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Quiring v. United States

United States District Court, D. Idaho

February 7, 2018

TRAVIS QUIRING, Movant,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Respondent.

          MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER AND DENIAL OF CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

          B. Lynn Winmill Chief U.S. District Court Judge

         INTRODUCTION

         The Court has before it a motion to vacate Quiring's sentence and a request for a hearing on that motion. The motions are fully briefed and at issue. For the reasons explained below, the Court will deny both motions.

         LITIGATION BACKGROUND

         Quiring pled guilty to a counterfeiting charge and was sentenced to 24 months to run consecutively to his sentence in the State court. He is currently in State custody that is not set to expire until 2026. On March 10, 2017, Quiring filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate, set aside or correct sentence, claiming that (1) he did not waive speedy trial; (2) he signed a plea agreement and the prosecutor told him that his federal sentence would be concurrent with his state sentence; and (3) he has completed his classes and wants leniency. He also requested a hearing on that motion.

         STANDARD OF REVIEW

         Under § 2255, “a district court must grant a hearing to determine the validity of a petition brought under that section, “[u]nless the motions and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief.” U.S. v. Blaylock, 20 F.3d 1458, 1465 (9th Cir. 1994). In determining whether a § 2255 motion requires a hearing, “[t]he standard essentially is whether the movant has made specific factual allegations that, if true, state a claim on which relief could be granted.” U.S. v. Withers, 638 F.3d 1055, 1062 (9th Cir. 2011). A district court may dismiss a § 2255 motion based on a facial review of the record “only if the allegations in the motion, when viewed against the record, do not give rise to a claim for relief or are palpably incredible or patently frivolous.” Id. at 1062-63.

         ANALYSIS

         Speedy Trial Claim

         Quiring complains that the Court “took 10 mo. to get me to sentencing” and alleges that he “never signed or explicitly waived my right to speedy trial.” See Petition (Dkt. No. 1) at ¶ 14. Quiring made his initial appearance on May 20, 2015. A week later, on May 27, 2015, the Court granted a motion to continue filed by Quiring's co-defendant, continuing the trial for both defendants until October 5, 2015. About two months before that trial date, on July 28, 2015, Quiring pled guilty.

         This time-line shows conclusively that there was no speedy trial violation - at most only a few days had run off the speedy trial clock when Quiring pled guilty. While Quiring complains that he never consented to his co-defendant's motion to continue the trial, that argument must be rejected. Under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(6), excludable time exists for “a reasonable period of delay when the defendant is joined for trial with a co-defendant as to whom the time for trial has not run and no motion for severance has been granted.” As the continuance order makes clear, the finding of excludable time applied to both Quiring and his co-defendant. See Order (Dkt. No. 28 in U.S. v. Quiring Case No. 2:15-CR-113-BLW). Quiring's speedy trial allegations fail to state a claim and must be dismissed.

         Promise for a Concurrent Sentence

         Quiring alleges that “I signed a plea agreement to run state and federal time concurrent” and further alleges that “[t]he prosecutor and I had an agreement for concurrent sentencing.” Petition, supra at ¶ 14. But the Plea Agreement signed by Quiring contains no promise for a concurrent sentence - it says nothing that could even be construed as such a promise. Indeed, that Agreement contains a provision, just above Quiring's signature, stating that ‘[n]o other promises or inducements have been made to me, directly or indirectly, by any agent of the Government, including any Assistant United States Attorney, concerning the plea to be entered in this case.” See Plea Agreement (Dkt. No. 32 in U.S. v. Quiring, supra). During the plea hearing, Quiring confirmed that the signature on the plea agreement was his. He was then asked if there were any promises or inducements made to him other than those contained in the plea agreement to induce him to plead guilty, and he answered that there were none. This argument must be rejected.

         Completion ...


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