United States District Court, D. Idaho
NICHOLAS J. LONGEE, Plaintiff,
ROY C. HOLLOWAY; STANLEY HOLLOWAY; PETER HATCH; CALVIN H. CAMPBELL; and TWIN FALLS COUNTY, Defendants.
INITIAL REVIEW ORDER BY SCREENING JUDGE
LYNN WINMILL U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
Clerk of Court conditionally filed Plaintiff Nicholas J.
Longee's Complaint as a result of Plaintiff's status
as an inmate and in forma pauperis request. The Court now
reviews the Complaint to determine whether it should be
summarily dismissed in whole or in part under 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915 and 1915A. Having reviewed the record, and
otherwise being fully informed, the Court enters the
following Order directing Plaintiff to file an amended
complaint if Plaintiff intends to proceed.
Court must review complaints filed by prisoners seeking
relief against a governmental entity or an officer or
employee of a governmental entity, as well as complaints
filed in forma pauperis, to determine whether summary
dismissal is appropriate. The Court must dismiss a complaint
or any portion thereof that states a frivolous or malicious
claim, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is
immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)
complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). A complaint fails to
state a claim for relief under Rule 8 if the factual
assertions in the complaint, taken as true, are insufficient
for the reviewing court plausibly “to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “Threadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice.” Id. In other
words, although Rule 8 “does not require detailed
factual allegations, ... it demands more than an unadorned,
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). If the facts
pleaded are “merely consistent with a defendant's
liability, ” or if there is an “obvious
alternative explanation” that would not result in
liability, the complaint has not stated a claim for relief
that is plausible on its face. Id. at 678, 682
(internal quotation marks omitted).
is a prisoner in the custody of the Idaho Department of
Correction, currently incarcerated at the Idaho State
Correctional Center. Plaintiff states that he was convicted
of a criminal offense, but later received post-conviction
relief with respect to that offense. Following that grant of
relief, he was charged with additional crimes that apparently
were related to the charge for which he was granted
post-conviction relief. Compl., Dkt. 3, at 2-3.
These new charges were eventually dismissed “through
another petition for post-conviction relief.”
Id. at 3.
sues two Twin Falls County magistrate judges, two Twin Falls
County prosecutors, and Twin Falls County itself, asserting
claims of vindictive prosecution. Id. at 2-5.
has not alleged sufficient facts to proceed with the
Complaint. The Court will, however, grant Plaintiff 28 days
to amend the Complaint. Any amended complaint should take
into consideration the following.
Standards of Law Governing Plaintiff's Claims
brings his claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the civil
rights statute. To state a plausible civil rights claim, a
plaintiff must allege a violation of rights protected by the
Constitution or created by federal statute proximately caused
by conduct of a person acting under color of state law.
Crumpton v. Gates, 947 F.2d 1418, 1420 (9th Cir.
1991). To be liable under § 1983, “the defendant
must possess a purposeful, a knowing, or possibly a reckless
state of mind.” Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135
S.Ct. 2466, 2472 (2015). Negligence is not actionable under
§ 1983, because a negligent act by a public official is
not an abuse of governmental power but merely a
“failure to measure up to the conduct of a reasonable
person.” Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327,
bring a § 1983 claim against a municipality-a local
governmental entity such as Twin Falls County-a plaintiff
must allege that the execution of an official policy or
unofficial custom inflicted the injury of which the plaintiff
complains, as required by Monell v. Department of Social
Services of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). Under
Monell, the requisite elements of a § 1983
claim against a municipality are the following: (1) the
plaintiff was deprived of a constitutional right; (2) the
municipality had a policy or custom; (3) the policy or custom
amounted to deliberate indifference to plaintiff's
constitutional right; and (4) the policy or custom was the
moving force behind the constitutional violation. Mabe v.
San Bernardino Cnty., 237 F.3d 1101, 1110-11 (9th Cir.
2001). Further, a municipality “may be held liable
under § 1983 when the individual who committed the
constitutional tort was an official with final policy-making
authority or such an official ratified a subordinate's
unconstitutional decision or action and the basis for
it.” Clouthier v. County of Contra Costa, 591
F.3d 1232, 1250 (9th Cir. 2010), overruled in part on
other grounds by Castro v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d
1060, 1069 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc).
unwritten policy or custom must be so “persistent and
widespread” that it constitutes a “permanent and
well settled” practice. Monell, 436 U.S. at
691 (quoting Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398
U.S. 144, 167-168 (1970)). “Liability for improper
custom may not be predicated on isolated or sporadic
incidents; it must be founded upon practices of sufficient
duration, frequency and consistency that the ...