trial on any or all
matters at issue in the actions; (2) consolidate the actions;
or (3) issue any other orders to avoid necessary cost or
delay.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 42(a). “[D]istrict courts
have broad discretion to consolidate complaints.”
Garity v. APWU Nat'l Labor Org., 828 F.3d 848,
856 (9th Cir. 2016). When deciding whether to consolidate, a
court weighs the potential for increased efficiency against
any inconvenience, delay, or expense consolidation would
cause. Huene v. United States, 743 F.3d 703, 704
(9th Cir. 1984).
ANALYSIS
Plaintiffs
ask that these cases be consolidated on the grounds that they
involve common questions of law or fact, and that
consolidation will promote efficiency and prevent
inconsistent adjudications. Defendants argue that the facts
and claims presented by Plaintiffs in Doe XX are
distinct from each other, and are distinct from the facts and
claims presented in Doe I. As with permissive
joinder under Fed.R.Civ.P. 20, the Court's authority to
consolidate cases under Rule 42(a) inheres when the actions
share at least one common question of fact or law.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 42(a). There is no requirement that all
questions of law and fact be identical. Cf. Order on
Def's Motion to Sever, Doe I at Dkt. 27. Here, each
Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants made misrepresentations
about the safety of Scouting, and whether the alleged
representations were false is a question of fact common to
each Plaintiff's claim.
Plaintiffs
argue that this Court's experience presiding over Doe
I gives it particular familiarity with the parties, the
procedural and factual issues underlying Plaintiffs'
claims, and issues likely to arise around case management,
scheduling and discovery throughout litigation in Doe
XX. For this reason, Plaintiffs ask that the cases be
combined for “case management and scheduling
purposes.” Plaintiffs advance no specific arguments in
favor of consolidation, other than the advantage of having
the same judge preside over both cases. Nor do Plaintiffs
articulate how these cases should be consolidated, other than
to explain that they are not seeking consolidation for
discovery, pre-trial motions, or trial, at least at this
time.
After
Plaintiffs filed their motion, Doe XX was reassigned
to this Court upon expiration of the consent deadline. As
such, both Doe I and Doe XX are now pending
this Court, rendering moot many of Plaintiffs' arguments
for consolidation. Absent any other justification or
articulated purpose for which these cases should be
consolidated, the Court finds that the potential for
inconvenience or delay from consolidating Doe XX
with Doe I at this late date outweighs any benefit
that might accrue. Although the Court declines to consolidate
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