United States District Court, D. Idaho
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
C. NYE U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
before the Court is Defendant Bendpak, Inc.'s
(“Bendpak”) Motion to Dismiss. Dkt. 66. Having
reviewed the record and briefs, the Court finds that the
facts and legal arguments are adequately presented.
Accordingly, in the interest of avoiding further delay, and
because the Court finds that the decisional process would not
be significantly aided by oral argument, the Court will
decide the Motion without oral argument. Dist. Idaho Loc.
Civ. R. 7.1(d)(2)(ii). For the reasons outlined below, the
Court DENIES the Motion.
March 15, 2017, the Court held oral argument on numerous
pending Motions. Following the hearing, the Court issued a
Memorandum Decision and Order. Dkt. 58. Relevant to the
instant Motion to Dismiss are the Court's rulings
regarding BendPak's Motion in Limine Re: Subsequent
Remedial Measures and Cusack's Motion to Amend Complaint.
The Court will briefly discuss each Motion and the
Court's prior rulings on the same.
Motion in Limine Re: Subsequent Remedial Measures, Bendpak
petitioned the Court to preclude all evidence of subsequent
remedial measures it made (specifically, BendPak's
introduction of a secondary safety bracket) to the RJ-7
Rolling Jacks that are at issue in this case. The Court
granted in part and denied in part this Motion based upon
Idaho Code section 6-1406 and held that, “[c]onsistent
with that statute, Cusack will not be allowed to introduce
evidence of BendPak's adding of the secondary safety
bracket for purposes of negligence, defect etc., but will be
able to introduce it under a ‘failure to warn'
theory.” Dkt. 58, at 9.
Motion to Amend Complaint, Cusack requested that he be
allowed to (1) add a claim for punitive damages, and (2)
remove all Defendants except BendPak from the case caption
and from the factual allegations of the Complaint.
Ultimately, the Court denied without prejudice the portion of
Cusack's Motion seeking to add a claim for punitive
damages and granted his request to remove everyone except
BendPak from the Complaint. Id. at 14-15. Cusack
subsequently filed his Amended Complaint. Dkt. 60.
the issuance of the Court's Decision-and Cusack filing
his Amended Complaint-BendPak filed a Motion to Dismiss (Dkt.
66) arguing that, in light of the Court's prior ruling,
the Court must now dismiss certain of Cusack's claims as
they fail to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted. Additionally, BendPak argues that several of the
factual assertions in the Amended Complaint must be dismissed
as they are contrary the law of the case.
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim challenges the
legal sufficiency of the claims stated in the complaint.
Conservation Force v. Salazar, 646 F.3d 1240, 1242
(9th Cir. 2011). “A complaint generally must satisfy
the notice pleading requirements of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 8(a)(2) to avoid dismissal under a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion.” Id. (citing Porter v. Jones,
319 F.3d 483, 494 (9th Cir. 2003)). “Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only ‘a short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief,' in order to ‘give the
defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests, '” Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley
v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).
sufficiently state a claim for relief and survive a 12(b)(6)
motion, the pleading “does not need detailed factual
allegations;” however, the “[f]actual allegations
must be enough to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level.” Id. Mere “labels and
conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do.”
Id. Rather, there must be “enough facts to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Id. at 570; see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
light of Twombly and Iqbal, the Ninth
Circuit summarized the governing standard as follows:
“In sum, for a complaint to survive a motion to
dismiss, the nonconclusory factual content, and reasonable
inferences from that content, must be plausibly suggestive of
a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief.” Moss v.
U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009).
deciding whether to grant a motion to dismiss, the court must
accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations in the
pleading under attack. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 663. A
court is not, however, “required to accept as true
allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted
deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.”
Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988
(9th Cir. 2001).