United States District Court, D. Idaho
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
C. NYE U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE:
before the Court is Defendants Rainbow's End Recovery
Center, LLC, Aly Bruner, and Nancy Del
Colletti's Motion to Dismiss. Dkt. 4. Also before the
Court is Plaintiffs Crystal Maple and Derek Stephens'
Motion to Continue Pursuant to Rule 56(d). Dkt. 8. Having
reviewed this record herein, the Court finds the parties have
adequately presented the facts and legal arguments in the
briefs and record. Accordingly, in the interest of avoiding
further delay, and because the Court finds that the
decisional process would not be significantly aided by oral
argument, the Court will decide the motion without oral
argument. Dist. Idaho Loc. Civ. R. 7.1(d)(2)(ii). For the
reasons set forth below the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs'
Motion to Continue and withholds ruling on Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss at this time.
the underlying facts of this case are not pertinent to this
Motion; however, the Court will give a brief overview to put
the matter at issue in context.
End Recovery Center (“RERC”) does business as a
residential addiction treatment facility in Challis, Idaho.
Bruner and Del Colletti are husband and wife and co-own RERC.
Del Colletti acts as the Executive Director and Bruner acts
as the property manager. Maple and Stephens are husband and
wife and both worked for RERC during the timeframe in
question: Stephens as a chef, Maple as a night technician and
alleges that Bruner engaged in inappropriate conduct towards
her during her employment with RERC. Maple maintains that on
one occasion, on or about January 14, 2017, Bruner sexually
battered her. Plaintiffs reported the incident to local law
enforcement. Maple and Stephens subsequently determined that
they could no longer work at RERC unless Del Colletti
addressed these issues regarding Bruner's behavior
towards Maple. According to Plaintiffs, Del Colletti refused.
As a result of Bruner's conduct, and RERC and/or Del
Colletti's failure to intervene, Maple alleges that RERC
constructively discharged her in violation of law. Stephens
also felt that due to the “hostile work environment,
” and Del Colletti's inaction, RERC constructively
discharged him as well.
August 11, 2017, Plaintiffs filed their complaint in the
instant suit alleging nine different state and federal causes
of action. Many of these claims revolve around Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
November 6, 2017, prior to filing an answer or any other
responsive pleading, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss
asking the Court to dismiss all federal claims and to decline
jurisdiction over the remaining state claims. Defendants
point out that in Title VII actions an employer is only
liable if it employs more than 15 people. Defendants maintain
that RERC has never employed more than 15 people and,
therefore, Plaintiffs' claims fail out the outset.
response to this Motion, Plaintiffs request that the Court
either deny the Motion, or that the Court delay consideration
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d) until appropriate
discovery can be conducted to determine the number of RERC
Motion to Dismiss
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim challenges the
legal sufficiency of the claims stated in the complaint.
Conservation Force v. Salazar, 646 F.3d 1240, 1242
(9th Cir. 2011). “A complaint generally must satisfy
the notice pleading requirements of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 8(a)(2) to avoid dismissal under a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion.” Id. (citing Porter v. Jones,
319 F.3d 483, 494 (9th Cir. 2003)). “Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only ‘a short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief, ' in order to ‘give the
defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests.'” Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 555 (2007) (quoting Conley
v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).
sufficiently state a claim for relief and survive a 12(b)(6)
motion, the pleading “does not need detailed factual
allegations;” however, the “[f]actual allegations
must be enough to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level.” Id. at 555. Mere
“labels and conclusions” or a “formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not
do.” Id. Rather, there must be “enough
facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Id. at 570. In other words, the
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
light of Twombly and Iqbal, the Ninth
Circuit summarized the governing standard as follows:
“In sum, for a complaint to survive a motion to
dismiss, the nonconclusory factual content, and reasonable
inferences from that content, must be plausibly suggestive of
a claim entitling the ...