Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Dade v. United States

United States District Court, D. Idaho

January 29, 2019

JOHN ERNEST DADE, Plaintiff,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendant.

          MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER

          B. LYNN WINMILL U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE.

         INTRODUCTION

         The Court has before it plaintiff Dade's second motion under § 2255. Dade received counsel and the motion is fully briefed. For the reasons explained below, the motion is denied.

         LITIGATION BACKGROUND

         In 2002, Dade was convicted by a jury of Counts One, Two, Three, Four, and Six of the eight-count Second Superseding Indictment. More specifically, he was convicted of making threatening interstate communications (Count One), interstate stalking (Count Two), interstate domestic violence on February 18, 2001 (Count Three), use of a firearm in relation to a violent crime (Count Four), and interstate domestic violence on October 20, 2000 (Count Six). The Court imposed a sentence of 336 months.

         The Ninth Circuit affirmed his conviction, noting the “overwhelming” evidence of guilt, but remanded the case for resentencing because the formerly mandatory sentencing guidelines had been rendered advisory by U.S. v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). See U.S. v. Dade, 136 Fed.Appx. 973 (9th Cir. 2005). Upon resentencing, the Court again imposed a 336-month sentence, finding that it was the shortest sentence that would ensure that the victim and other women with whom Dade might become involved would be protected. See Resentencing Transcript (Dkt. No. 387-2) at p. 92 in U.S. v. Dade, 4:01-CR-196-BLW. Dade's appeal of his sentence was rejected. U.S. v. Dade, 275 Fed.Appx. 600 (9th Cir. 2008).

         Dade then filed, and the Court denied, a § 2255 motion. See Memorandum Decision (Dkt. No. 526) in U.S. v Dade, supra. When the Supreme Court issued Johnson v. U.S., 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015), the Ninth Circuit authorized Dade to file a second § 2255 motion. See Order (Dkt. No. 544) in U.S. v. Dade, supra. It is that motion that is now before the Court.

         Dade argues that three of his convictions - for Counts 3, 4 and 6 - must be reversed under Johnson and a follow-up case, Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S.Ct. 1204 (2018). Those three Counts were based on a definition of “crime of violence” contained in 18 U.S.C. § 16. The Dimaya case, citing Johnson, held that § 16(b) was unconstitutionally vague, requiring, Dade argues, that the conviction on those three Counts be set aside. The three Counts at issue include two counts of interstate domestic violence under 18 U.S.C. § 2261, and one count of brandishing a firearm while committing one of the interstate domestic violence crimes.

         Counts Three and Six alleged that Dade committed interstate domestic violence, and required, as an element of each offense, that Dade committed or attempted to commit a “crime of violence.” See 18 U.S.C. § 2261(a)(1). Count Four alleged that Dade brandished a firearm in relation to a “crime of violence.” One element of that offense was that Dade committed the crime of interstate domestic violence as charged in Count Three. Thus, all three Counts required the jury to find that Dade committed a “crime of violence.”

         Because the interstate domestic violence statute - § 2261 - did not contain a definition for “crime of violence, ” the definition contained in 18 U.S.C. § 16 applied. The definition of “crime of violence” in § 16 contains two parts: Subpart (a) is known as the force (or elements) clause and subpart (b) is known as the residual clause. The two subparts define a crime of violence in the disjunctive as follows:

(a) an offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another, or
(b) any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense.

         During Dade's trial, the Court found as a matter of law that three Idaho crimes were crimes of violence: Assault, battery, and burglary. The Court so instructed the jury, and the jury convicted Dade of the two counts of interstate domestic violence (Counts Three and Six) and the count of brandishing a firearm while committing Count Three (Count Four), although the jury verdict form did not identify which of the three Idaho crimes the jury relied upon to render those convictions.

         Following that trial, the Supreme Court declared § 16(b) unconstitutionally vague in Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S.Ct. 1204 (2018), holding that “it requires a court to picture the kind of conduct that the crime involves in the ‘ordinary case,' and to judge whether that abstraction presents some not-well-specified-yet-sufficiently-large degree of risk.” Id. at 1216. This “produces . . . more unpredictability and arbitrariness than the Due Process Clause tolerates.” Id. at 1223.

         By striking down § 16(b), Dimaya leaves only § 16(a) as an operative definition of a crime of violence. The Government concedes that, using the categorical approach, the definition of burglary contained in the Idaho statute does not meet the definition of crime of violence under § 16(a). See Government Response Brief (Dkt. No. 94) at p. 2. Dade argues that because the jury in its verdict form did not identify which of the three Idaho crimes it relied upon to find that a crime of violence had been committed, it may have relied upon the crime of burglary, and may have relied upon the definition contained in ยง 16(b), rendering its verdict void. The Government responds that the trial record shows conclusively that Dade's convictions ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.