United States District Court, D. Idaho
JACKSON'S BUY, SELL, TRADE, INC., an Idaho Corporation, and TERRY JACKSON, Plaintiffs,
v.
DOUG GIDDINGS, individually and in his official capacity as SHERIFF OF IDAHO COUNTY; the IDAHO COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT; the COUNTY OF IDAHO, STATE OF IDAHO; the IDAHO COUNTY COMMISSIONERS; and JOHN DOES 1- 10, Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT
DAVID
C. NYE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
I.
INTRODUCTION
Pending
before the Court are Defendants Doug Giddings (individually
and in his official capacity as Sheriff of Idaho County),
Idaho County Sheriff's Department, Idaho County, and the
Idaho County Commissioners' Motion for Summary Judgment
(Dkt. 13), and Plaintiffs Jackson's Buy, Sell, Trade,
Inc. and Terry Jackson's Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment (Dkt. 16). On September 3, 2019, the Court held oral
argument and took the motions under advisement. Upon review,
and for the reasons set forth below, the Court finds good
cause to GRANT Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment
and DENY Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary
Judgement.
II.
BACKGROUND
In
1990, Plaintiffs Jackson's Buy, Sell, Trade, Inc., and
Terry Jackson (collectively “Plaintiffs”) sued
Idaho County, the Idaho County Sheriff, and the Deputy Idaho
County Sheriff (collectively “1990 Defendants”)
when they changed Idaho County's non-preference towing
policies from prior policies, customs and/or practices that
had been in effect, in some form, since 1975. Plaintiffs in
the 1990 case are the same as those in this case. Idaho
County and the Idaho County Sheriff are sued again in this
case.
The
Sheriff's Department relies on its non-preference towing
call list when it calls for vehicle towing assistance, unless
the driver requiring help requests a specific towing company.
The Sheriff”s Department will uniformly rotate through
the list, so that each of towing companies on the
non-preference list have an opportunity to respond and get
business. In the 1990 case, Plaintiffs alleged that they had
acquired a property interest in receiving non-preference
towing calls for towing services in Idaho County.
In
1992, the parties resolved the case via a joint stipulation
(“Stipulation”). The parties stipulated that
Plaintiffs had acquired a property interest in non-preference
calls for towing services in Idaho County. Consequently, the
Idaho County Commissioners implemented a new towing policy in
1992 that was in accordance with the various policies,
customs and/or practices which had existed in Idaho County
prior to 1990. Although this towing policy was amended in
2007 with Plaintiffs' input, the base policy implemented
in 1992 remained substantially in effect.
However,
on May 26, 2009, the County Commissioners voted in a public
meeting to entirely rescind Idaho County's existing
towing policy. A month later, on June 23, 2009, the County
Commissioners discussed their decision to terminate the old
towing policy in a public meeting. Terry Jackson
(“Jackson”) was present and provided oral
comments on the issue. On July 7, 2009, the County
Commissioners again discussed revocation of the old towing
policy, and Jackson again provided oral comments. During the
meeting, the County Commissioners voted not to reverse their
rescission of the old towing policy. After the July meeting,
the Idaho County Sheriff adopted a new towing policy which
gave the Sheriff more discretion to decide which tow
providers would be on the non-preference tow rotation call
list.
On
December 19, 2015, Idaho County Sheriff's deputies
arrested Jackson for driving under the influence. During this
event, Jackson was allegedly involved in a physical
altercation with the deputies. Three days later, the Idaho
County Sheriff informed Plaintiffs in writing that based on
Jackson's conduct on December 19, 2015, Plaintiffs were
removed from the non-preference tow rotation list. The Idaho
County Sheriff did not provide Plaintiffs with prior notice
or an opportunity to be heard. Since December 21, 2015,
Plaintiffs have not received any non-preference tow calls
from Idaho County.
Plaintiffs
filed suit on December 20, 2017, in the District Court of the
Second Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for
the County of Nez Perce, against Defendants Doug Giddings
(individually and in his official capacity as Sheriff of
Idaho County), Idaho County Sheriff's Department, Idaho
County, and the Idaho County Commissioners (collectively
“Defendants”). Plaintiffs alleged (1) a violation
of their constitutional due process rights and civil rights
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, (2) breach of contract, and (3)
tortious interference with Plaintiffs' economic
advantage. On March 14, 2018, Defendants removed the action
to the United States District Court for the District of Idaho
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1441, and 1446.
On
April 8, 2019, Defendants filed the pending Motion for
Summary Judgment. Dkt. 13. On April 9, 2019, Plaintiffs filed
the pending Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the issue
of whether Defendants violated the Plaintiffs' Fourteenth
Amendment due process rights. Dkt. 16.
III.
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary
judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is
no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P.
56(a). The Court's role at summary judgment is not
“to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the
matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for
trial.” Zetwick v. Cty. of Yolo, 850 F.3d 436,
441 (9th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). In considering a
motion for summary judgment, the Court must “view[ ]
the facts in the non-moving party's favor.”
Id. To defeat a motion for summary judgment, the
respondent need only present evidence upon which “a
reasonable juror drawing all inferences in favor of the
respondent could return a verdict in [his or her]
favor.” Id. (citation omitted).
Accordingly,
the Court must enter summary judgment if a party “fails
to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an
element essential to that party's case, and on which that
party will bear the burden of proof at trial.”
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
The respondent cannot simply rely on an unsworn affidavit or
the pleadings to defeat a motion for summary judgment; rather
the respondent must set forth the “specific facts,
” supported by evidence, with “reasonable
particularity” that precludes summary judgment. Far
Out Productions, Inc. v. Oskar, 247 F.3d 986, 997 (9th
Cir. 2001).
IV.
ANALYSIS
a.
Breach of Contract and Tortious Interference ...