United States District Court, D. Idaho
PROGRESSIVE SPECIALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, an Ohio corporation, and COASTAL SELECT INSURANCE COMPANY, a California corporation, a/s/o of Thomas Schmitt, Plaintiffs,
TIFFIN MOTOR HOMES, INC., an Alabama Corporation, CUMMINS INC., an Indiana Corporation, and DAIMLER TRUCKS NORTH AMERICA LLC, a Delaware Corporation, Defendants.
Lynn Winmill U.S. District Court Judge.
before the Court is Defendant Tiffin Motor Homes Inc.'s
Motion to Compel Discovery Responses from Defendant Daimler
Trucks North America, LLC (Dkt. 56). Having reviewed the
parties' briefing, as well as the record in this case,
the Court has determined that oral argument is unnecessary.
Accordingly, the Court enters the following Order.
September 28, 2017 Plaintiffs Progressive Special Insurance
Company and Coastal Select Insurance Company filed a
complaint for damages arising out of an RV fire. Dkt. 1. On
February 8, 2018, Plaintiffs served their first set of
requests for production (“RFPs”) on Daimler.
See Dkts. 56, 57. On March 14, 2018 Daimler objected
to Plaintiffs' RFPs, including to RFPs 5 and 17, on the
grounds of overbreadth and irrelevance. Id.
Nevertheless, Daimler produced documents responsive to these
requests on March 19, 2018, and again on May 10, 2018.
Id. Discovery closed in this case on September 7,
2018, and the dispositive motion deadline passed on October
22, 2018. See Dkt. 45.
November 28, 2018, Defendant Tiffin sent its first
meet-and-confer letter to Defendant Daimler regarding
Daimler's responses to Plaintiffs' RPFs, specifically
RFP Nos. 5 and 17. See Dkt. 56. On January 18, 2019,
the parties engaged in a mediation with the Court to try to
resolve their discovery dispute. See Dkt. 52. The
parties could not reach an agreement, and Defendant Tiffin
filed a Motion to Compel Discovery Responses from Defendant
Daimler Trucks North America on February 6, 2019. Dkt. 56.
Tiffin Lacks Standing to Enforce Plaintiffs' Requests for
to compel responses to requests for production are governed
by Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. As a
threshold matter, the party pursuing a motion to compel must
have standing to bring the motion. Payne v. Exxon
Corp., 121 F.3d 503, 510 (9th Cir. 1997) (“Only
‘the discovering party'... may bring a motion to
compel.”); see also Loop AI Labs v. Gatti, No.
15-cv-00798-HSG (DMR), 2016 WL 4474584 at *8 (N.D. Cal. Aug.
25, 2016) (“under Rule 37(a) ... a party lacks standing
to move to compel answers to a different party's
parties do not dispute that Plaintiffs, not Defendant Tiffin,
propounded the requests for production at issue in this
motion to compel. See Dkts. 56, 57. Both the Ninth
Circuit and the plain language of Rule 37 make clear that
only the “party seeking discovery” has standing
to move to compel compliance with a discovery request. Fed.
R. Civ. Pro. 37(a)(3)(B); Payne 121 F.3d at 510.
Defendant Tiffin nevertheless seeks to compel co-Defendant
Daimler to respond to Plaintiffs' RFPs under
Rule 37(a)(3)(B). See Dkt. 56. Rule 37 and the Ninth
Circuit make clear that Tiffin lacks standing to do so.
Furthermore, Tiffin has failed to point to any federal court
that has compelled discovery on behalf of a party that did
not issue the discovery request. See generally Dkt.
56. Accordingly, the Court will deny Defendant Tiffin's
motion to compel because it lacks standing to enforce another
party's discovery requests.
Tiffin's Motion is Untimely
motion to compel is also untimely. Other district courts
within the Ninth Circuit have regularly denied motions to
compel when those motions were filed after the close of
discovery. See, e.g. Pac. Marine Ctr., Inc. v.
Philadelphia Indem. Ins. Co., No. 1:13-cv-00992-DAD-SKO,
2016 WL 110291, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 11, 2016) (denying
motion to compel filed three months after the close of
discovery and after motions for summary judgment had been
filed); Skinner v. Ryan, No. CV-09-2152-PHX-SMM
(LOA), 2010 WL 4602935 (D. Ariz. Nov. 5, 2010) (motion to
compel filed over three months after the deadline for
bringing discovery disputes to the court's attention
denied as untimely); Christmas v. MERS, No.
2:09-cv-01389-RLH-GWF, 2010 WL 2695662 (D. Nev. July 2, 2010)
(denying motion to compel filed after deadline for discovery
and dispositive motions as untimely).
Days Inn Worldwide, Inc. v. Sonia Investments, 237
F.R.D. 395, 397 (N.D. Tex. 2006), the court engaged in a
comprehensive analysis of cases throughout the federal
judiciary, and ultimately identified eight factors that
district and appellate courts have considered in analyzing
the timeliness of a motion to compel: (1) the length of time
since expiration of the deadline; (2) the length of time the
moving party has known about the discovery; (3) whether the
discovery deadline has been previously extended; (4) the
explanation for the tardiness or delay; (5) whether
dispositive motions have been scheduled or filed; (6) the age
of the case; (7) any prejudice to the party from whom the
discovery is sought; and (8) disruption of the court's
schedule. Days Inn, 237 F.R.D. at 398.
to the Days Inn factors, the Court reaches the
inescapable conclusion that Tiffin's Motion is untimely.
Tiffin filed its motion to compel almost five months after
the close of discovery; it knew or should have known about
Daimler's allegedly deficient discovery back in May,
2018. It is also months past the dispositive motion deadline,
this case began almost a year and a half ago, and Tiffin has
not argued convincingly that it is unfairly prejudiced by the
Court denying this motion to compel. Finally, ...