United States District Court, D. Idaho
SUCCESSIVE REVIEW ORDER BY SCREENING JUDGE
C. Nye District Court Judge
Gregory Joseph Nelson is a prisoner proceeding pro se in this
civil rights action. The Court previously reviewed
Plaintiff's first amended complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A, determined that it failed to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted, and allowed Plaintiff an
additional opportunity to amend. See Initial Review
Order, Dkt. 4.
has now filed a Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”).
See Dkt. 6. The SAC alleges that Defendants have
violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and
unusual punishment by failing to protect him from attack by
other inmates. Id. at 9-10.
Court retains its screening authority pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A(b). Having screened the SAC, the Court enters
the following Order requiring Plaintiff to file a supplement
showing why the SAC should not be dismissed as untimely.
Court explained in its Initial Review Order, the Court must
dismiss a prisoner complaint-or any portion thereof-that
states a frivolous or malicious claim, fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief
from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C.
Standards of Law
complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). A complaint fails to
state a claim for relief under Rule 8 if the factual
assertions in the complaint, taken as true, are insufficient
for the reviewing court plausibly “to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “[D]etailed factual
allegations” are not required, but a plaintiff must
offer “more than ... unadorned,
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). If the facts
pleaded are “merely consistent with a defendant's
liability, ” the complaint has not stated a claim for
relief that is plausible on its face. Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted).
brings his claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the civil
rights statute. To state a plausible civil rights claim, a
plaintiff must allege a violation of rights protected by the
Constitution or created by federal statute proximately caused
by conduct of a person acting under color of state law.
Crumpton v. Gates, 947 F.2d 1418, 1420 (9th Cir.
1991). To be liable under § 1983, “the defendant
must possess a purposeful, a knowing, or possibly a reckless
state of mind.” Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135
S.Ct. 2466, 2472 (2015). Negligence is not actionable under
§ 1983, because a negligent act by a public official is
not an abuse of governmental power but merely a
“failure to measure up to the conduct of a reasonable
person.” Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327,
Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects
prisoners against cruel and unusual punishment. To state a
claim under the Eighth Amendment, a plaintiff must show that
he is (or was) “incarcerated under conditions posing a
substantial risk of serious harm, ” or that he has been
deprived of “the minimal civilized measure of
life's necessities” as a result of Defendants'
actions. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)
(internal quotation marks omitted). An Eighth Amendment claim
requires a plaintiff to satisfy “both an objective
standard-that the deprivation was serious enough to
constitute cruel and unusual punishment-and a subjective
standard-deliberate indifference.” Snow v.
McDaniel, 681 F.3d 978, 985 (9th Cir. 2012),
overruled in part on other grounds by Peralta v.
Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc).
to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation, the
deprivation alleged must be objectively sufficiently harmful,
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834, or, in other words,
sufficiently “grave” or “serious, ”
Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991). As the
United States Supreme Court has explained:
Not every governmental action affecting the interests or
well-being of a prisoner is subject to Eighth Amendment
scrutiny, however. After incarceration, only the unnecessary
and wanton infliction of pain constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment forbidden by the Eighth Amendment. To be cruel and
unusual punishment, conduct that does not purport to be
punishment at all must involve more than ordinary lack of due
care for the prisoner's interests or safety.
Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986)
(internal quotation marks, citation, and alteration omitted).
respect to the subjective prong of an Eighth Amendment
analysis, a defendant acts with deliberate indifference only
if the defendant (1) was aware of the risk to the
prisoner's health or safety, and (2) deliberately
disregarded that risk. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.
Prison officials who actually knew of a substantial risk will
not be liable under § 1983 “if they responded
reasonably to the risk, even if the harm ultimately was not
averted.” Id. at 844. Mere ...