United States District Court, D. Idaho
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER RE: JACKSON
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Docket No. 46)
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE FIRST AMENDED
COMPLAINT (Docket No. 62)
Ronald
E. Bush Chief U.S. Magistrate Judge
Now
pending before the Court are (1) the Jackson Defendants'
Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 46), and (2)
Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File First Amended
Complaint (Docket No. 62). Having carefully considered the
record, participated in oral argument, and otherwise being
fully advised, the Court enters the following Memorandum
Decision and Order:
I.
GENERAL BACKGROUND
This
case arises from Plaintiff Robert Kreb's
“joint” employment by Defendants Jacksons Food
Stores, Inc. (“Jacksons”), Jackson Jet Center,
LLC and Conyan Aviation, Inc., d/b/a Jackson Jet Center
(“JJC”), and Life Flight Network, LLC
(“LFN”) (collectively referred to as
“Defendants”). See Compl., ¶ 2.16
(Docket No. 1, Att. 1). According to Plaintiff, Defendants
hired him on or about February 24, 2014 “to fly fixed
wing emergency medical response planes for the emergency
medical transport services offered by Defendants.”
Id. at ¶¶ 4.24, 2.3. While Plaintiff
worked for Defendants, he lived in Washington and was
“placed in Lewiston, Idaho as his principal base of
operations.” Id. at ¶ 2.5. During this
time, Plaintiff “would commute from his home in Friday
Harbor[, Washington] each week to start a seven-day schedule
for LFN.” Id. at ¶ 4.20. Although
Plaintiff flew LFN patients in various parts of the Pacific
Northwest, he contends that he “reported to the
Lewiston, Idaho base to perform” those flights.
Id. at ¶ 2.9. While employed, Plaintiff raised
many complaints with Defendants about their alleged failure
to pay him wages and other compensation he says he was
promised. See id. at ¶¶ 4.23, 4.27-4.45.
Defendants
fired Plaintiff on July 10, 2014, one day after he allegedly
raised safety concerns about a flight Defendants had
scheduled him to pilot. See id. at ¶¶
4.46-4.53. Following his termination, Plaintiff alleges that
Defendants “blacklisted” him from employment
opportunities, and that he has since moved to New Mexico with
his family because he could not obtain employment in the
Pacific Northwest. See id. at ¶¶
4.58-4.59, 4.61.
On May
11, 2016, Plaintiff filed a Complaint against Defendants in
the Superior Court of the State of Washington in King County,
Washington. In that complaint, he alleged that Defendants owe
him unpaid wages and other compensation (first cause of
action), wrongfully discharged him in violation of public
policy (second cause of action), and breached their
employment contract with him (third cause of action). See
id. at ¶¶ 1.1, 5.1-7.3. Among other damages
and costs, Plaintiff seeks unpaid wages, lost future wages,
punitive damages, exemplary damages, and emotional distress
damages. See id. at ¶¶ 8.1-8.11.
On June
6, 2016, Defendants removed the Washington state court case
to federal court in the Western District of Washington, based
on diversity jurisdiction. See Not. of Removal
(Docket No. 1). Then, on July 21, 2016, Defendants moved for
a change of venue to the District of Idaho under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1404. See Mot. to Change Venue (Docket No.
19). On September 14, 2016, United States District Judge
James L. Robart granted that Defendants' motion,
transferring venue to this Court:
On balance, the Court finds Defendants have met their burden
of demonstrating that transfer is appropriate. Of the nine
factors, four weigh in favor of transfer, five are neutral,
and none weigh against transfer. Most importantly, most of
the parties, the case-related contacts, the relevant
witnesses, and other evidence are located in Idaho. For these
reasons, Defendants have made “a strong showing of
inconvenience” to support a transfer of venue.
Accordingly, the court concludes that transfer to the
District of Idaho pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404 is
warranted.
9/14/16 Order, p. 15 (Docket No. 37) (internal citations
omitted).
Jacksons
and JJC (collectively the Jackson Defendants) now move for
summary judgment on all of Plaintiff's claims against
them. See generally MSJ (Docket No.
46).[1] They
argue that under a conflict of laws analysis, Idaho law
applies to preclude each of Plaintiff's claims against
them. See id., p. 3 (“Under Idaho law,
Kreb's claims for unpaid wages are barred by the statute
of limitations, his claim for wrongful termination is barred
by his election of an administrative remedy, and his claim
for breach of contract is barred by the statute of
limitations.”). Plaintiff disputes that a conflict of
laws analysis favors Idaho law over Washington law, but
argues that most of his claims survive under Idaho law
regardless. See generally Opp. to MSJ
(Docket No. 6). Relatedly, Plaintiff also moves for leave to
amend his Complaint to add a cause of action under the Fair
Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) for retaliation.
See Mot. to Am. (Docket No. 62).
II.
DISCUSSION
A. The Jackson Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment (Docket No. 46)
1.
Summary Judgment Standard
Summary
judgment is appropriate where a party can show that, as to
any claim or defense, “there is no genuine dispute as
to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). One of the
principal purposes of the summary judgment “is to
isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims . . .
.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323
(1986). It is “not a disfavored procedural shortcut,
” but is instead the “principal tool[ ] by which
factually insufficient claims or defenses [can] be isolated
and prevented from going to trial with the attendant
unwarranted consumption of public and private
resources.” Id. at 327. “[T]he mere
existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties
will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for
summary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). There must be a
genuine dispute as to any material fact - a fact
“that may affect the outcome of the case.”
Id. at 248.
The
moving party is entitled to summary judgment if that party
shows that each issue of material fact is not or cannot be
disputed. To show the material facts are not in dispute, a
party may cite to particular materials in the record, or show
that the materials cited do not establish the presence of a
genuine dispute, or that the adverse party is unable to
produce admissible evidence to support the fact. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A) & (B); Ransier v. United
States, 2014 WL 5305852, *2 (D. Idaho 2014).
Rule
56(e)(3) authorizes summary judgment for the moving party
“if the motion and supporting materials - including the
facts considered undisputed - show that the movant is
entitled to it.” The existence of a scintilla of
evidence in support of the non-moving party's position is
insufficient. Rather, “there must be evidence on which
the jury could reasonably find for the [non-moving
party].” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 252 (1986).
2.
Washington v. Idaho: Conflict of Laws Analysis
The
United States Supreme Court has held that, when a change of
venue occurs pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a),
“[t]he transferee district court must be obligated to
apply the state law that would have been applied if there had
been no change of venue.” Van Dusen v.
Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 639 (1964). In a diversity case,
the federal court must apply the conflict of laws principles
of the forum state. See Sarlot-Kantarjian v. First
Pennsylvania Mort. Trust, 599 F.2d 915, 917
(9th Cir. 1979). Therefore, there is no dispute
that Washington's conflict of laws rules apply to
determine whether Washington or Idaho law should govern the
instant action. See S.A. Empresa De Viacao Aerea Rio
Grandense v. Boeing Co., 641 F.2d 746, 749
(9th Cir. 1981); compare also Mem. in
Supp. of MSJ, p. 5 (Docket No. 46, Att. 2), with
Opp. to MSJ, p. 2 (Docket No. 60).
a.
An Actual Conflict Exists
However,
before a conflict of laws inquiry takes place, Washington law
presupposes an actual conflict between the laws of Washington
and Idaho. See Burnside v. Simpson Paper Co., 864
P.2d 937, 941-42 (Wash. 1994). When the result of the issues
is different under the law of the two states, there is a
“real” conflict. See Weizer v. Sessions,
940 P.2d 261, 264 (Wash. 1997). Here, a comparison of
Washington's and Idaho's statutory laws'
application to Plaintiff's claim for unpaid wages reveals
a clear conflict in need of resolution via a conflict of laws
analysis.
Plaintiff
alleges that Defendants, under Washington law, (1)
“willfully violated RCW 49.52.050 and RCW 49.52.070 by
failing to pay [his] promised wage for all time engaged in
work, ” and (2) “willfully violated RCW
49.46.130(1) by not paying an overtime rate of at least one
and one-half times his regular rate of pay for all hours in
excess of forty in a seven-day workweek.” Compl.,
¶¶ 5.2-5.3 (Docket No. 1, Att. 1). Relevant
here, RCW 49.52.050(2) penalizes employers “who . . .
willfully and with intent to deprive [an] employee of any
part of his or her wages, . . . pay any employee a lower wage
than the wage such employer is obligated to pay such employee
by any statute, ordinance, or contract”; RCW 49.52.070
creates civil liability for any employer who violates RCW
49.52.050(2) and provides that the wronged employee may be
entitled to “twice the amount of wages unlawfully
rebated or withheld”; and, with few exceptions, RCW
49.46.130(1) requires all employers to pay their employees
overtime for hours worked over forty in a work.
Defendants
contend that these provisions of Washington law clash with
Idaho's wage laws. See Mem. in Supp. of MSJ, p.
6 (Docket No. 46, Att. 2). For example, Idaho Code §
45-608 provides that employers must pay “all wages due
to their employees at least once during each calendar month,
on regular paydays designated in advance by the
employer” - unlike RCW 49.052.050, there is no
requirement under Idaho law that an employer act
“willfully and with the intent” to withhold pay.
See id. Moreover, Idaho Code § 45-615(2)
provides for the recovery of treble damages in a successful
wage claim, whereas RCW 49.52.050(2) permits double damages.
See id.[2] And, finally, unlike RCW 49.46.130(1),
Idaho has no statute requiring the payment of overtime wages
specifically. See id. According to Defendants, these
instances reveal “clear conflicts between the Idaho
statutes on the wage and overtime claims and the Washington
statutes governing those issues.” Id.
It is
unclear whether the subjective component inherent within RCW
49.052.050 offers a difference without much of a distinction
when compared to Idaho Code § 45-608. In other words, as
Plaintiff argues, it may well be that Defendants owe him
wages under either Washington or Idaho law because Defendants
have not alleged that their failure to pay him his promised
wages was somehow a mistake or inadvertent (and, thus, not
otherwise willful or intentional). See Opp. to MSJ,
p. 5 (Docket No. 60). As such, there can be no underlying
conflict that then sets in motion Washington's conflict
of laws analysis. See Woodward v. Taylor, 366 P.3d
432, 435 (Wash. 2016) (“If there is no actual conflict,
the local law of the forum applies and the court does not
reach the most significant relationship step.”). The
extent to which this same logic extends to Defendants'
alleged failure to pay Plaintiff overtime wages is likewise
unclear, given that there is no Idaho statute requiring the
payment of such wages, notwithstanding a possible contract
requiring the same - rhetorically speaking, how does this
reality speak to an employer's subjective intent
surrounding its failure to make such payments, if at all?
The
question is abstract at present and not answered here. Still,
the fact remains that the legal mechanism for recovering
overtime wages in Washington and Idaho is different. In
Idaho, an aggrieved employee must first prove the existence
of an agreement for payment of overtime wages before
recovering such wages pursuant to that agreement. In
comparison, Washington allows an aggrieved employee to
recover overtime wages via statute alone, independent of any
agreement. Said another way, if Washington law were to apply
to this case, the Defendants could be liable for payment of
overtime wages without Plaintiff having to first prove the
existence of any agreement (as is needed under Idaho law) for
payment of such wages. Without attempting to conclude as a
matter of law that the outcome is the same under ...