United States District Court, D. Idaho
ANNA ALMERICO, CHELSEA GAONALINCOLN, MICAELA AKASHA DE LOYOLA-CARKIN and HANNAY SHARP, Plaintiffs,
LAWERENCE DENNEY, as Idaho Secretary of State in his official capacity, LAWRENCE WASDEN, as Idaho Attorney General in his official capacity, RUSSELL BARRON, as Director of the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare in his official capacity and THE STATE OF IDAHO, Defendants.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
Lynn Winmill, U.S. District Court Judge.
the Court is Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration of
the Court's Memorandum Decision and Order. Dkt. 34. For
the following reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs'
Motion for Reconsideration.
is not intended to provide litigants with a “second
bite at the apple.” Weeks v. Bayer, 246 F.3d
1231, 1236 (9th Cir. 2001). Instead, reconsideration of a
final judgment under Rule 59(e) is an “extraordinary
remedy, to be used sparingly in the interests of finality and
conservation of judicial resources.” Carroll v.
Nakatani, 342 F.3d 934, 945 (9th Cir. 2003). A losing
party cannot use a post-judgment motion to reconsider as a
means of litigating old matters or presenting arguments that
could have been raised before the entry of judgment.
School Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah County, Or. v. ACandS,
Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993).
result, there are four limited grounds upon which a motion to
alter or amend judgment may be granted: (1) the motion is
necessary to correct manifest errors of law or fact; (2) the
moving party presents newly discovered or previously
unavailable evidence; (3) the motion is necessary to prevent
manifest injustice; or (4) there is an intervening change in
the law. Turner v. Burlington North. Santa Fe R.R.
Co., 338 F.3d 1058, 1063 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation
Motion for Reconsideration advances two arguments. First,
Plaintiffs argue that the court misapplied the Unite States
Supreme Court's decision in United States v.
Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987). Dkt. 34-1 at 5-14. Second,
Plaintiffs argue that the Court failed to address and
improperly dismissed their distinct Equal Protection Clause
claim. Both mistakes, according to Plaintiffs, constitute
clear error and result in manifest injustice. Plaintiffs'
arguments are meritless.
Salerno Does Not Require the Court to Apply Strict
first argument is that the Court, pursuant to
Salerno, is required to apply strict scrutiny to the
Pregnancy Exclusion in evaluating its constitutionality. This
interpretation of Salerno would turn the case on its
head. Although the Supreme Court in Salerno did
analyze whether the Bail Reform Act complied with substantive
and procedural due process, it did so pursuant to the
standard for facial challenges. The Supreme Court could not
have been clearer as to that standard:
A facial challenge to a legislative Act is, of course, the
most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the
challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists
under which the Act would be valid. The fact that the Bail
Reform Act might operate unconstitutionally under some
conceivable set of circumstances is insufficient to render it
Id. at 745. Thus, the Supreme Court did not engage
in its analysis of the Bail Reform Act's compliance with
substantive and procedural due process for the purpose of
analyzing whether the Bail Reform Act satisfied strict
scrutiny. Instead, the Supreme Court engaged in the
substantive and procedural due process analysis for the
limited purpose of answering the question
of whether there might be a circumstance in which the Bail
Reform Act could be applied constitutionally.
the exact process used by this Court in its prior Memorandum
Decision and Order. After determining that
Salerno's “no set of circumstances”
language applied to Plaintiffs' due process and equal
protection challenges, see Almerico v. Denney, No.
1:18-CV-00239-BLW, 2019 WL 1413745, at *1-4 (D. Idaho Mar.
28, 2019), the Court concluded that a potential set of
circumstances existed in which the State could (1) limit a
woman's ability to prospectively dictate her healthcare
choices and (2) dictate the medical care that a pregnant
woman receives. Id. at *5-7. Salerno bars a
more searching analysis, as does precedent from the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. See,
e.g., Tucson Woman's Clinic v. Eden,
379 F.3d 531, 556 (9th Cir. 2004) (limiting its analysis of
plaintiffs' substantive due process claim to whether
plaintiffs had presented any evidence to “show that
there are no circumstances under which the delegation could
be applied constitutionally”).
The Court Did Not Overlook Plaintiffs' Equal