United States District Court, D. Idaho
ARMANDO BALDERAS, JR., DUSTIN HORN, CODY TENNANT, WILLIAM SCOBBY, OCTAVIO GONZALEZ, JAY BARTOLOME, and JON RANSOM, Plaintiffs,
UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, INC., an Ohio corporation, Defendant.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
C. NYE CHIEF U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE.
matter comes before the Court on Defendant United Parcel
Service, Inc's (“UPS”) Motion to Dismiss.
Dkt. 4. On March 12, 2019, the Court held oral argument on
the motion and took it under advisement. For the reasons set
forth below, the Court finds good cause to GRANT the Motion
are a group of UPS drivers. “From time to time UPS
allows regular part-time employees to work as replacements
for full-time package drivers . . . . When working as
replacements for full-time package drivers, the part time
employee[s] [are] classified as  ‘utility
driver[s].'” Dkt. 1-2, at 4. The Plaintiffs worked
as part-time utility drivers for UPS between November 9,
2008, and August 1, 2013. At some point after August 1, 2013,
they all became full-time package drivers.
contend that “[f]or at least the time period of
November 9, 2008 to and through August 1, 2013, UPS agreed
that time spent as a utility driver would be applied to the
employees' full-time package car progression
period.” Id. According to Plaintiffs,
“[t]he Progression Period determines the rate of pay an
employee receives” as a full-time package driver.
Plaintiffs became full-time package drivers, UPS allegedly
refused to apply the time they spent driving as part-time
utility drivers to their progression periods. As such, they
contend that “UPS paid [them] at a lower hourly rate
than the agreed upon hourly rate.” Id. On
February 9, 2018, Plaintiffs filed suit against UPS in Idaho
state court asserting a single cause of action under the
Idaho Wage Claim Act [IWCA], Idaho Code (“I.C.”)
§§ 45-601 et seq.
removed the case to this Court on August 27, 2018. It argues
that the Plaintiffs' wage claims are preempted by Section
301 of the Labor Management Relations Act
(“LMRA”). This provision is codified as 29 U.S.C.
§ 185(a). UPS contends that under Section 301 of the
LMRA, Plaintiffs' claims are “effectively federal
claims” and, therefore, removal to this Court was
proper. Dkt. 1.
seeks dismissal of Plaintiffs' claims pursuant to Fed R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(1) because:
(1) resolution of the claims require an analysis and
interpretation of the terms of a collective bargaining
agreement (“CBA”), and related supplemental
agreements, entered into between UPS and the Union, of which
Plaintiffs are members; and (2) pursuant to the terms of the
CBA and its related agreements, Plaintiffs are required to
resolve their wage claims through the Union's grievance
process, which includes binding arbitration, not in the
4-1, at 2. Alternatively, “UPS also seeks dismissal
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
because Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim for loss of
wages that may be heard by this Court.” Id.
subject matter jurisdiction is challenged pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), the plaintiff bears the
burden of persuasion. Indus. Tectonics, Inc. v. Aero
Alloy, 912 F.2d 1090, 1092 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing
McNutt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S.
178, 189 (1936)). A party who brings a Rule 12(b)(1)
challenge may do so by referring to the face of the pleadings
or by presenting extrinsic evidence. See White v.
Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1242 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Rule
12(b)(1) jurisdictional attacks can be either facial or
factual . . . .”).
jurisdictional attack is facial, the challenger asserts that
the allegations contained in a complaint are insufficient on
their face to establish federal jurisdiction. Safe Air
for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir.
2004). When considering this type of jurisdictional attack, a
court must consider the allegations of the complaint to be
true and construe them in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff. Love v. United States, 915 F.2d 1242,
1245 (9th Cir. 1988).
contrast, in a factual attack, the challenger disputes the
truth of the allegations that, by themselves, would otherwise
invoke federal jurisdiction.” Meyer, 373 F.3d
at 1039. In resolving a factual attack on jurisdiction, the
court need not presume the truthfulness of the
plaintiff's allegations, and may review evidence beyond
the complaint without converting the motion to dismiss into a
motion for summary judgment. Id. Here, it appears
UPS is making a factual challenge by contending that the
Plaintiffs' claim must be addressed through the
collective bargaining agreement.