United States District Court, D. Idaho
TARANGO D. PADILLA, Petitioner,
RANDY BLADES, Respondent.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
LYNN WINMILL, U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
in this matter, the Court granted Respondent Randy
Blades' Motion for Partial Summary Dismissal of
Petitioner Tarango D. Padilla's Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus. (Dkts. 8, 12.) Petitioner is challenging his
state court grand theft and persistent violator convictions.
Petitioner was permitted to proceed to the merits of a
subclaim contained in Claim Two, alleging Sixth Amendment
ineffective assistance of counsel. Respondent has filed a
Response and Brief in Support of Dismissal as to the
remaining claim. (Dkt. 13.) Petitioner has elected not to
file a reply.
Court takes judicial notice of the records from
Petitioner's state court proceedings, which have been
lodged by the parties. See Fed. R. Evid. 201(b);
Dawson v. Mahoney, 451 F.3d 550, 551 (9th Cir.
2006). Having carefully reviewed the record, including the
state court record, the Court finds that the parties have
adequately presented the facts and legal arguments in the
briefs and record and that oral argument is unnecessary.
See D. Idaho L. Civ. R. 7.1(d). Accordingly, the
Court enters the following Order.
OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL CLAIM
Standard of Law
28 U.S.C.§ 2254(d), as amended by the Anti-terrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”),
applies when a petitioner files a federal habeas corpus
action to challenge a state court judgment. That section
limits relief to instances where the state court's
adjudication of the petitioner's claim:
1. resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved
an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal
law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States;
2. resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented
in the state court proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
petitioner contests the state court's legal conclusions,
including application of the law to the facts, §
2254(d)(1) governs. That section consists of two alternative
tests: the “contrary to” test and the
“unreasonable application” test.
the first test, a state court's decision is
“contrary to” clearly established federal law
“if the state court applies a rule different from the
governing law set forth in [the Supreme Court's] cases,
or if it decides a case differently than [the Supreme Court]
[has] done on a set of materially indistinguishable
facts.” Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694
the second test, to satisfy the “unreasonable
application” clause of § 2254(d)(1) the petitioner
must show that the state court-although it identified
“the correct governing legal rule” from Supreme
Court precedent-nonetheless “unreasonably applie[d] it
to the facts of the particular state prisoner's
case.” Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S.
362, 407 (2000). “Section 2254(d)(1) provides
a remedy for instances in which a state court unreasonably
applies [Supreme Court] precedent; it does not
require state courts to extend that precedent or license
federal courts to treat the failure to do so as error.”
White v. Woodall, 572 U.S 415, 426 (2014).
petitioner contests the reasonableness of the state
court's factual determinations based entirely on the
state court record, a federal court must undertake a §
2254(d)(2) analysis. Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992,
999 (9th Cir. 2004), abrogated on other grounds as
recognized in Murray v. Schriro, 745 F.3d 984 (9th Cir.
2014). There are two general ways to challenge factual
findings as unreasonable under § 2254(d)(2).
“First, a petitioner may challenge the substance of the
state court's findings and attempt to show that those
findings were not supported by substantial evidence in the
state court record. Second, a petitioner may challenge the
fact-finding process itself on the ground that it was
deficient in some material way.” Hibbler v.
Benedetti, 693 F.3d 1140, 1146 (9th Cir. 2012) (internal
federal district court concludes that the state reasonably
found the facts and applied the correct federal legal
precedent but nevertheless came to an incorrect conclusion,
habeas corpus relief is not necessarily warranted. Rather,
the federal district court also must conclude that the state
court decision is objectively unreasonable. Lockyer v.
Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003); Bell, 535 U.S.
at 694. If fairminded jurists could disagree on the
correctness of the state court's decision, then the
decision is considered “objectively reasonable, ”
and relief is not warranted under § 2254(d)(1).
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011).
Stated differently, if all fairminded jurists would
agree that the state court decision is incorrect, that
equates to a finding that the decision is “objectively
unreasonable.” After any mandatory harmless
error review, then habeas corpus relief can be granted. The
Supreme Court emphasized that “even a strong case for
relief does not mean the state court's contrary
conclusion was unreasonable.” Id. (internal
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) is the
clearly-established law governing Sixth Amendment claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel. Strickland
dictates that, to succeed on an ineffective assistance claim,
a petitioner must show that (1) counsel's performance was
deficient in that it fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness, and that (2) the petitioner was prejudiced by
the deficient performance. Id. at 684.
assessing trial counsel's performance under
Strickland's first prong, a reviewing court must
view counsel's conduct at the time that the challenged
act or omission occurred, making an effort to eliminate the
distorting lens of hindsight. Id. at 689. The court
must indulge in the strong presumption that counsel's
conduct fell within the wide range of reasonable professional
assessing prejudice under Strickland's second
prong, a court must find that, under the particular
circumstances of the case, there is a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different. Id. at 684,
694. A reasonable probability is one sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome. Id. at 694.
petitioner must establish both deficient performance and
prejudice to prove an ineffective assistance of counsel
claim. 466 U.S. at 697. On habeas review, the court may
consider either prong of the Strickland test first,
or it may ...