Appeal
from the District Court of the First Judicial District of the
State of Idaho, Kootenai County. Cynthia K.C. Meyer, District
Judge.
The
decision of the district court is affirmed.
Lawrence G. Wasden, Idaho Attorney General, Boise, for
appellant. Kenneth K. Jorgensen argued.
Anne
Taylor, Kootenai County Public Defender's Office, Coeur
d'Alene, for respondent. Amanda R. Montalvo argued.
BRODY,
JUSTICE.
This
case involves the vexing question of the proper amount of
credit for time served to which Christopher Osborn is
entitled under Idaho Code section 19-2603, the statute
governing rearrest for a probation violation. Osborn violated
a no contact order twice, pleaded guilty to the misdemeanor
charges, and was given consecutive sentences of 365 days in
jail on each count. Both sentences were suspended and he was
placed on probation for two years on each count to be served
concurrently. He was later arrested for, and admitted to,
violating the terms of his probation; he served 106 days in
jail from the date of his arrest before admitting the
violations. The magistrate court granted Osborn 106 days
credit for time served against the first of his consecutive
sentences. Osborn then filed a Rule 35 motion seeking credit
for time served against both consecutive sentences. The
magistrate court denied Osborn's motion. Osborn appealed
to the district court, and it reversed the magistrate
court's denial and granted Osborn credit for time served
against both sentences. We affirm the district court's
decision.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
After a
domestic violence incident, Christopher Osborn was ordered to
have no direct or indirect contact with his girlfriend.
Osborn ignored this order and went to his girlfriend's
home a month later, taking property, making death threats,
and throwing items at her. After police extracted Osborn from
a hiding place in the garage, he was charged with two
misdemeanor counts of violating the no contact order. Osborn
pleaded guilty to both counts and was given consecutive
sentences of 365 days jail on each count, the maximum
sentences available for those offenses. After giving Osborn
credit against each count for time served prior to judgment,
the magistrate court suspended 278 days of each sentence and
placed Osborn on supervised probation for two years on each
count to be served concurrently.
Osborn
absconded immediately upon his release from jail. The State
filed a motion to revoke probation, alleging Osborn violated
the terms of his probation by failing to report to the
probation department within three business days of his
release and was evading supervision. The State requested that
a bench warrant be issued. The State's request was
granted and a bench warrant was issued.
A few
months later, Osborn was arrested after he was found hiding
between a mattress and a box-spring in his girlfriend's
home. He had pulled her into the home by her hair and
threatened to kill her. Osborn's girlfriend was
eventually found unharmed but terrified, hiding amongst
insulation in the home's attic. Police charged Osborn
with violating the no contact order again, and with
kidnapping, and with obstructing an officer. Once in custody
on the new charges, Osborn was served with the outstanding
bench warrant issued in this case for his alleged probation
violations. The State also filed an amended motion to revoke
probation which added the allegation that Osborn violated the
terms of his probation by committing new offenses.
A
little over three months after he was arrested on the new
charges, Osborn admitted to violating the terms of his
probation in this case. The magistrate court revoked his
probation and imposed his previously-suspended consecutive
sentences. The magistrate court credited Osborn with 106 days
spent in jail from service of the bench warrant until he
admitted the probation violations. The magistrate court
credited the time against the first count alone, reasoning
that the time served was post-sentencing on consecutive
counts. Osborn filed a Rule 35 motion asking for additional
credit for time served, arguing that he was owed 106 days
credit against his second count as well, irrespective of the
fact that it was a consecutive sentence. After a hearing on
the matter, the magistrate court denied the motion, stating:
. . . [M]y interpretation of [State v.] Owens and [Idaho Code
section 19-2603] is that after sentencing is imposed-and to
the extent it's structured consecutively as it was
here-[Osborn is] no longer entitled to having credit on each
of the various counts because now the sentences have been
structured consecutively, which it was, and he got credit for
the time that he was in towards that structured sentence. He
doesn't get it twice . . .
Osborn
appealed the magistrate court's denial of his Rule 35
motion to the district court.
Upon
review, the district court reversed the magistrate
court's decision and credited Osborn with 106 days
against the sentences for each of the two counts, rather than
just the first. The district court determined that the plain
language of Idaho Code section 19-2603 and existing case law
mandated that "if [a] bench warrant includes more than
one offense, then a defendant is entitled to credit served on
each offense." It then explained that Osborn's
consecutive sentences did not change the analysis:
In the present case, [Osborn] was taken into custody under a
bench warrant based on a probation violation that applied to
both charges. The fact that [Osborn's] sentences were
imposed to run consecutively is of no moment, because he
violated the terms of his probation on both charges. Thus,
under the plain language of Idaho Code § 19-2603,
[Osborn] is entitled to credit for 106 days against each
count, for total credit of 346 days.
The
State timely appealed to this Court. We affirm the decision
of the district court.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
"The
question of whether a sentencing court has properly awarded
credit for time served to the facts of a particular case is a
question of law, which is subject to free review by the
appellate courts." State v. Gonzalez, No.
44534, 2019 WL 693765, at *2 (Idaho Feb. 20, 2019) (internal
citation omitted). Additionally, "the interpretation of
a statute is a question of law over which this Court
exercises free review." City of Idaho Falls v. H-K
Contractors, Inc., 163 Idaho 579, 581, 416 P.3d 951, 953
(2018).
Our objective when interpreting a statute is "to derive
the intent of the legislative body that adopted the
act." Id. (quoting State v. Schulz,
151 Idaho 863, 866, 264 P.3d 970, 973 (2011)). Statutory
interpretation begins with the statute's plain language.
State v. Dunlap, 155 Idaho 345, 361, 313 P.3d 1, 17
(2013). This Court considers the statute as a whole, and
gives words their plain, usual, and ordinary meanings.
Id. When the statute's language is unambiguous,
the legislature's clearly expressed intent must be given
effect, and we do not need to go beyond the statute's
plain language to consider other rules of statutory
construction. Id. at 361-62, 313 P.3d at 17-18.
State v. Owens, 158 Idaho 1, 3, 343 P.3d 30, 32
(2015).
III.
ANALYSIS
The
State contends the district court erred in granting Osborn
credit for time served against both of his consecutive
sentences. Section 19-2603, the statute at issue, provides in
part:
The defendant shall receive credit for time served from
the date of service of a bench warrant issued by the court
after a finding of probable cause to believe the defendant
has violated a condition of probation . . . .
I.C. § 19-2603 (emphasis added). The State asserts this
language is plain and unambiguous. Its argument is: "By
granting consecutive credit for time served against
the consecutive sentences the magistrate granted 'credit
for time served from the date of service of a bench
warrant.' Not giving concurrent credit against
the consecutive sentences in no way deprived Osborn of
'credit for time served from the date of service of a
bench warrant.' Osborn was serving his consecutive
sentences from the moment ...