Balderas v. United Parcel Service, Inc.

          MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER

          David C. Nye Chief U.S. District Court Judge.

         I. INTRODUCTION

         This matter comes before the Court on Defendant United Parcel Service, Inc.'s (“UPS”) Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint (“Motion”). Dkt. 19. Having reviewed the record and briefs, the Court finds that the facts and legal arguments are adequately presented. Accordingly, in the interest of avoiding further delay, and because the Court finds that the decisional process would not be significantly aided by oral argument, ^[1] the Court will decide the Motion without oral argument. Dist. Idaho Loc. Civ. R. 7.1(d)(1)(B). For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds good cause to GRANT the Motion.

         II. BACKGROUND

         The background of this case is set forth in the Court's prior order. Dkt. 16.. The Court hereby incorporates that background by reference. In short, the Court granted UPS's initial Motion to Dismiss, holding that, as alleged, Plaintiffs' Complaint was substantially dependent on the parties' collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”)^[2] and thus Plaintiffs' sole cause of action was preempted by § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (“LRMA”). However, the Court allowed Plaintiffs thirty (30) days to file an amended complaint.

         Plaintiffs filed their Amended Complaint (Dkt. 17), again alleging one claim under the Idaho Wage Claim Act, Idaho Code §§ 45-601, et seq. (“IWCA”). The Amended Complaint differs from the original Complaint in only two ways. First, Plaintiffs reference the Letter of Understanding Regarding Utility Drivers Between United Parcel Service and Teamsters Local 483 (“LOU”), a document that reflects Plaintiffs' labor union and UPS's understanding of the CBA as it relates to utility drivers. The LOU allows for hours worked as utility drivers to be credited towards employees' progression periods once they became full-time package drivers. Second, Plaintiffs allege they exhausted their remedies under the terms of the CBA when the UPS Grievance Committee (“Committee”) dismissed their grievance regarding the very issues now before the Court.

         UPS filed the instant Motion, seeking to dismiss the Amended Complaint under Rule 12(b)(1) or, alternatively, 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

         III. LEGAL STANDARD

         1. Rule 12(b)(1)

         When subject matter jurisdiction is challenged pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), the plaintiff bears the burden of persuasion. Indus. Tectonics, Inc. v. Aero Alloy, 912 F.2d 1090, 1092 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing McNutt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189 (1936)). A party who brings a Rule 12(b)(1) challenge may do so by referring to the face of the pleadings or by presenting extrinsic evidence. See White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1242 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional attacks can be either facial or factual.”). If the jurisdictional attack is facial, the challenger asserts that the allegations contained in a complaint are insufficient on their face to establish federal jurisdiction. Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). When considering this type of jurisdictional attack, a court must consider the allegations of the complaint to be true and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Love v. United States, 915 F.2d 1242, 1245 (9th Cir. 1988).

         By contrast, in a factual attack, the challenger disputes the truth of the allegations that, by themselves, would otherwise invoke federal jurisdiction. Meyer, 373 F.3d at 1039. In resolving a factual attack on jurisdiction, the court need not presume the truthfulness of the plaintiff's allegations, and may review evidence beyond the complaint without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. Id. Here, as it did in its previous motion, UPS makes a factual challenge by contending that the Plaintiffs' claim must be addressed through the CBA.

         2. Rule 12(b)(6)

         Rule 12(b)(6) permits a court to dismiss a claim if the plaintiff has “fail[ed] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). “A Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal may be based on either a ‘lack of a cognizable legal theory' or ‘the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.'” Johnson v. Riverside Healthcare Sys., LP, 534 F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). Rule 8(a)(2) requires a complaint to contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, ” in order to “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554 (2007). “This is not an onerous burden.” Johnson, 534 F.3d at 1121. A complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations, ” but it must set forth “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The complaint must also contain sufficient factual matter to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court must view the complaint in the light most favorable to the claimant and “accept[] all well-pleaded factual allegations as true, as well as any reasonable inference drawn from them.” Johnson, 534 F.3d at 1122.

         Finally, in determining whether a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal should be granted, the Court may not look at matters outside the complaint. Schneider v. Calf. Dep't of Corrections, 151 F.3d 1194, 1197 (9th Cir. 1998). However, the Court can take judicial notice of any document not attached to the complaint if the complaint specifically refers to it and its authenticity is not questioned. Fed.R.Evid. 201(f); Townsend v. Columbia Operations, 667 F.2d 844, 848-49 (9th Cir. 1982).

         IV. ANALYSIS

         The Court has already provided a thorough analysis on the interplay between Plaintiffs' IWCA claim, the CBA, and § 301 of the LMRA. Dkt. 16, at 5-11. ...