United States District Court, D. Idaho
ARMANDO BALDERAS, JR., DUSTIN HORN, CODY TENNANT, WILLIAM SCOBBY, OCTAVIO GONZALEZ, JAY BARTOLOME, and JON RANSOM, Plaintiffs,
UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, INC., an Ohio corporation, Defendant.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
C. Nye Chief U.S. District Court Judge.
matter comes before the Court on Defendant United Parcel
Service, Inc.'s (“UPS”) Motion to Dismiss
Amended Complaint (“Motion”). Dkt. 19. Having
reviewed the record and briefs, the Court finds that the
facts and legal arguments are adequately presented.
Accordingly, in the interest of avoiding further delay, and
because the Court finds that the decisional process would not
be significantly aided by oral argument,  the Court will
decide the Motion without oral argument. Dist. Idaho Loc.
Civ. R. 7.1(d)(1)(B). For the reasons set forth below, the
Court finds good cause to GRANT the Motion.
background of this case is set forth in the Court's prior
order. Dkt. 16.. The Court hereby incorporates that
background by reference. In short, the Court granted
UPS's initial Motion to Dismiss, holding that, as
alleged, Plaintiffs' Complaint was substantially
dependent on the parties' collective bargaining agreement
(“CBA”) and thus Plaintiffs' sole cause of
action was preempted by § 301 of the Labor Management
Relations Act (“LRMA”). However, the Court
allowed Plaintiffs thirty (30) days to file an amended
filed their Amended Complaint (Dkt. 17), again alleging one
claim under the Idaho Wage Claim Act, Idaho Code §§
45-601, et seq. (“IWCA”). The Amended
Complaint differs from the original Complaint in only two
ways. First, Plaintiffs reference the Letter of Understanding
Regarding Utility Drivers Between United Parcel Service and
Teamsters Local 483 (“LOU”), a document that
reflects Plaintiffs' labor union and UPS's
understanding of the CBA as it relates to utility drivers.
The LOU allows for hours worked as utility drivers to be
credited towards employees' progression periods once they
became full-time package drivers. Second, Plaintiffs allege
they exhausted their remedies under the terms of the CBA when
the UPS Grievance Committee (“Committee”)
dismissed their grievance regarding the very issues now
before the Court.
filed the instant Motion, seeking to dismiss the Amended
Complaint under Rule 12(b)(1) or, alternatively, 12(b)(6) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
subject matter jurisdiction is challenged pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), the plaintiff bears the
burden of persuasion. Indus. Tectonics, Inc. v. Aero
Alloy, 912 F.2d 1090, 1092 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing
McNutt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S.
178, 189 (1936)). A party who brings a Rule 12(b)(1)
challenge may do so by referring to the face of the pleadings
or by presenting extrinsic evidence. See White v.
Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1242 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Rule
12(b)(1) jurisdictional attacks can be either facial or
factual.”). If the jurisdictional attack is facial, the
challenger asserts that the allegations contained in a
complaint are insufficient on their face to establish federal
jurisdiction. Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373
F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). When considering this type
of jurisdictional attack, a court must consider the
allegations of the complaint to be true and construe them in
the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Love v. United
States, 915 F.2d 1242, 1245 (9th Cir. 1988).
contrast, in a factual attack, the challenger disputes the
truth of the allegations that, by themselves, would otherwise
invoke federal jurisdiction. Meyer, 373 F.3d at
1039. In resolving a factual attack on jurisdiction, the
court need not presume the truthfulness of the
plaintiff's allegations, and may review evidence beyond
the complaint without converting the motion to dismiss into a
motion for summary judgment. Id. Here, as it did in
its previous motion, UPS makes a factual challenge by
contending that the Plaintiffs' claim must be addressed
through the CBA.
12(b)(6) permits a court to dismiss a claim if the plaintiff
has “fail[ed] to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). “A Rule 12(b)(6)
dismissal may be based on either a ‘lack of a
cognizable legal theory' or ‘the absence of
sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal
theory.'” Johnson v. Riverside Healthcare Sys.,
LP, 534 F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation
omitted). Rule 8(a)(2) requires a complaint to contain
“a short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief, ” in order to
“give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim
is and the grounds upon which it rests.” See Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554 (2007).
“This is not an onerous burden.”
Johnson, 534 F.3d at 1121. A complaint “does
not need detailed factual allegations, ” but it must
set forth “more than labels and conclusions, and a
formulaic recitation of the elements.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The complaint must also
contain sufficient factual matter to “state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at
570. In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court must
view the complaint in the light most favorable to the
claimant and “accept all well-pleaded factual
allegations as true, as well as any reasonable inference
drawn from them.” Johnson, 534 F.3d at 1122.
in determining whether a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal should be
granted, the Court may not look at matters outside the
complaint. Schneider v. Calf. Dep't of
Corrections, 151 F.3d 1194, 1197 (9th Cir. 1998).
However, the Court can take judicial notice of any document
not attached to the complaint if the complaint specifically
refers to it and its authenticity is not questioned.
Fed.R.Evid. 201(f); Townsend v. Columbia Operations,
667 F.2d 844, 848-49 (9th Cir. 1982).
Court has already provided a thorough analysis on the
interplay between Plaintiffs' IWCA claim, the CBA, and
§ 301 of the LMRA. Dkt. 16, at 5-11. ...