United States District Court, D. Idaho
MARK D. BEAVERS, Petitioner,
STEVE LITTLE, Respondent.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
C. NYE U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE.
before the Court in Mark D. Beavers' habeas corpus matter
are several motions ripe for adjudication. The Court takes
judicial notice of the records from Petitioner's state
court proceedings, which have been lodged by the parties.
See Fed. R. Evid. 201(b); Dawson v.
Mahoney, 451 F.3d 550, 551 (9th Cir. 2006). Having
carefully reviewed the record, including the state court
record, the Court finds that the parties have adequately
presented the facts and legal arguments in the briefs and
record and that oral argument is unnecessary. See D.
Idaho L. Civ. R. 7.1(d). Accordingly, the Court enters the
Idaho Court of Appeals described the facts of the underlying
charges as follows:
After receiving reports of a strong odor of marijuana
emanating from Beavers' home, police obtained a search
warrant. During the search of Beavers' home, police
discovered forty-five growing marijuana plants, jars
containing marijuana, and literature on growing marijuana.
Police also discovered scales, bags, and paraphernalia.
Beavers was arrested and charged with trafficking in
marijuana and possession of a controlled substance with the
intent to deliver [in one case].
While Beavers was out on bond on those charges, he was
arrested for selling marijuana to an undercover police
officer. Police again obtained a search warrant for his home
and discovered growing marijuana plants, seeds, bags, scales,
and jars containing marijuana. Beavers was charged with
trafficking in marijuana, possession of a controlled
substance with the intent to deliver, and delivery of a
controlled substance in [a second case].
(State's Lodging B-5 at 1-2.)
was convicted of both sets of crimes in two separate trials
in the First Judicial District Court in Coeur d'Alene,
Idaho. The two sets of crimes were eventually consolidated
for sentencing. This habeas corpus action challenges only the
second set of charges. Attorney Martin Neils, of the Kootenai
County Public Defender Office, represented Petitioner at his
first trial; Attorney Staci Anderson represented Petitioner
at his second trial.
consolidated direct appeal, all of Petitioner's
convictions were affirmed. (State's Lodging B-5.)
However, the sentences arising from the second criminal
action were vacated, because the sentence enhancement was
improperly determined. The Idaho Court of Appeals concluded
that the trial court should have ordered a jury trial on the
enhancement after it concluded that Petitioner's
admission of prior felony convictions was involuntary.
remand, a jury found facts necessary for the enhancements.
Petitioner was re-sentenced on those counts on December 20,
2011, and a judgment was entered. Petitioner obtained no
other relief on appeal of his sentences after remand.
(State's Lodging D-4.)
filed a post-conviction action asserting one prosecutorial
misconduct claim and thirteen ineffective assistance of trial
counsel claims. (State's Lodging E-1.) The state district
court appointed Attorney J. Lynn Brooks to represent
Petitioner. The State filed a motion for summary dismissal,
and Petitioner's counsel filed a responsive brief. The
Court held a telephonic oral argument hearing on the motion.
Petitioner was not present.
weeks after the hearing, Petitioner filed a motion for change
of counsel, asserting that his counsel was ineffective for
several reasons. The state court granted the State's
motion for summary dismissal without addressing
Petitioner's motion for change of counsel.
was represented by Attorney Jason Pintler of the State
Appellate Public Defender Office on appeal. The Idaho Court
of Appeals affirmed summary dismissal of the post-conviction
petition, and the Idaho Supreme Court denied review.
(State's Lodging F-4 to F-6.)
appears that Petitioner has satisfied most of his sentences,
except the enhanced trafficking sentence, which extends to
2022. He is currently on parole.
in this matter, the Court granted Respondent's Motion for
Summary Dismissal to the extent that it concluded the
following claims were procedurally defaulted: Claims 4
through 11, and 13 through 16 (ineffective assistance of
trial counsel claims); Claims 17 (prosecutorial misconduct),
20 (merits of factual disputes not fully resolved in
underlying criminal proceedings) and 21(a) (fact-finding
procedure inadequate). Claims 18 through 20 and 21(b) through
24 were dismissed as noncognizable. Dkt. 21. Only Claims 1
and 12 remain for a merits determination.
Court permitted Petitioner to file a Motion for Application
of the Martinez v. Ryan exception to excuse the
procedural default of his ineffective assistance of trial
counsel claims. Dkt. 21. Two extensions of time for
submission of the motion were granted. Dkts. 26, 34. The
Court will first consider the preliminary motions, and then
proceed to the Martinez v. Ryan motion.
has filed a Motion to Reconsider Appointment of Counsel, his
second such request. Dkt. 35. Having reviewed the request in
light of the substance of the record, the Court again
declines to appoint counsel.
has filed a Motion for Discovery. Dkt. 37. Petitioner asserts
that he has never been provided with the full recordings of
the conversations between him and the police confidential
informant, Cathy Johnson, that occurred on November 20 and
21, 2007, which led to the second set of charges against
Petitioner. See Dkt. 37-1 at 9; Dkt. 44 at 18; Dkt.
55 at 14. The Court will expand the record with the new
recordings supplied by Petitioner that he received in 2017,
but only to the extent that they may be used for procedural
Petitioner still asserts that the new recording he received
is not the full recording. Nothing in the entire record
suggests that there is another recording, or that the
recording he has was altered. Petitioner's belief, alone,
does not support his request.
cause for discovery exists when there is “reason to
believe that the petitioner may, if the facts are fully
developed, be able to demonstrate that he is entitled to
relief.” Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899,
908-09 (1997) (internal quotation marks and alteration
omitted). To show good cause, a request for discovery must be
supported by specific factual allegations. Habeas corpus
review “was never meant to be a fishing expedition for
habeas petitioners to explore their case in search of its
existence.” Rich v. Calderon, 187 F.3d 1064,
1067 (9th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). If
good cause is shown, the extent and scope of discovery is
within the court's discretion. See Habeas Rule
has not shown good cause to continue to hunt for an
“original” recording. Nor has he provided any
inkling as to the content of this “original”
recording, or why it would aid his defense, since the
evidence at Petitioner's second trial showed that he sold
marijuana to a third party. (State's Lodging A-6 at
37-46.) Moreover, the Court has listened carefully to the
recording and heard nothing, such as an obvious break in the
recording, to indicate that it has been altered or otherwise
edited from the alleged “original.” Petitioner
and Johnson are frequently heard talking over each other,
which would make alteration all but impossible. No. further
discovery is warranted.
has also filed a Motion to Expand the Record. Dkt. 45. Most
of the documents he has supplied pertain to his medical
necessity defense. The Court will grant the motion only to
the extent that the new items may be used for procedural
and Respondent have filed Motions for Extensions of Time as
to various document deadlines. Dkts. 36, 47, 48, 51, 52. Good
cause appearing, the motions will be granted.
FOR APPLICATION OF MARTINEZ V. RYAN
Standard of Law
exists a limited exception to the general rule that
ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel cannot
constitute cause to excuse a procedural default. See
Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991) (setting
forth general rule). That exception was established in
Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012). In
Martinez, the court held that a circumstance of no
counsel or inadequate assistance of counsel “at
initial-review collateral review proceedings may establish
cause for a prisoner's procedural default of a claim of
ineffective assistance at trial.” Id. at 9,
17. The Martinez Court created the limited exception
because “as an equitable matter... the initial-review
collateral proceeding, if undertaken without counsel, or with
ineffective counsel, may not have been sufficient to ensure
that proper consideration was given to a substantial
claim.” Id. at 14.
Martinez v. Ryan exception permits the district
court to hear procedurally defaulted claims of ineffective
assistance of trial counsel. Id. at 16. The
exception, however, has not been extended to other types of
claims. Davila v. Davis, 137 S.Ct. 2058, 2065
(2017). Neither does Martinez apply to attorney
ineffectiveness in ...