United States District Court, D. Idaho
SHALYNN F. PADDOCK, M.B. and A.P., Plaintiffs,
v.
ANDREW BALLOU; BRIANA DIXON; COUNTY OF CANYON, a public entity; IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND WELFARE CPA; RAYCHELLE MINDEN, in her individual capacity; MIRANDA SQUIBB, in her individual capacity; JASMINE OLMEDO, in her individual capacity; ARACELI LUNA, in her individual capacity; CALDWELL POLICE DEPARTMENT; OFFICER T. EDWARDS, in his individual capacity; OFFICER DEFUR, in his individual capacity KIDS SERVICES, INC. of Caldwell, Canyon County, Idaho; and JOHN AND JANE DOES 1-50, Defendants.
ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION (DKT.
54)
David
C. Nye, U.S. District Court Judge
I.
INTRODUCTION
On June
19, 2018, United States Magistrate Judge Candy W. Dale issued
a Report and Recommendation (“Report”),
recommending that: (1) Defendant KIDS Services Inc.'s
Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 10) be granted; (2) Defendant Andrew
Ballou's Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 40) be granted; (3)
Defendant Briana Dixon's Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 41) be
granted; and (4) Plaintiff Shalynn Paddock be given 30 days
to file an Amended Complaint.
Any
party may challenge a magistrate judge's proposed
recommendation by filing written objections to the report and
recommendation within fourteen days after being served with a
copy of the same. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1);
Local Civil Rule 72.1(b). No objections have been filed in
this case and the matter is now ripe for the Court's
consideration.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C), this Court “may
accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings
and recommendations made by the magistrate judge.”
Where the parties object to a report and recommendation, this
Court “shall make a de novo determination of
those portions of the report which objection is made.”
Id. Where, however, no objections are filed, the
district court need not conduct a de novo review.
The
Ninth Circuit has interpreted the requirements of 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(C) as follows:
The statute [28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C)] makes it clear
that the district judge must review the magistrate
judge's findings and recommendations de novo if
objection is made, but not otherwise. . . .to the extent
de novo review is required to satisfy Article III
concerns, it need not be exercised unless requested by the
parties. Neither the Constitution nor the statute requires a
district judge to review, de novo, findings and
recommendations that the parties themselves accept as
correct.
United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121
(9th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted); see also Wang v. Masaitis, 416 F.3d 993,
1000 & n.13 (9th Cir. 2005).
Further,
to the extent that no objections are made, arguments to the
contrary are waived. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72; 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (objections are waived if they are
not filed within fourteen days of service of the report and
recommendation). Thus, “[w]hen no timely objection is
filed, the Court need only satisfy itself that there is no
clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the
recommendation.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory
committee's note to 1983 amendment (citing Campbell
v. United States Dist. Court, 501 F.2d 196, 206 (9th
Cir. 1974)).
III.
DISCUSSION
The
complete procedural background and facts of this case are
well articulated in the Report and the Court incorporates the
same in this Order. In a prior order (Dkt. 50), the Court
outlined the status of each Defendant in this case. Some
Defendants were not properly served-nor have they been to
this day-and many appear immune from suit. That aside, three
Defendants have appeared and respectively filed motions to
dismiss. These motions are the substance of Judge Dale's
Report.
This
Court has reviewed the entire Report as well as the full
record in this matter for clear error and finds none.
Moreover, this Court agrees with the Report's recitation
of the facts, discussion of the applicable law, analysis,
reasoning, and conclusions. For these reasons, the Court will
adopt the Report and grant the respective motions to dismiss.
The Court will also-in accordance with the Report-allow
Paddock to file an amended complaint. If Paddock elects to
file an amended complaint, however, it must conform with the
“Leave to Amend Complaint” section of the Report.
Of the four claims Paddock alleges against KIDS Services, she
will only be allowed to amend her Fourteenth Amendment claim
to set forth an appropriate factual basis. Paddock will not
be allowed to amend her Thirteenth Amendment claim against
KIDS Services, nor her Idaho state law claims for invasion of
privacy or violations of the Idaho Human Rights Act, as no
amendment could save those claims. Likewise, Paddock will
only be allowed to amend her invasion of privacy (tort)
claims against Ballou and Dixon. She will not be allowed to
amend her Sixth Amendment claims or her Idaho state civil
rights claims against either Ballou or Dixon as amendments to
these claims would also be futile.
IV.
ORDER
The
Court HEREBY ORDERS:
1. The Report and Recommendation entered on June 19, 2018,
attached below, (Dkt. 54) is ADOPTED IN ITS
ENTIRETY.
2. Defendant KIDS Services, Inc.'s Motion to Dismiss
(Dkt. 10) is GRANTED.
3. Defendant Andrew Ballou's Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 40)
is GRANTED.
4. Defendant Briana Dixon's Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 41)
is GRANTED.
5. Plaintiff is GRANTED LEAVE to file an
amended complaint to cure deficiencies identified in the
Report as outlined. If Plaintiff elects to file an amended
complaint, such must be filed within 30 days of this
decision. The Court may review the same to ensure compliance
with Fed.R.Civ.P. 8 and Judge Dale's Report.
REPORT
AND RECOMMENDATION
Candy
W. Dale, United States Magistrate Judge
INTRODUCTION
Pending
before the Court are three motions to dismiss filed by
Defendants KIDS Services, Inc., Andrew Ballou, [1] and Briana Dixon.
(Dkt. 10, 40, 41.) The motions to dismiss are ripe for the
Court's consideration. Having reviewed the record herein,
the Court finds the facts and legal arguments are adequately
presented in the briefs and record. Accordingly, in the
interest of avoiding delay, and because the Court
conclusively finds that the decisional process would not be
significantly aided by oral argument, the motions will be
decided on the record without oral argument. Dist. Idaho L.
Rule 7.1(d).
The
pertinent claims asserted against the moving
parties[2] begin with count one, brought under
Section 1983, which claims that Plaintiff's Fourteenth
Amendment right to familial association was violated by
Defendants KIDS Services and Briana Dixon, Defendant
Ballou's girlfriend (or spouse). (Dkt. 1, p. 13.) Next,
Plaintiff alleges violations of the Sixth Amendment against
Ballou in count two, and the Thirteenth Amendment against
Defendant KIDS Services and “CPS Workers” in
count three. Id.
Turning
to Plaintiff's state law claims, count five alleges a
violation of her state civil rights by all Defendants, but
does not state which specific rights were violated. (Dkt. 1,
¶ 74-87.) And second, Plaintiff alleges in count nine
that all Defendants committed the tort of invasion of
privacy. (Dkt. 1, ¶ 88-94.) After careful consideration
of the briefing, the standard of review, and relevant
authorities, the Court will recommend that all three motions
to dismiss be granted.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff
Shalynn Paddock (Plaintiff), who appears pro se in this
matter, brings both constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (Section 1983) and state law claims. (Dkt. 1,
¶ 1.) Defendants in this case are: Canyon County, Canyon
County Sheriff's Department, Caldwell Police Department,
Raychelle Minden, Miranda Squibb, Jasmine Olmedo, Araceli
Luna, Officer T. Edwards, Officer Defur, Kids In Divorce
Support Services, Inc. (KIDS Services), [3] Briana Dixon, and
Andrew Ballou. (Dkt. 1, ¶ 4-15.) Defendants Minden,
Squibb, Olmedo, and Luna are identified as employees of Child
Protective Services (CPS) in Canyon County. (Dkt. 1, ¶
7-10, 16.) Defendant Officers Edwards and Defur are both
employees of the Caldwell Police Department. (Dkt. 1, ¶
11- 12.) KIDS Services is a private company located in Canyon
County. (Dkt. 1, ¶13; (Dkt. 13.) It appears Andrew
Ballou is the father of one of Plaintiff's children,
M.B., and Briana Dixon is either Ballou's girlfriend or
spouse. When reading the caption and complaint together, it
is unclear if the government employees named as defendants
are being sued in their individual capacities, their official
capacities, or both, as the information in the caption does
not fully align with the allegations in the complaint.
Plaintiff
asserts that all named Defendants deprived her of various
constitutional and state rights during investigations
regarding allegations of child abuse, which later resulted in
the removal of her minor children from the home. (Dkt. 1.)
Plaintiff states the investigation stemmed from allegations
that Plaintiff's son, M.B., was not being fed, had
bruises on his body from being hit by Plaintiff, had bedbugs
present in his bed, and was often locked in his bedroom for
long periods of time. (Dkt. 1, ¶ 20; see also
Report, Dkt. 1-2 at 4.) Additional allegations in the
underlying investigation included that drugs and drug
paraphernalia were present in the home, and that Plaintiff
was consuming alcohol while breastfeeding. (Dkt. 1, ¶
20.)
Plaintiff
was subjected to numerous welfare checks performed by both
CPS employees and law enforcement officials, where the
purpose was to ensure that Plaintiff's children were
living in a safe environment. (Dkt. 1, ¶ 20, 22.) On
November 17, 2017, Plaintiff alleges that Officer Defur was
in possession of a protection order that instructed him to
remove M.B. from Plaintiff's home, which he did, based on
the continuing allegations of child abuse. (Dkt. 1, ¶
23.) KIDS Services later facilitated supervised visitations
between M.B. and Plaintiff. (Dkt. 1, ¶ 23, 26.)
KIDS
Services charged Plaintiff a sixty-dollar intake fee, as well
as fifty dollars per hour to participate in supervised visits
with M.B. (Dkt. 1, ¶ 26.) Plaintiff asserts that KIDS
Services told her when and how long her visits with M.B.
would be - she was not given a choice in the matter. (Dkt. 1,
¶ 26.) After the first visit with M.B., Plaintiff
contacted KIDS Services to find out when her next visitation
was scheduled, but Plaintiff did not receive a response from
KIDS Services. (Dkt. 1, ¶ 35.) Last, Plaintiff alleges
that KIDS Services scheduled a visitation appointment, failed
to inform Plaintiff about the appointment, and then charged
Plaintiff forty dollars for missing the appointment. (Dkt. 1,
¶ 35, 37.)
Another
incident occurred on December 9, 2017. (Dkt. 1, ¶ 30.)
According to Plaintiff's complaint, Defendants Olmedo and
Officer Edwards arrived at Plaintiff's home with the
intent of performing a welfare check. Specifically, they
requested to check on Plaintiff's infant daughter, A.P.,
as they believed the baby had rashes on her body, and had
been given soda by way of bottle-feeding. Id. Upon
arrival, Defendants allegedly pushed their way into
Plaintiff's home. Id. Plaintiff asserts she did
not provide Defendants with consent to enter the home and
told them to leave. Id. Defendants Olmedo and
Officer Edwards allegedly forced Plaintiff to remove her
daughter's clothing so she could be inspected for rashes
by these Defendants. Id. Plaintiff's home was
also searched by these officials, which included a search for
bedbugs in the mattresses and a search of Plaintiff's
roommate's bedroom. Id. It is unclear from
Plaintiff's complaint whether Defendants Olmedo and
Officer Edwards had obtained judicial authorization prior to
entering and searching the home, and examining A.P.
Id.
On
February 6, 2018, KIDS Services filed a motion to dismiss.
(Dkt. 10.) Plaintiff was provided an opportunity to respond
to the motion, and she received notice regarding how to do
so. (Dkt. 11.) Plaintiff filed a document on February 27,
2018, titled “Questions for KIDS Services' Council
[sic] Concerning Motion to Dismiss.” (Dkt. 26.) KIDS
Services responded to Plaintiff's filing by indicating
that Plaintiff did not address the legal issues raised by
KIDS Services in its motion to dismiss. (Dkt. 32.) KIDS
Services asserts that Plaintiff failed to allege facts to
support a cognizable cause of action against it, and requests
the Court grant its motion to dismiss. Id.
Plaintiff
later filed an opposition to KIDS Services' motion to
dismiss on April 5, 2018. (Dkt. 44.) Plaintiff opposes the
motion on the grounds that a conflict of interest exists,
because legal counsel for KIDS Services is also a director of
the organization. Plaintiff alleges also that KIDS Services
“has a close monetary relationship with the courts thus
causing a biased relationship in favor of the wishes of the
courts, police, prosecutors, and judges.” KIDS Services
responded, asserting that the objections Plaintiff raised are
insufficient as a matter of law to defeat its motion to
dismiss, and Plaintiff failed to identify any substantive
issues of law which would affect the motion. (Dkt. 49.)
On
April 3, 2018, Defendants Ballou and Dixon separately filed
motions to dismiss with accompanying memoranda, which are
nearly identical to each other, and substantially similar to
KIDS Services memorandum. (Dkt. 40, 41.) Ballou raises three
arguments. First, that this is a custody dispute and the
complaint raises frivolous allegations against Ballou that
should be resolved in state court. (Dkt. 40,
31.)[4]
Second, Ballou contends that, to the extent Plaintiff alleges
civil rights violations against him, Plaintiff failed to file
a complaint with the Idaho Human Rights Commission prior to
filing suit. And third, Ballou asserts that Plaintiff's
claim for invasion of privacy is not viable. Dixon raises the
same arguments in her motion to dismiss. (Dkt. 41-1.)
Additionally,
in their answers, both Ballou and Dixon asserted that the
complaint failed to state claims against them upon which
relief could be granted. (Dkt. 30, 31.)
In
response, Plaintiff argues neither Ballou nor Dixon addressed
all of the allegations made against them in her Complaint;
discovery has not yet been conducted so she cannot support
her claims; the custody matter is a separate matter, and has
no relationship to the civil rights claims she brings here;
and last, that she is not required to file a complaint with
any state agency if she believes “there will be no fair
resolution at the state level.” (Dkt. 51,
52.)[5]
STANDARDS
OF REVIEW
1.
Motion to Dismiss
Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief” to “give the defendant fair
notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it
rests.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555 (2007). While a complaint attacked by a Rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss “does not need detailed
factual allegations, ” it must set forth “more
than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of
the elements of a cause of action will not do.”
Id. at 555. The principle “that a court must
accept a complaint's allegations as true is inapplicable
to threadbare recitals of a cause of action's elements,
supported by mere conclusory statements.” Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (citing Twombly
at 555).
To
survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Twombly at 570. A claim has facial plausibility when
the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged. Id. at 556. The
plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability
requirement, ” but it asks for more than a sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.
Id. Where a complaint pleads facts that are
“merely consistent with” a defendant's
liability, it “stops short of the line between
possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to
relief.'” Id. at 557.
The
United States Supreme Court identified two “working
principles” that underlie Twombly in
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). First,
the Court need not accept as true legal conclusions that are
couched as factual allegations. Id. Rule 8 does not
“unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed
with nothing more than conclusions.” Id. at
678-79. Second, to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint
must state a plausible claim for relief. Id. at 679.
“Determining whether a complaint states a plausible
claim for relief will ... be a context-specific task that
requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial
experience and common sense.” Id.
Additionally,
a pro se complaint must be construed liberally.
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). “A
pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must
be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers.” Id. (quoting Estelle
v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Because Plaintiff proceeds pro se,
the Court must construe her pleadings liberally and afford
her the benefit of any doubt. See Bretz v. Kelman,
773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc).
2.
...