United States District Court, D. Idaho
NICHOLAS D. SCOYNI, Plaintiff,
v.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT of IDAHO 9TH CIRCUIT, Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: MOTION TO DISMISS
David
C. Nye Chief U.S. District Court Judge.
Pending
before the Court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Dkt.
5). Having reviewed the record and briefs, the Court finds
that the facts and legal arguments are adequately presented.
Accordingly, in the interest of avoiding further delay, and
because the Court finds that the decisional process would not
be significantly aided by oral argument, the Court will
decide the motion without oral argument. Dist. Idaho Loc.
Civ. R. 7.1(d)(1)(B). For reasons set forth below, the Court
GRANTS Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.
BACKGROUND
On
November 14, 2018, Nicolas Scoyni (“Scoyni”) sued
Salvador, et al. in United States District Court for the
District Court of Idaho in case No. 1:18-cv-00506-BLW. On
June 21, 2019, Scoyni filed the present suit against
Defendants “United States district court of Idaho 9th
circuit, ” and a “[j]udge, magistrate, law clerk,
[and] clerk of court” (collectively
“Defendants”) for actions Defendants allegedly
took in Scoyni v. Salvador, et al. Dkt. 1, at 3. On August
29, 2019, Defendants, by and through Joanne P. Rodriguez,
Assistant United States Attorney for the District of Idaho,
filed the pending motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
STANDARD
OF REVIEW
Under
Rule 12(b)(6), a party may move to dismiss based on the
failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). In considering a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss, a court must take all allegations of
material fact as true and construe them in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party, although “conclusory
allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are
insufficient to avoid a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal.”
Cousins v. Lockyer, 568 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir.
2009). A Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal “may be based on
either a ‘lack of a cognizable legal theory' or
‘the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a
cognizable legal theory.'” Johnson v. Riverside
Healthcare Sys., LP, 534 F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th Cir. 2008)
(citing Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901
F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990)). A dismissal without leave to
amend is improper unless it is beyond doubt that the
complaint “could not be saved by any amendment.”
Harris v. Amgen, Inc., 573 F.3d 728, 737 (9th Cir.
2009).
A pro
se complaint is “to be liberally construed” and
“however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers.” See Erikson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,
94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,
106 (1976) and citing the Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(f)'s, now
8(e)'s, mandate to construe pleadings so as to do
justice). A court is obligated, “where the petitioner
is pro se, particularly in civil rights cases, to construe
the pleadings liberally and to afford the petitioner the
benefit of any doubt.'” Hebbe v. Pliler,
627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Bretz v.
Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985) (en
banc)).
DISCUSSION
Scoyni
asserts a Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal
Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), cause of
action against Defendants for violating his Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendment rights. Scoyni contends that Defendants
violated his constitutional rights when they entered, or
failed to enter, certain judicial orders and displayed
“overwhelming obvious favoritism of the defendants of a
civil lawsuit.” Dkt. 1 at 5-7. In sum, Scoyni is suing
Defendants for their handling of his case.
Defendants
move to dismiss Scoyni's Complaint for failure to state a
claim for essentially two reasons: (1) no Bivens remedy
exists on the facts alleged; and (2) even if a Bivens remedy
did exist, Defendants are entitled to either absolute or
quasi-judicial immunity.
1. No.
Bivens Remedy Exists for the Alleged Conduct
a. A
Bivens Claim Must Be Asserted Against Federal Officers in
Their Individual Capacities
A
Bivens claim is a private action against federal officials in
their individual capacities for alleged violations of a
plaintiff's constitutional rights, but the right to
pursue such an action is qualified and not absolute.
Adams v. Johnson, 355 F.3d 1179, 1183 (9th Cir.
2004). A plaintiff may not assert a Bivens claim against
federal officials or agencies in their official capacities
unless the United States waives its sovereign immunity.
Ibrahim v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 538 F.3d
1250, 1257 (9th Cir. 2008) (“But no Bivens-like cause
of action is available against federal agencies or federal
agents sued in their official capacities.”) (citing
FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 485-86 (1994);
Nurse v. United States, 226 F.3d 996, 1004 (9th Cir.
2000)).
Here
Scoyni sues the “United States district court of Idaho
9th circuit, ” a federal agency. He may not assert a
Bivens claim against the district court because the United
States has not waived its sovereign immunity. Scoyni also
fails to name and or sue the Defendants in their individual
capacities in his Complaint. However, this Court will
construe his pro-se ...