2018
Opinion No. 16
Appeal
from the District Court of the First Judicial District, State
of Idaho, Kootenai County. Hon. Richard S. Christensen,
District Judge.
Order
denying motion to dismiss and judgment of conviction,
affirmed.
Eric
D. Fredericksen, State Appellate Public Defender; Ben P.
McGreevy, Deputy Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for
appellant.
Hon.
Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Ted S. Tollefson,
Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.
HUSKEY, Judge
Robert
Johnson Kinney appeals from his judgment of conviction after
a jury found him guilty of sexual battery of a minor. Kinney
argues the district court erred when it failed to dismiss the
sexual battery charge on proportionality grounds. We affirm
the district court's finding that the Idaho's Sex
Offender Registration Act does not constitute cruel and
unusual punishment, and therefore affirm the district
court's order denying Kinney's motion to dismiss and
judgment of conviction.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Kinney
was arrested and charged with felony sexual battery of a
minor, Idaho Code § 18-1508A. Kinney filed three motions
to dismiss: (1) a motion to dismiss on equal protection
grounds; (2) a motion to dismiss on substantive due process
grounds; and (3) a motion to dismiss on proportionality
grounds. The district court held a hearing on Kinney's
three motions. After hearing arguments from both parties, the
district court entered a memorandum decision and order which
denied all three motions. On appeal, Kinney does not
challenge the district court's denial of his motion to
dismiss on equal protection grounds or his motion to dismiss
on substantive due process grounds. With regard to
Kinney's motion to dismiss on proportionality grounds,
the district court relied on two sources: (1) the legislative
intent within Idaho's Sex Offender Registration Act; and
(2) Idaho case law, particularly the Idaho Supreme Court
decision in State v. Joslin, 145 Idaho 75, 175 P.3d
764 (2007). The district court concluded: "The doctrine
of stare decisis leads this Court to hold that Idaho's
Sex Offender Registry is remedial rather than punitive.
Therefore, Defendant's argument that the State's Sex
Offender Registry requirement violates the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment
must fail."
The
case proceeded to trial where the jury found Kinney guilty of
sexual battery of a minor. Prior to sentencing, Kinney filed
a motion to reconsider the motion to dismiss on
proportionality grounds. Kinney argued there was a
possibility that a motion to dismiss on constitutional
grounds is not ripe for adjudication until there is a
conviction. Kinney also argued Idaho should adopt the
reasoning of Does #1-5 v. Snyder, 834 F.3d 696 (6th
Cir. 2016), an opinion which determined the Michigan
sex-offender registry law was unconstitutional.
Before
ruling on the motion to reconsider, the district court
imposed a unified sentence of seven years, with two years
determinate, and retained jurisdiction. After sentencing, the
district court conducted a hearing and denied Kinney's
motion to reconsider. Kinney timely appeals.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Where
the constitutionality of a statute is challenged, we review
the district court's decision de novo. State v.
Cobb, 132 Idaho 195, 197, 969 P.2d 244, 246 (1998);
State v. Martin, 148 Idaho 31, 34, 218 P.3d 10, 13
(Ct. App. 2009). The party attacking a statute on
constitutional grounds bears the burden of proof and must
overcome a strong presumption of validity. State v.
Korsen, 138 Idaho 706, 711, 69 P.3d 126, 131 (2003),
abrogated on other grounds by Evans v. Michigan, 568
U.S. 313 (2013); State v. Cook, 146 Idaho 261, 262,
192 P.3d 1085, 1086 (Ct. App. 2008). Appellate courts are
obligated to seek an interpretation of a statute that upholds
its constitutionality. State v. Manzanares, 152
Idaho 410, 418, 272 P.3d 382, 390 (2012); Martin,
148 Idaho at 34, 218 P.3d at 13.
III.
ANALYSIS
Kinney
argues the district court erred when it failed to dismiss the
sexual battery charge on proportionality grounds. Kinney
argues that while registering pursuant to the original
version of Idaho's Sex Offender Registration Act may not
have been punishment, changes to the statute have created
more onerous and more punitive registration requirements,
thus resulting in punishment. Therefore, Kinney asserts that
requiring him to register as a sex offender pursuant to
Idaho's Sex Offender Registration Act is cruel and
unusual punishment in violation of the Idaho Constitution and
the United States Constitution.[1] The State asserts that
Idaho's Sex Offender Registration Act is not a punishment
and is constitutional according to the controlling Idaho case
law.
A.
Idaho's Sex Offender Registration Notification and
Community Right-to-Know Act
The
Idaho legislature enacted the Sex Offender Registration
Notification and Community Right-to-Know Act ("Sexual
Offender Registration Act" or "SORA") in 1993.
The legislation's Statement of Purpose explained:
The proposed legislation will require convicted sex offenders
to register with local law enforcement in the county of their
residence during probation and parole and for a period of ten
years after discharge from probation and parole. Registration
information would be sent by local law enforcement agencies
to the Department of Law Enforcement to create a central
statewide sex offender registry. This information will be
available to law enforcement agencies. Name of the offender
and the criminal conviction information is available to the
public upon written request provided they supply the
person's name, date of birth and social security number.
S.B. 1002, 52nd Leg., 1st Sess., Statement of
Purpose (Idaho 1993). The enacted legislation also
contained the following explanation of the legislature's
findings, which Idaho courts have relied on in interpreting
the purpose of SORA:
The legislature finds that sex offenders present a high risk
of reoffense and that efforts of law enforcement agencies to
protect their communities, conduct investigations and quickly
apprehend offenders who commit sex offenses are impaired by
the lack of information available about individuals who have
pled guilty to or have been found guilty of sex offenses who
live within their jurisdiction. Therefore, this state's
policy is to assist efforts of local law enforcement agencies
to protect their communities by requiring sex offenders to
register with local law enforcement agencies as provided in
this chapter.
I.C. § 18-8302 (1993).
In
1998, as a result of new federal legislation, Idaho repealed
its 1993 version of SORA and passed a new Sex Offender
Registration Act that conformed to the federal requirements
of the 1994 Jacob Wetterling Act[2] and the Megan's
Law[3]
amendment.[4] I.C. §§ 18-8301 through 18-8326
(1998). The 1998 statement of purpose explained: "This
legislation overhauls the sexual offender registry to comply
with federal guidelines and to provide easier access by the
public to registry information." S.B. 1297, 54th Leg.,
2nd Sess., Statement of Purpose (Idaho 1998). The
findings, found at I.C. § 18-8302, were also updated in
1998:
The legislature finds that sexual offenders present a
significant risk of reoffense and that efforts of law
enforcement agencies to protect their communities, conduct
investigations and quickly apprehend offenders who commit
sexual offenses are impaired by the lack of current
information available about individuals who have been
convicted of sexual offenses who live within their
jurisdiction. The legislature further finds that providing
public access to certain information about convicted sexual
offenders assists parents in the protection of their
children. Such access further provides a means for
organizations that work with youth or other vulnerable
populations to prevent sexual offenders from threatening
those served by the organizations. Finally, public access
assists the community in being observant of convicted sexual
offenders in order to prevent them from recommitting sexual
crimes. Therefore, this state's policy is to assist
efforts of ...