United States District Court, D. Idaho
PHILIP A. TURNEY, an individual; BILLY RAY BARTLETT, an individual; MICHAEL A. McCALL, an individual; and REUBEN J. CORTES, an individual, KENNETH MICHAEL WORKMAN, an individual, and RAY MARVIN NICHOLS, an individual, Plaintiffs,
HENRY ATENCIO, et al., Defendants.
ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
AND PHASE 1 SCHEDULING ORDER
LYNN WINMILL, U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE.
before the Court are several motions filed by the parties in
the lead and member cases. Having reviewed the motions and
the entirety of the record, the Court enters the following
8, 2016, Plaintiffs Workman and Nichols filed their pro se
lawsuit asserting that the Idaho Department of Correction
(“IDOC”) and its contract medical provider
Corizon Health Care, Inc. (“Corizon”) were not
providing constitutionally adequate Hepatitis C treatment.
Plaintiffs alleged that, while Hepatitis C can now be cured
with a costly new drug-a non-interferon direct-action
antiviral medication (“DAA”)-IDOC/Corizon policy
is to treat only the prisoners with severe symptoms.
Plaintiffs asserted that prison officials instead should
treat all prisoners infected with Hepatitis C to prevent
their symptoms from becoming severe. Workman and Nichols
sought only injunctive and declaratory relief in their
original pro se Complaint.
developed liver cirrhosis. He has since been treated and
essentially cured of Hepatitis C. Defendants' pending
summary judgment motion asserts that Workman's claims are
now moot because he has been cured.
January 3, 2018, Plaintiffs Philip A. Turney, Billy Ray
Bartlett, Michael A. Hall, and Reuben J. Cortes
(“Turney plaintiffs”) filed a similar
Hepatitis C Complaint in Case No. 1:18-cv-00001-BLW,
Turney v. Atencio. (Dkt. 11.) The Court has since
consolidated Workman and Nichol's action into the
Turney action. (Dkt. 94.)
OF PENDING MOTIONS
Standards of Law
judgment is appropriate where a party can show that, as to a
particular claim or defense, “there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). To
show that the material facts are not in dispute, a party may
cite to particular parts of materials in the record or show
that the adverse party is unable to produce admissible
evidence to support the fact. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1)(A) &
(B). The Court must consider “the cited materials,
” but it may also consider “other materials in
the record.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(3).
III of the Constitution requires that “federal courts
confine themselves to deciding actual cases and
controversies.” Gator.com Corp. v. L.L. Bean,
Inc., 398 F.3d 1125, 1128 (9th Cir. 2005). In addition,
“Article III requires that a live controversy persist
throughout all stages of the litigation.” Id.
at 1128-29 (quoting Burke v. Barnes, 479 U.S. 361,
363 (1987)). The test for mootness is whether the court can
give the plaintiff any effective relief if he is victorious;
“[t]hat is, whether the court can ‘undo' the
effects of the alleged wrongdoing.” Reimers v.
Oregon, 863 F.2d 630, 632 (9th Cir. 1989).
that are capable of repetition, yet may continue to evade
review can be an exception to the mootness doctrine. To
qualify for this exception, a litigant must show that
“(1) the challenged action is too short in duration to
be fully litigated prior to its expiration, and (2) there is
a reasonable expectation that the injury will occur
again.” Dilley v. Gunn, 64 F.3d 1365, 1368
(9th Cir. 1995) (citing Weinstein v. Bradford, 423
U.S. 147, 149 (1975) (per curiam)).