United States District Court, D. Idaho
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER RE: MOTIONS TO STRIKE
(DKT. 52; DKT. 60)
HONORABLE CANDY W. DALE, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
INTRODUCTION
Pending
before the Court are two motions to strike filed by
Defendants City of Weiser, Police Chief Greg Moon, and police
officers Brandon Hathorn and Jason Maxfield. (Dkt. 52 and
Dkt. 60.)[1] The motions are made pursuant to rules
12(f) and 56(c)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The parties have fully briefed each motion, and presented
oral arguments at a hearing on December 7, 2017. After
carefully considering the parties' briefing, arguments,
docket, and relevant authorities, the Court will deny in part
and grant in part Defendants' motion to strike at Docket
52, and will deny in part and grant in part Defendants'
motion to strike at Docket 60.
The
undersigned notes, however, that Defendants' motion for
partial summary judgment (Dkt. 41), and Defendants'
motion for summary judgment (Dkt. 55), are pending for
resolution by the presiding District Judge, who retains the
discretion to modify the rulings contained in this decision
should he conclude the undersigned committed error. 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(A). Further, rulings on whether the evidence
is admissible at trial are reserved to the time of trial, and
Defendant's objections are preserved.
BACKGROUND
In this
case, Carrie Ann Kinkade alleges that two police officers
employed by the City of Weiser, Brandon Hathorn and Jason
Maxfield, are personally liable for excessive use of force
and arrest without probable cause under 42 U.S.C. Section
1983 and the Idaho Tort Claims Act. Kinkade alleges the same
claims against the City of Weiser and Police Chief Greg Moon.
(Second Amended Complaint, Dkt. 25.)
In a
state case related to the same incident, the State of Idaho
filed criminal charges against Kinkade for disturbing the
peace, a violation of Idaho Code Section 18-6409, and for
battery upon a certain personnel, a police officer, a
violation of Idaho Code Section 18-915(3)(B). On June 3,
2014, a preliminary hearing was conducted on the matter.
During the hearing, the state magistrate judge found that
there was probable cause for an arrest based on the battery
charge. The charges against Kinkade were later dropped by the
State.
Defendants
filed a motion for partial summary judgment limited to
Kinkade's arrest without probable cause claim (false
arrest). (Dkt. 41.) Additionally, Defendants filed a motion
for summary judgment for all claims alleged against the City
of Weiser and Police Chief Greg Moon. (Dkt. 55.) Plaintiff
responded to each motion with briefing including the
affidavits that are the subject of the pending motions to
strike.[2]
STANDARD
OF LAW
Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) governs motions to strike.
Under the rule, a “court may strike from a pleading an
insufficient defense or any redundant, impertinent, or
scandalous matter.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(f). Motions to
strike are “generally regarded with disfavor because of
the limited importance of pleading in federal practice, and
because they are often used as a delaying tactic.”
Neilson v. Union Bank of Cal., N.A., 290 F.Supp.2d
1101, 1152 (C.D. Cal. 2003). A court has broad discretion in
deciding such motions. Phelps v. City of Parma,
Idaho, No. 1:14-CV-00085-EJL, 2015 WL 893112, at *1 (D.
Idaho Mar. 2, 2015). Motions strike must be construed in the
light most favorable to the non-moving party. Id. A
court will deny such motion if the challenged material has
“any relation to the subject matter of the
controversy.” Id.
Defendants
assert that each of the affidavits fails to comply with the
requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c)(4),
which requires that affidavits or declarations submitted in
response to a motion for summary judgment “be made on
personal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in
evidence, and show that the affiant or declarant is competent
to testify on the matters stated.” Defendants argue
that the affidavits contain information that is not relevant
to the motions. According to the Federal Rules of Evidence,
“[a]ll relevant evidence is admissible, except as
otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United States,
by Act of Congress, by these rules, or by other rules
prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory
authority.” Fed.R.Evid. 402. Evidence is relevant when
it has “any tendency to make the existence of any fact
that is of consequence to the determination of the action
more probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence.” Fed.R.Evid. 401.
DISCUSSION
I.
Defendants' Motion to Strike the Affidavits of Kinkade
and Musser as to the Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment
Defendants'
motion for partial summary judgment is limited Kinkade's
false arrest claim against the two officers, and is limited
to Defendant's argument that those claims are barred by
collateral estoppel because of a previous finding of probable
cause for arrest by a state magistrate judge. (Dkt. 41.) They
argue that the evidence in Kinkade's affidavit (Dkt.
47-3) is irrelevant to Defendants' argument that
collateral estoppel bars the false arrest claim. The
affidavit discusses Kinkade's version of the events,
argues Officer Hathorn's version of the events is
...