Balderas v. United Parcel Service, Inc.

          MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER

          DAVID C. NYE CHIEF U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE.

         I. INTRODUCTION

         This matter comes before the Court on Defendant United Parcel Service, Inc's (“UPS”) Motion to Dismiss. Dkt. 4. On March 12, 2019, the Court held oral argument on the motion and took it under advisement. For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds good cause to GRANT the Motion to Dismiss.

         II. BACKGROUND

         Plaintiffs are a group of UPS drivers. “From time to time UPS allows regular part-time employees to work as replacements for full-time package drivers . . . . When working as replacements for full-time package drivers, the part time employee[s] [are] classified as [] ‘utility driver[s].'” Dkt. 1-2, at 4. The Plaintiffs worked as part-time utility drivers for UPS between November 9, 2008, and August 1, 2013. At some point after August 1, 2013, they all became full-time package drivers.

         Plaintiffs contend that “[f]or at least the time period of November 9, 2008 to and through August 1, 2013, UPS agreed that time spent as a utility driver would be applied to the employees' full-time package car progression period.” Id. According to Plaintiffs, “[t]he Progression Period determines the rate of pay an employee receives” as a full-time package driver. Id.^[1]

         After Plaintiffs became full-time package drivers, UPS allegedly refused to apply the time they spent driving as part-time utility drivers to their progression periods. As such, they contend that “UPS paid [them] at a lower hourly rate than the agreed upon hourly rate.” Id. On February 9, 2018, Plaintiffs filed suit against UPS in Idaho state court asserting a single cause of action under the Idaho Wage Claim Act [IWCA], Idaho Code (“I.C.”) §§ 45-601 et seq.

         UPS removed the case to this Court on August 27, 2018. It argues that the Plaintiffs' wage claims are preempted by Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA”). This provision is codified as 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). UPS contends that under Section 301 of the LMRA, Plaintiffs' claims are “effectively federal claims” and, therefore, removal to this Court was proper. Dkt. 1.

         UPS now seeks dismissal of Plaintiffs' claims pursuant to Fed R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) because:

(1) resolution of the claims require an analysis and interpretation of the terms of a collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”), and related supplemental agreements, entered into between UPS and the Union, of which Plaintiffs are members; and (2) pursuant to the terms of the CBA and its related agreements, Plaintiffs are required to resolve their wage claims through the Union's grievance process, which includes binding arbitration, not in the courts.

         Dkt. 4-1, at 2. Alternatively, “UPS also seeks dismissal pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.

         12(b)(6) because Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim for loss of wages that may be heard by this Court.” Id.

         III. LEGAL STANDARDS

         A. Rule 12(b)(1)

         When subject matter jurisdiction is challenged pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), the plaintiff bears the burden of persuasion. Indus. Tectonics, Inc. v. Aero Alloy, 912 F.2d 1090, 1092 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing McNutt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189 (1936)). A party who brings a Rule 12(b)(1) challenge may do so by referring to the face of the pleadings or by presenting extrinsic evidence. See White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1242 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional attacks can be either facial or factual . . . .”).

         If the jurisdictional attack is facial, the challenger asserts that the allegations contained in a complaint are insufficient on their face to establish federal jurisdiction. Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). When considering this type of jurisdictional attack, a court must consider the allegations of the complaint to be true and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Love v. United States, 915 F.2d 1242, 1245 (9th Cir. 1988).

         “By contrast, in a factual attack, the challenger disputes the truth of the allegations that, by themselves, would otherwise invoke federal jurisdiction.” Meyer, 373 F.3d at 1039. In resolving a factual attack on jurisdiction, the court need not presume the truthfulness of the plaintiff's allegations, and may review evidence beyond the complaint without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. Id. Here, it appears UPS is making a factual challenge by contending that the Plaintiffs' claim must be addressed through the collective bargaining agreement.

         B. ...