from the District Court of the First Judicial District of the
State of Idaho, Kootenai County, Hon. John T. Mitchell,
judgment of the district court is affirmed in part, reversed
in part, and remanded for further proceedings.
Don Fredericksen, State Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for
Appellant. Brian R. Dickson argued.
Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General, Boise, for Respondent.
Russell J. Spencer argued.
Le Veque appeals the decisions of the district court in
Kootenai County to revoke his probation and subsequently
relinquish jurisdiction. Le Veque argues that the district
court abused its discretion in these decisions by refusing to
consider the propriety of the terms of his probation at the
revocation hearing and by relinquishing jurisdiction solely
because Le Veque had not obtained a polygraph examination
that the district court desired. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the district court's order revoking probation
and reversed the district court's order relinquishing
jurisdiction. We granted the State's petition for review.
We affirm the district court's decision revoking Le
Veque's probation, reverse the district court's
decision relinquishing jurisdiction, and remand the case for
further proceedings before a new district court judge.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Veque pled guilty to burglary and possession of a controlled
substance. The district court imposed an underlying unified
sentence of ten years, with four years fixed, for the
burglary and a concurrent unified sentence of seven years,
with four years fixed, for possession of a controlled
substance. The district court retained jurisdiction.
Following this initial period of retained jurisdiction, the
district court suspended Le Veque's sentences and placed
him on probation for three years.
Veque was initially placed on general supervision probation.
After reviewing Le Veque's criminal history, the
Department of Correction (Department) learned that Le Veque
had been convicted of a sex offense in South Dakota within
the preceding ten years and placed him on sex offender
probation. By way of motions, Le Veque challenged the
propriety of the terms and conditions of his probation, but
the district court denied his attempts to terminate the
probation or modify the terms of probation. The district
court found that the Department's policy that resulted in
Le Veque being placed on sex offender probation was not
arbitrary or capricious. Le Veque did not appeal the district
court's denial of his motions.
on probation, Le Veque engaged in an unapproved sexual
relationship, failed to provide truthful information on
polygraph examinations, and was terminated from his sex
offender treatment program for failing to take responsibility
for his prior sex crime. Le Veque was also sanctioned for
consuming alcohol and using a substance known as
kratom while on probation.
October 28, 2015, Le Veque was arrested on an agent's
warrant and the State filed a motion seeking revocation of
his probation based upon allegations contained in his
probation officer's report of violation. Le Veque denied
those allegations and again challenged the propriety of
subjecting him to the requirements of sex offender probation.
The district court denied Le Veque's motion objecting to
sex offender probation, noting that it had previously denied
two similar motions. Following an evidentiary hearing, the
district court found that Le Veque had willfully violated the
terms of his probation. The district court revoked Le
Veque's probation and ordered him to serve his previously
suspended sentence, retaining jurisdiction for up to one
year. In that order, the district court included the
following statement: "THE COURT SPECIFICALLY
RECOMMENDS SEX OFFENDER TREATMENT AFTER HE FULLY
DISCLOSES HIS INVOLVEMENT IN HIS SOUTH DAKOTA CRIME, AND THAT
HIS DISCLOSURE IS VERIFIED WITH A POLYGRAPH."
Le Veque timely filed a notice of appeal from the order
the district court's recommendation that Le Veque be
placed in a sex offender treatment program, the Department
placed Le Veque in a substance abuse program. Le Veque
successfully completed the substance abuse program and the
Department recommended that he be placed on probation. The
prosecutor joined in the recommendation, despite concerns
that Le Veque had not been placed into a sex offender
district court relinquished jurisdiction, noting that he had
not completed the polygraph examination that the district
court had addressed in its previous order. The district court
acknowledged that the Department determines the type of
treatment provided but stated that Le Veque
"could've arranged for a full disclosure polygraph
that was passable or passed either before you went on your
[second] rider or after you returned, and you haven't . .
. ." Le Veque and his attorney then inquired if the
district court would allow additional time for Le Veque to
take a polygraph examination. The district court denied that
request and entered its order relinquishing jurisdiction.
Veque timely appealed from the order relinquishing
jurisdiction, which was treated as an amended notice of
appeal. Thus, the two matters before the Court on appeal are:
(1) the district court's revocation of Le Veque's
probation and (2) the district court's subsequent
relinquishment of jurisdiction.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
considering a case on review from a decision of the Court of
Appeals, this Court gives due consideration to the
conclusions of the Court of Appeals, but reviews the district
court's decision directly. State v. Rogers, 140
Idaho 223, 226, 91 P.3d 1127, 1130 (2004). This Court
exercises free review over constitutional questions.
Guzman v. Piercy, 155 Idaho 928, 934, 318 P.3d 918,
decision to relinquish jurisdiction or grant probation is
committed to the district judge's discretion."
State v. Coassolo, 136 Idaho 138, 143, 30 P.3d 293,
298 (2001). "Once a probation violation has been proven,
the decision of whether to revoke probation is within the
sound discretion of the court." State v. Rose,
144 Idaho 762, 765, 171 P.3d 253, 256 (2007).
When this Court reviews an alleged abuse of discretion by a
trial court the sequence of inquiry requires consideration of
four essentials. Whether the trial court: (1)
correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted
within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted
consistently with the legal standards applicable to the
specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its
decision by the exercise of reason.
Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863, 421
P.3d 187, 194 (2018) (emphasis in original) (citing Hull
v. Geisler, 163 Idaho 247, 250, 409 P.3d 827, 830