United States District Court, D. Idaho
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
C. Nye, U.S. District Court Judge.
matter comes before the Court on Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment. Dkt. 27. Having reviewed the record, the
Court finds that the parties have adequately presented the
facts and legal arguments in the briefs. Accordingly, in the
interest of avoiding further delay, and because the Court
finds that the decisional process would not be significantly
aided by oral argument, the Court decides the Motion on the
record without oral argument. Dist. Idaho Loc. Civ. R.
7.1(d)(2)(ii). For the reasons set forth below, the Court
finds good cause to GRANT the Motion for Summary Judgment.
Cesar Herrera Sanchez is an inmate at the Idaho State
Correctional Center. Dkt 27-3, at 7. When the events that
give rise to this case occurred, Sanchez was a pre-trial
detainee at the Bonneville County Jail, awaiting trial on
charges for drug trafficking and possession of paraphernalia.
When officers booked Sanchez into the Bonneville County Jail,
on August 12, 2015, they asked him if he had any enemies in
the Jail. Dkt. 27-4, at 1. Sanchez stated that he did not
have any enemies and he did not know anyone in the Bonneville
County Jail. Id. Thereafter, Officers placed Sanchez
in “Unit 2” at the Jail, which contained 40 or 50
other detainees. Id.
September 8, 2015, three individuals who were also staying in
Unit 2, Jorge Espinoza, Juan Villa, and Roberto Vargas,
attacked Sanchez in his cell. Id. at 2. Sanchez had
not had any problems with these three individuals, or any
other Bonneville County Jail inmates, up until that time.
Id. Sanchez was familiar with the three assailants
and would pray with Espinoza and Jan Villa every night before
bed as “they were the only [other detainees at the
Jail] that spoke Spanish.” Id. at 4. These
three individuals hit Sanchez until he “was drenched in
blood.” Id. at 3. They told Sanchez they were
attacking him “because [he] was working with the
police.” Id. When Idaho State Police officers
originally arrested Sanchez, he told them he was working with
federal marshals in Montana. Dkt. 27-3, at 8. Sanchez
believes someone told his three attackers this information.
officers or staff members working at the Bonneville County
Jail saw the attack or arrived while the attack was ongoing.
Dkt. 27-4, at 3. After the individuals left, Sanchez
“rang the bell at the door, ” which is supposed
to alert Jail staff to emergencies. Id. The first
two times Sanchez rang the bell no one answered. Id.
The third time officers responded. Id.
discovering Sanchez, officers took him to shower, gave him
new clothes, and then took him to see a doctor, where he
received prompt medical care. Id. The attackers
broke Sanchez's left index finger, knocked loose two of
his front teeth, and split open his lip such that it required
nine stitches. Id.; Dkt. 23, at 4. Sanchez also
suffered from temporary hearing loss. Dkt. 23, at 4.
deputies moved Sanchez to “isolation, ” away from
the general population for three to four months. Dkt. 27-4,
at 5. Deputies then moved him to Unit 4, a “protective
custody” unit for the remainder of his time at the
Bonneville County Jail. Id. at 6. Sanchez had no
other problems with inmates during the remainder of his time
at the Bonneville County Jail. The Bonneville County Jail
investigated the attack, and the attackers were ultimately
charged with battery. Id. at 3, 6.
April 17, 2017, Sanchez filed this suit and an application to
proceed in forma pauperis. Sanchez asserted claims for
failure to protect under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against three
deputies at the Bonneville County Jail⸺Deputy Charles
Boomgarden, Deputy Tyrel Parmer, and Deputy John Trotter
(“the deputy Defendants”). He also asserts a
§ 1983 claim against the Bonneville County Jail.
Magistrate Judge Candy Dale reviewed Sanchez's Complaint,
First Amended Complaint, and Second Amended Complaint
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 and 1915A to
determine if Sanchez had asserted facts necessary to support
claims upon which relief could be granted. Dkts. 8, 11, 21.
Judge Dale ultimately concluded that Sanchez could proceed on
his claims. Defendants now move for summary judgment on all
of Sanchez's claims. In addition to the § 1983
claims, Defendants also move to dismiss a state law
negligence claim that Judge Dale never addressed. The Court
will address each claim in turn.
pending Motion is a motion for summary judgment. However,
Defendants have also argued that Sanchez's Second Amended
Complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted. The Court will, therefore,
set forth both standards.
Summary Judgment Standard
judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is
no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P.
56(a). This Court's role at summary judgment is not
“to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the
matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for
trial.” Zetwick v. Cty. of Yolo, 850 F.3d 436,
441 (9th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). In considering a
motion for summary judgment, this Court must “view
the facts in the non-moving party's favor.”
Id. To defeat a motion for summary judgment, the
respondent need only present evidence upon which “a
reasonable juror drawing all inferences in favor of the
respondent could return a verdict in [his or her]
favor.” Id. (citation omitted). Accordingly,
this Court must enter summary judgment if a party
“fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the
existence of an element essential to that party's case,
and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at
trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 322 (1986). The respondent cannot simply rely on an
unsworn affidavit or the pleadings to defeat a motion for
summary judgment; rather the respondent must set forth the
“specific facts, ” supported by evidence, with