United States District Court, D. Idaho
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER RE: PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DKT. 21) DEFENDANT'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DKT. 23) DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SEAL
(DKT. 25) DEFENDANT'S AMENDED MOTION TO SEAL (DKT.
E Bush Chief U.S. Magistrate Judge
are Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 21),
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment
(Dkt. 23), Defendant's Motion to Seal (Dkt. 25) and
Defendant's Amended Motion to Seal (Dkt. 27). Having
carefully considered the record and otherwise being fully
advised, the Court enters the following Memorandum Decision
John Lee (“Lee”) is an inmate in the custody of
the Idaho Department of Correction (“IDOC”).
While he was incarcerated at the Idaho Maximum Security
Institution (“IMSI”) in July 2016, he was
prescribed Risperdal, an antipsychotic medication, to treat
his diagnosed paranoid schizophrenia. Patchett Decl. ¶ 5
(Dkt. 24). After he refused treatment, a three-person
Involuntary Medication Hearing Committee (otherwise known as
a Harper panel) was convened on August
16, 2016. Patchett Decl. ¶ 7 and Ex. B at 7 (Dkt. 24).
The Harper panel was comprised of IDOC deputy warden Sue
Wessels, defendant here, as well as two private medical
doctors who are not IDOC employees. Patchett Decl. Ex. D at
13-19 (Dkt. 24). After the panel authorized forcibly
medicating Mr. Lee, he appealed the decision to IMSI Warden
Al Ramirez on August 17, 2016, and the warden upheld the
decision on August 19, 2016. Patchett Decl. ¶ 9 and Ex.
F at 21 (Dkt. 24). Subsequently, Mr. Lee's treating
physician Dr. Scott Eliason prescribed him Haldol, a
different antipsychotic medication, in lieu of Risperdal.
Patchett Decl. ¶ 10 (Dkt. 24). When Mr. Lee refused to
take the medication, he was forcibly medicated on August 23,
2016. Patchett Decl. ¶ 11 and Ex. G at 23 (Dkt. 24). Mr.
Lee has since complied with taking his prescribed medication.
Patchett Decl. ¶ 12 (Dkt. 24).
October 2016, Mr. Lee sued, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the
members of the Harper panel in case 1:16-cv-00443-CWD,
seeking an injunction preventing IDOC from forcibly
medicating him in the future. In February 2017, after Mr.
Lee did not timely file an amended complaint after notice of
deficiencies in his claim, that case was dismissed.
filed this lawsuit in May 2017, bringing the same claims
against the same defendants but in a complaint that was more
detailed than in his prior case. Among other things, he
claims that the medication interferes with the practice of
his religion (Buddhism), because he “need[s] a clear
mind and need[s] to be in control of [his] thoughts to
meditate, [and] any outside interference effects [sic] [his]
ability to achieve spiritual enlightenment.” Prisoner
Compl. 4 (Dkt. 3). He avers that meditation is “the
only way” he can achieve spiritual enlightenment. He
contends that there are less restrictive alternatives that
the prison could use to further its interest in safety, such
as “administrative segregation, higher security
measures, a single cell, single or double escort when outside
of cell[, ] etc.” Id.
also claims that he is inhibited from pursuing his cultural
beliefs, such as martial arts, because of the medication.
Id. at 5. Mr. Lee contends that the medication
causes tremors, stiffness, and muscle spasms which make it
difficult for him to practice his desired martial arts.
Finally, Plaintiff claims that the medication inhibits his
ability to adequately pursue his appeal in his ongoing state
criminal case. Id. at 5-6.
Court issued an Initial Review Order on August 28, 2017,
holding that Mr. Lee may proceed on his claims for injunctive
relief under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), 42 U.S.C. §§
2000cc et seq. (Dkt. 11.) Mr. Lee's other claims were
dismissed. However, Mr. Lee did not timely serve defendants
Dr. Stoddart and Dr. Davis-Johnson; hence, his RLUIPA claims
against them were dismissed. (Dkt. 20.) Only Mr. Lee's
RLUIPA claim against Defendant Wessels remains pending.
10, 2018, Mr. Lee moved for summary judgment (Dkt. 21). On
June 5, 2018, Ms. Wessels moved for summary judgment (Dkt.
23). On June 6, 2018, Ms. Wessels moved to seal certain
documents filed in conjunction with her motion for summary
judgment. (Dkt. 25.) She amended her motion to seal (Dkt. 27)
the same day by filing a new motion.
certain disputes are “appropriately resolved through
the judicial process” in federal courts. Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). Article
III of the United States Constitution limits the jurisdiction
of federal courts to “Cases” and
“Controversies.” Id. Under this
“case” or “controversy” requirement,
a party invoking federal jurisdiction must demonstrate that
he has “suffered or [is] imminently threatened with a
concrete and particularized ‘injury in fact' that
is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant
and likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial
be “likely” as opposed to merely
“speculative” that the alleged injury will be
redressed by a favorable decision. Id. at 561. Where
none of the relief requested, including injunctive relief,
would likely remedy the alleged injury in fact, the plaintiff
lacks standing and his claim is subject to dismissal.
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523
U.S. 83, 109 (1998). A lack of redressability may be evident
in various ways, including when “the wrong parties are
before the court.” Gonzales v. Gorsuch, 688
F.2d 1263, 1267 (9th Cir. 1982); see also Am. Dev. Corp.
v. Strack, 81 F.3d 167 at *3 (9th Cir. 1996)
(unpublished) (applying Gonzales and holding that
“[n]either Strack nor Republic are proper defendants
because the controversy regarding the appointment of the
receiver and the proper scope of the receiver's authority
is between the FDIC and ADC.”). It is the
plaintiff's burden to show that the alleged harm would be
redressed by the remedy sought. See Bowker v.
Morton, 541 F.2d 1347, 1350 (9th Cir. 1976).
courts have dismissed RLUIPA claims for lack of
redressability. In Jones v. Williams, 791 F.3d 1023
(9th Cir. 2015), the district court's dismissal of
plaintiff's RLUIPA claims for injunctive relief was
upheld, in part because “any injunctive relief ordered
in Jones' favor would have no practical impact on [his]
rights and would not redress in any way the injury he
originally asserted.” Id. at 1031. (Alteration
in original; internal citation and quotation marks omitted.)
courts must examine jurisdictional issues such as standing,
including redressability, even if the issue is not raised by
any party. U.S. v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 742 (1995).
Motion to Seal Standard.
documents related to a dispositive motion, the moving party
must show “compelling reasons” to seal. Ctr. for
Auto Safety v. Chrysler Grp., LLC, 809 F.3d 1092,
1098 (9th Cir. 2016). This standard is met when a court finds
“a compelling reason and articulates the factual basis
for its ruling, without relying on hypothesis or conjecture.
The court must then conscientiously balance the competing
interests of the public and the ...