United States District Court, D. Idaho
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
B.
Lynn Winmill U.S. District Court Judge
INTRODUCTION
The
Defendant made timely objections to the Probation
Officer's findings in the Presentence Investigation
Report (Dkt. 33) that she had 10 criminal history points and
was not eligible for the Safety Valve, under 18 U.S.C §
3553(f). [Dkt. 32] The Government filed a response supporting
the probation officer's findings. [Dkt. 41] The Court
heard arguments on October 7, 2019 and orally overruled all
of the Defendant's objections at that time. This Order is
filed to set forth, in more detail, the basis for the
Court's oral ruling.
BACKGROUND
Ms.
Adame was indicted on, and pled guilty to, one count of
Distribution of Methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B). Plea
Agreement, Dkt. 17 at 2. The mandatory minimum sentence
for this offense is five years. 21 U.S.C. §
841(b)(1)(B)(viii). The Initial Presentence Investigation
Report (“PSR”) calculated Ms. Adame's
criminal history score as 10, with a criminal history
category of V, which she objects to. Initial PSR
¶¶ 51-53, Dkt. 30. The Initial PSR found that she
had two 2-point offenses[1] and seven 1-point offenses, four of
which were included in the calculation of Ms. Adame's
criminal history category. Id. at 6-13. The Initial
PSR also found that she committed the instant offense while
under a criminal justice sentence, adding two criminal
history points. Id. ¶ 52.
Adame
also objects to the Probation Officer's determination of
her “Safety Valve” eligibility. Def.'s
Objections at 17, Dkt. 32. The First Step Act of 2018
expanded the eligibility of defendants to be sentenced below
the mandatory minimum for certain types of controlled
substances offenses. Pub. L. 115-391, Title IV, §
402(a), Dec. 21, 2018, 132 Stat. 5221. In order to be
eligible for a sentence below the mandatory minimum the Court
must find that Ms. Adame meets certain criminal history
requirements. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f). Section 3553(f),
known as the “Safety Valve, ” is reproduced
below:
(f) LIMITATION ON APPLICABILITY OF STATUTORY MINIMUMS IN
CERTAIN CASES.-Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in
the case of an offense under section 401, 404, or 406 of the
Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 841, 844, 846), section
1010 or 1013 of the Controlled Substances Import and Export
Act (21 U.S.C. 960, 963), or section 70503 or 70506 of title
46, the court shall impose a sentence pursuant to guidelines
promulgated by the United States Sentencing Commission under
section 994 of title 28 without regard to any statutory
minimum sentence, if the court finds at sentencing, after the
Government has been afforded the opportunity to make a
recommendation, that-
(1) the defendant does not have-
(A) more than 4 criminal history points, excluding any
criminal history points resulting from a 1-point offense, as
determined under the sentencing guidelines;
(B) a prior 3-point offense, as determined under the
sentencing guidelines; and
(C) a prior 2-point violent offense, as determined under the
sentencing guidelines;
(2) the defendant did not use violence or credible threats of
violence or possess a firearm or other dangerous weapon (or
induce another participant to do so) in connection with the
offense;
(3) the offense did not result in death or serious bodily
injury to any person;
(4) the defendant was not an organizer, leader, manager, or
supervisor of others in the offense, as determined under the
sentencing guidelines and was not engaged in a continuing
criminal enterprise, as defined in section 408 of the
Controlled Substances Act; and
(5) not later than the time of the sentencing hearing, the
defendant has truthfully provided to the Government all
information and evidence the defendant has concerning the
offense or offenses that were part of the same course of
conduct or of a common scheme or plan, but the fact that the
defendant has no relevant or useful other information to
provide or that the Government is already aware of the
information shall not preclude a determination by the court
that the defendant has complied with this requirement.
Information disclosed by a defendant under this subsection
may not be used to enhance the sentence of the defendant
unless the information relates to a violent offense.
18 U.S.C. § 3553
The
Final PSR found that Adame, having more than four criminal
history points (excluding 1-point offenses), did not meet the
requirements of subsection (f)(1)(A). Addendum to
PSR ¶¶ 15-18, Dkt. 33-1. This rendered her
ineligible for the Safety Valve.
Adame
makes two statutory interpretation arguments in support of
her safety valve eligibility. See Def.'s
Objections at 19, Dkt. 32. First, she argues that
section 3553(f)(1) should be read in the conjunctive to
require that the Court find all three of: (A) more than 4
criminal history points, (B) a 3-point offense, and (C) a
2-point violent offense, before she is ineligible for the
Safety Valve. Her second argument is that “status
points, ” assigned for being under a criminal justice
sentence during the commission of the instant offense, are
different than “offense-based” points, and should
not count toward her criminal history points under section
3553(f)(1)(A).
LEGAL
STANDARD
1.
Determination of Defendant's Criminal History
Category
The
Government bears the burden of proof for any fact that the
sentencing court would find necessary to determine the base
offense level or criminal history category. U.S. v.
Felix, 561 F.3d 1036, 1043 (9th Cir. 2009). Normally, at
sentencing, the government must prove any fact by a
preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 1045-46.
The
defendant may challenge the existence of a prior conviction,
however “[c]ollateral attacks at sentencing on prior
state court convictions are prohibited.” U.S. v.
Martinez-Martinez, 295 F.3d 1041, 1044 (9th Cir. 2002).
The only narrow exception to this prohibition is for
convictions obtained in violation of a Defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to counsel. Id. (citing Custis
v. U.S., 511 U.S. 485, 490-97 (1994)).
2.
Statutory Interpretation
The
Court's objective when interpreting a statute is to
ascertain the intent of Congress and to give effect to
legislative will. Moorhead v. United States, 774
F.2d 936, 940 (9th Cir.1985). The Court begins with the
statute's plain language. Id. at 941. Absent a
clearly expressed legislative ...