Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Papin v. Papin

Supreme Court of Idaho

December 20, 2019

VERONIKA O. PAPIN, Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
JERRY A. PAPIN, Defendant-Appellant.

          Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of the State of Idaho, Bonneville County. Dane H. Watkins, Jr., District Judge.

         The decision of the district court is affirmed in part and reversed in part and remanded for further proceedings.

          Smith Woolf Anderson & Wilkinson, PLLC, Idaho Falls, for Appellant. Marty Anderson argued.

          Banks Gaffney & McNally, Idaho Falls, for Respondent. John E. Cutler argued.

          MOELLER, JUSTICE.

         This is an appeal originating from a complex divorce between Jerry and Veronika Papin. Jerry appeals from the Bonneville County district court's decision, which affirmed in part the judgment of the magistrate court dividing the marital estate. On appeal, Jerry argues that the district court erred in affirming several of the magistrate court's rulings, including: (1) its holding that the marriage settlement agreement was invalid; (2) its holding that the community was entitled to reimbursement for the funds expended towards the mortgage and property taxes on Jerry's separate property home; (3) its characterization of certain property as either separate or community; (4) its valuation of certain property; (5) its award of spousal maintenance to Veronika; and (6) its award of attorney fees to Veronika. For the reasons stated below, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.

         I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

         Jerry and Veronika were married on June 3, 2003, when they were thirty-seven and twenty-nine years old, respectively. Throughout the marriage, the parties resided in Jerry's separate property home in Idaho Falls, Idaho. The parties have one child together, J.P., born on April 11, 2010.

         Veronika was born in the Czech Republic and moved to Idaho Falls in 2003 after having visited a few times. Czech is Veronika's first language, but she understands four other languages, including English. While married to Jerry, Veronika worked part time at an art gallery in Idaho Falls making minimum wage.

         Jerry was born in the United States and has lived in Idaho Falls since 1986. After leaving the Navy in 1991, Jerry began his career as an investment manager. Jerry affiliated his business with IDS Financial Services Inc. (IDS Financial), becoming an independent contractor with the firm. In 1995, IDS Financial changed its name to American Express Financial Advisors (American Express), and in 2005, American Express changed its name to Ameriprise Financial Services, Inc. (Ameriprise). Following the name change, Ameriprise updated its tax policy, thereby allowing Ameriprise affiliated investment managers, such as Jerry, to have their own distinct tax identity. In response, Jerry created Jerry Papin Support Services, LLC (JPSS).

         On August 31, 2011, Jerry sold his "Business and Assets" to Brinton Webb, another Ameriprise affiliated investment manager. Jerry and Webb executed an Agreement for Purchase and Sale of the Ameriprise Franchise of Jerry A. Papin, Jr. (Purchase and Sale Agreement) to document the terms of the sale to Webb.[1] The Purchase and Sale Agreement provided that Jerry would sell to Webb his "Business and Assets, as they exist," for $504, 000. The "Assets" included Jerry's "client base," which consisted of approximately 250 clients with approximately $45, 000, 000 in total assets under management (AUM).

         On the same day, Jerry and Webb executed the Amendment to the Agreement for Purchase and Sale of Practice (the Amendment). The Amendment explained that Jerry could "solicit clients of the Business . . . to move some or all of their accounts from [Webb's] Ameriprise [business] to [Jerry]'s new Industry business." The parties agreed that Jerry would limit the amount of AUM leaving Webb's Ameriprise business to no more than $12, 500, 000. Should Jerry procure more than that, he would have to reduce the purchase price by five percent for each increment of $1, 000, 000 in excess of $12, 500, 000.

         The very next day, Jerry executed an operating agreement with Melissa Davis, forming Straight Line Investment Group, LLC (Straight Line), a Nevada corporation. Jerry and Melissa each owned a fifty percent interest in Straight Line. One month later, Jerry amended the Certificate of Organization for JPSS, changing the name to Straight Line Investment Group, LLC (Straight Line (Idaho)).

         On November 16, 2011, Jerry informed Webb that he would be transferring $16, 900, 000 in AUM-i.e., $4, 400, 000 above the permitted $12, 500, 000-to his new business, Straight Line. As a result, Jerry reduced the purchase price of $504, 000 by twenty five percent. Accordingly, Webb was only required to pay Jerry $378, 000 for the sale of the business.

         Two years later, Jerry prepared a document entitled: A Covenant Affirming the Separate Business Property of Melissa Davis and Jerry A. Papin, Jr. (the Covenant). The Covenant provides in part:

Straight Line Investment Group, LLC, a business formed under the laws of the state of Nevada, as an evolution and continuation of the Investment management and financial advisory business, established in 1991, previously owned by Jerry A. Papin, Jr. exclusively, was contemplated, designed and has thereafter operated as [Jerry and Melissa's] separate property in proportion to their respective ownership interests.

         The Covenant further provides that the spouses of Jerry and Melissa affirm that Straight Line "has been and remains the separate property of [Jerry and Melissa]"; that the spouses do not have and never will have "any lawful right or claim to the intellectual or real property, revenue, proceeds, set-asides, investments, equity or any other thing of value of [Straight Line]"; and that the spouses forever disclaim and waive "all rights, title, and interest which may be vested in either or both of us by virtue of our respective marriages to the Partners in and to all revenues, proceeds, property, assets and other things of value of [Straight Line]" and "any subsequent finding by a jurisdictional authority of any community property or other joint interest." Melissa's husband, Adam Davis, signed the Covenant on October 24, 2013, and Veronika signed the Covenant on November 4, 2013. Neither Jerry nor Melissa signed the Covenant.

         On August 13, 2014, after more than eleven years of marriage, Veronika filed for divorce on the grounds of extreme cruelty or, in the alternative, on the grounds of irreconcilable differences. Jerry requested that the magistrate court grant the divorce on the grounds of adultery or, in the alternative, on the grounds of irreconcilable differences.

         Veronika challenged the validity of the Covenant by moving for summary judgment. Veronika argued that the Covenant is not a "binding or valid premarital agreement pursuant to I.C. § 32-916, et seq. and in accordance with leading Idaho case law." In response, Jerry filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, arguing that the Covenant is a "valid post marital agreement" and Veronika is not entitled to claim any interest in Jerry's separate property business. The magistrate court granted summary judgment in favor of Veronika, holding that the Covenant was not a valid marriage settlement agreement because (1) it was signed by only one spouse when Idaho Code section 32-917 requires both spouse's signatures and (2) it is unconscionable. The court also held that the Covenant was not an "instrument of conveyance" because there was no specific language of conveyance as required by Idaho Code section 32-906(2). Finally, the court held that the Covenant was not a valid agreement as between Veronika and Adam, i.e., the signatories, for lack of consideration.

         Trial commenced on July 1, 2015, and on October 19, 2015, the magistrate court entered its Memorandum Decision. Relevant to this appeal, the court made the following findings: (1) neither party met their burden of proving fault grounds for divorce; (2) community funds were used to pay down the mortgage and property taxes on Jerry's separate property home in the amount of $70, 000 and $13, 797.80, respectively; (3) the proceeds from the sale of the business are presumed to be community property because Jerry could not trace his separate property; (4) Straight Line is community property because it was started during the marriage; (5) the MPCU joint checking account and all investment accounts are community property because the accounts consist of either the proceeds from the sale of Jerry's business or community income; (6) Veronika is entitled to an award of temporary spousal maintenance; and (7) Veronika is entitled to two-thirds of her requested attorney fees.

         Veronika filed a motion for attorney fees and costs, requesting $89, 202.57 in attorney fees and $9, 787.94 in costs. The magistrate court issued its Memorandum Decision Re: Attorney's Fees, awarding Veronika all of her costs and part of her fees. As for costs, the court awarded Veronika $1, 714.19 as costs as a matter of right and $8, 073.75 as discretionary costs. As for attorney fees, the court reduced the requested amount by $5, 447.50 based on Jerry's objections to which Veronika failed to respond. The court also reduced the amount by $48, 372.60 for payments already received from community funds. Finally, the court reduced the amount by one-third, or $15, 056.80, because Veronika only prevailed in part. Accordingly, the court held that Jerry was required to pay Veronika a total of $30, 113.61 in attorney fees and costs. The court entered the Final Decree of divorce on January 29, 2016.

         Jerry appealed both memorandum decisions and the Final Decree to the district court. After oral argument, the district court entered its Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Appeal. The district court affirmed the magistrate court's decision on a majority of the issues, but remanded the following issues: (1) the determination of the appropriate allocation and distribution of the Eastern Idaho Credit Union Account; (2) the determination of the appropriate allocation and distribution of the Ameritrade Account; (3) reconsideration of certain evidence under the proper burden of proof to determine the amount the community is entitled to for reimbursement for the payment of principal and taxes on Jerry's separate residence; (4) the determination of whether any potential tax liability stemming from the 2011 sale of the business should be divided substantially equally; and (5) the determination of expert witness fees as a discretionary cost. Jerry timely appealed.

         II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

         The standard for reviewing a district court's decision when it acts in its intermediate appellate capacity continues to be the source of some confusion. See Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 672, 183 P.3d 758, 760 (2008). However, in Pelayo v. Pelayo, 154 Idaho 855, 303 P.3d 214 (2013), we clarified the standard:

When this Court reviews the decision of a district court sitting in its capacity as an appellate court, the standard of review is as follows:
The Supreme Court reviews the trial court (magistrate) record to determine whether there is substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate's findings of fact and whether the magistrate's conclusions of law follow from those findings. If those findings are so supported and the conclusions follow therefrom and if the district court affirmed the magistrate's decision, we affirm the district court's decision as a matter of procedure.
Bailey v. Bailey, 153 Idaho 526, 529, 284 P.3d 970, 973 (2012) (quoting Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 672, 183, P.3d 758, 760 (2008)). Thus, this Court does not review the decision of the magistrate court. Id. "Rather, we are 'procedurally bound to affirm or reverse the decisions of the district court.'" Id. (quoting State v. Korn, 148 Idaho 413, 514 n. 1, 224 P.3d 480, 482 n. 1 (2009)).
Prior to Losser, when this Court reviewed a district court acting in its appellate capacity the standard of review was: "when reviewing a decision of the district court acting in its appellate capacity, this Court will review the record and the magistrate court's decision independently of, but with due regard for, the district court's decision." Losser, 145 Idaho at 672, 183 P.3d at 760. After Losser, this Court does not directly review a magistrate court's decision. Id. Rather, it is bound to affirm or reverse the district court's decision. See Bailey, 153 Idaho at 529, 284 P.3d at 973; Korn, 148 Idaho at 415 n. 1, 224 P.3d at 482 n. 1.

Pelayo, 154 Idaho at 858-59, 303 P.3d at 217-18. Accordingly, we will review the district court's decision to determine whether it correctly addressed the issues raised on appeal.

         III. ANALYSIS

         A. The marriage settlement agreement.

         Jerry contends that the district court erred in affirming the magistrate court's finding on summary judgment that the Covenant was not a valid marriage settlement agreement. According to Jerry, the Covenant is a valid marriage settlement agreement because it was executed in accordance with the law and properly conveys any interest Veronika may have in Straight Line to Jerry, including all revenue. Veronika contends that the Covenant is not a valid marriage settlement agreement because Jerry is not a party to it, it lacks "mutuality and consideration," and it was not executed in accordance with the law.

         "On appeal from the grant of a motion for summary judgment, this Court employs the same standard as used by the [lower court] originally ruling on the motion." Intermountain Forest Mgmt., Inc. v. Louisiana Pacific Corp., 136 Idaho 233, 235, 31 P.3d 921, 923 (2001). Summary judgment is proper "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(a).

Where the parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment relying on the same facts, issues and theories, the parties effectively stipulate that there is no genuine issue of material fact that would preclude the district court from entering summary judgment. Davis v. Peacock, 133 Idaho 637, 640, 991 P.2d 362, 365 (1999) (citations omitted). However, the mere fact that both parties move for summary judgment does not in and of itself establish that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Kromrei v. AID Ins. Co., 110 Idaho 549, 551, 716 P.2d 1321 (1986) (citing Casey v. Highlands Ins. Co., 100 Idaho 505, 507, 600 P.2d 1387, 1389 (1979)). The fact that the parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment does not change the applicable standard of review, and this Court must evaluate each party's motion on its own merits. Stafford v. Klosterman, 134 Idaho 205, 207, 998 P.2d 1118, 1119 (2000) (citing Bear Island Water Ass'n, Inc., v. Brown, 125 Idaho 717, 721, 874 P.2d 528, 532 (1994)).

Intermountain Forest Mgmt., Inc., 136 Idaho at 235, 31 P.3d at 923.

         i. The magistrate court did not err in raising the issue of consideration sua sponte because it provided the parties with adequate notice and an opportunity to respond.

         Jerry contends that the magistrate court improperly raised sua sponte several issues regarding the validity of the Covenant during the hearing on the parties' motions for summary judgment because he was not provided with adequate notice and an opportunity to respond. Veronika contends that the magistrate court did not raise any issues sua sponte because Jerry placed the legitimacy of the Covenant at issue when he filed a cross-motion for summary judgment asserting its validity.

         Generally, "[t]he [lower] court may not grant summary judgment on a ground raised sua sponte." Sales v. Peabody, 157 Idaho 195, 201, 335 P.3d 40, 46 (2014). However, this is not a blanket rule:

We do not suggest that summary judgment may never be entered by a court sua sponte or on grounds other than those raised by the moving party. . . . [I]n such event, the party against whom the judgment will be entered must be given adequate advance notice and an opportunity to demonstrate why summary judgment should not be entered.

Mason v. Tucker and Assoc., 125 Idaho 429, 432, 871 P.2d 846, 849 (Ct. App. 1994).

         Here, Veronika filed a motion for summary judgment seeking to invalidate the Covenant. Veronika argued that the Covenant was not a valid marriage settlement agreement because there was no meeting of the minds and it is unconscionable. Jerry objected and filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, asking the magistrate court to find that the Covenant was a "valid post marital agreement." During the hearing on both motions, the magistrate court expressed its concern that the parties had not addressed several issues relating to the validity of the Covenant:

[Magistrate court]: And as I read through -- in preparation for today, I read through a great deal of the information with regards to the summary judgment motion. And I had some screaming issues that neither of you have addressed.
[Magistrate court]: And so what I have in the -- in the briefing and in the documents doesn't begin to cover the issues that at least seem to me -- for example, it's referred to as a marital settlement agreement by -- at least by Ms. Gaffney.
I know she referred to it as that, and I think that that's probably a description that is not uncomfortable for you, Mr. Anderson, in talking about it in those terms.
And yet it's not a marital settlement agreement because it's not an agreement between these parties. It's an agreement ostensibly between Mrs. Papin and the husband of Mr. Papin's business partner.
So it's not a marital settlement agreement. He's not a party to it.
[Magistrate court]: Whether she understood the agreement, that's a question of fact. But those aren't the only issues. And especially when it's -- it's an agreement between Mrs. Papin and somebody else who isn't a party to this litigation.
[A]nd where is the consideration to make that agreement binding?

         After voicing its concerns, the magistrate court continued the hearing to allow the parties an opportunity to brief any additional issues relating to the validity of the Covenant. The parties had approximately one month to supplement their motions, and both took the opportunity to do so. In her supplemental memorandum, Veronika alleged that the Covenant was not a valid marriage settlement agreement because it was not signed by both spouses and it does not convey anything to Jerry, but merely attempts to affirm the separate nature of the business.

         In its decision on summary judgment, the magistrate court ultimately found that the Covenant was not a valid marriage settlement agreement because it was not signed by both spouses and it was unconscionable. The court also found that the Covenant was not an "instrument of conveyance" because it did not contain specific language of conveyance. Finally, the court found that the Covenant was not a valid agreement as between Veronika and Adam because it lacked consideration.

         On intermediate appeal, Jerry argued that the magistrate court improperly raised several issues sua sponte, including the issues that were addressed in Veronika's supplemental memorandum as well as the additional issues of consideration, conveyance, and disclosure that were never raised by Veronika. The district court held that the only issue that was raised sua sponte was the issue regarding consideration, but it was not improper for the magistrate court to do so because the parties had notice and an opportunity to brief the issue. We agree with the district court.

         As to the issue of disclosure, we hold that Jerry raised the issue himself when he filed a cross-motion for summary judgment asking the court to find that the Covenant was a "valid post marital agreement." To have a "valid post marital agreement," the Covenant would have to be valid, which includes disclosing all pertinent information within each party's knowledge. "The marital relationship imposes the high duty of care of a fiduciary on each of the parties. This duty continues until the moment of the marriage's termination." Golder v. Golder, 110 Idaho 57, 60, 714 P.2d 26, 29 (1986).

This fiduciary duty extends to the parties' negotiations leading to the formation of the property settlement agreement during marriage, and requires, at least, a disclosure by both parties of all information within their knowledge regarding the existence of community property and of pertinent facts necessary to arrive at a reasonable valuation of the property. Like a business partner, each spouse is free to adopt a position favorable to himself or herself regarding the property's valuation, its inclusion in the community, or other such issues. They are not free, however, to resolve such issues unilaterally by concealing the very existence of particular items or amounts of property.

Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Compton v. Compton, 101 Idaho 328, 336, 612 P.2d 1175, 7783 (1980)). "When such an agreement is attacked the husband has the burden of clearly showing that it was fair in every particular." Sande v. Sande, 83 Idaho 233, 238, 360 P.2d 998, 1001 (1961) (quoting Hay v. Hay, 40 Idaho 159, 169, 232 P. 895, 897 (1924)). Accordingly, because Jerry himself asked the magistrate court to uphold the validity of the Covenant, the court did not raise the issue of disclosure sua sponte.

         As to the issue of conveyance, we similarly hold that Jerry raised the issue himself. In his supplemental reply to his cross-motion for summary judgment, Jerry cited to section 32-906(2) and asserted that "the Covenant property [sic] conveys Veronika's interest, if she had one, to Jerry in the business enterprises together with all revenue derived therefrom." During the continued hearing on the motions for summary judgment, Veronika asserted that section 32-906(2) is inapplicable because, according to the Covenant itself, Veronika is not conveying anything; both the title and language of the Covenant explain that Veronika is merely affirming the separate nature of the business. Jerry rebutted Veronika's argument by asserting that the Covenant "is clearly a conveyance." Accordingly, the magistrate court did not raise the issue of conveyance sua sponte.

         Finally, as to the issue of consideration, we hold that the magistrate court did in fact raise that issue sua sponte. Nevertheless, it was not error for the court to do so because it provided the parties with both notice-by identifying the issue during the hearing on the motions for summary judgment-and an opportunity to address the issue-by offering the parties additional time to supplement their briefing. Therefore, although the magistrate court sua sponte raised the issue of consideration, it was not error for the court to do so. Accordingly, we affirm the district court on this issue.

         ii. The district court erred in affirming the magistrate court's finding that the Covenant was procedurally invalid on the alternate grounds that it did not contain the grantee's mailing address.

         The magistrate court found that the Covenant was not a valid marriage settlement agreement because it was signed only by Veronika, thereby failing to satisfy the requirements of Idaho Code section 32-917. On intermediate appeal, the district court upheld the magistrate court's finding on alternative grounds. The district court held that, although section 32-917 only requires the grantor's signature, it further requires the inclusion of the grantee's mailing address, which the Covenant lacks.

         On intermediate appeal, the district court may affirm a magistrate court's decision that is based upon an erroneous legal theory if an alternative legal basis can be found to support the decision. See, e.g., Campbell v. Parkway Surgery Ctr., LLC, 158 Idaho 957, 966, 354 P.3d 1172, 1181 (2015) ("The district court was permitted to affirm the magistrate court's judgment on the correct legal theory if the magistrate's legal basis for supporting its judgment was incorrect."). Thus, we must initially determine whether the district court correctly determined that section 32-917 only requires the grantor's signature and the grantee's mailing address.

         "The interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which this Court exercises free review." Webb v. Webb, 143 Idaho 521, 525, 148 P.3d 1267, 1271 (2006). In Idaho, property rights of husband and wife are governed by Chapter 9, Title 32, Idaho Code, "unless there is a marriage settlement agreement entered into during the marriage containing stipulations contrary thereto." I.C. § 32-916. Section 32-917 provides that "[a]ll contracts for marriage settlements must be in writing, and executed and acknowledged or proved in like manner as conveyances of land are required to be executed and acknowledged or proved." Idaho Code section 55-601 addresses how conveyances of land are to be executed and acknowledged or proved: "A conveyance of an estate in real property may be made by an instrument in writing, subscribed by the party disposing of the same, or by his agent thereunto authorized by writing. The name of the grantee and his complete mailing address must appear on such instrument."

         In Chavez v. Barrus, we addressed the issue of whether a marital property settlement agreement is required to contain formalized language of conveyance to be a valid settlement agreement. 146 Idaho 212, 220, 192 P.3d 1036, 1044 (2008). In doing so, we began by recognizing that certain minimum requirements must be met when assigning the interests in the marital homestead through a settlement agreement:

"All contracts for marriage settlements must be in writing, and executed and acknowledged or proved in like manner as conveyances of land are required to be executed and acknowledged or proved." I.C. § 32-917. The general rule for conveyances of land states: "A conveyance of an estate in real property may be made by an instrument in writing, subscribed by the party disposing of the same, or by his agent thereunto authorized by writing. The name of the grantee and his complete mailing address must appear on such instrument." I.C. § 55-601; see also I.C. § 9-503 (stating that transfers of real property must be in writing).

Id. We held that the agreement between the husband and wife satisfied the requirements of section 32-917 without specifying which of the requirements had been satisfied. We now take the opportunity to do so.

         First, it is an absolute requirement that the marriage settlement agreement be in writing. See I.C. § 32-917 ("All contracts for marriage settlements must be in writing . . . ."); I.C. § 55-601 ("A conveyance of an estate in real property may be made by an instrument in writing . . . ."). Second, only the grantor, i.e., the conveying spouse, is required to sign the settlement agreement. See I.C. § 55-601 (explaining that the instrument of conveyance need only be "subscribed by the party disposing of the same."). Third, the settlement agreement must contain the mailing address of the grantee spouse, but only if the property that is being conveyed is real property. This requirement, found in section 55-601, is only necessary for conveyances of real property because the address of the grantee is needed for property tax purposes. This holding is also supported by the language found in section 32-917, which provides that marriage settlement agreements need only be "executed and acknowledged or proved in like manner as conveyances of land are required to be executed and acknowledged or proved." (Emphasis added). "Like" is defined as "[e]qual in quantity, quality, or degree; corresponding exactly" or "[s]imilar or substantially similar; of much the same nature." LIKE, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). We interpret the Legislature's use of the phrase, "in like manner as conveyances of land," to only refer to the acts of executing, acknowledging, and proving the agreement. The address requirement would only apply to "conveyances of land." Thus, the grantee's mailing address is only necessary in a marriage settlement agreement when title to real property is being conveyed or modified.

         Looking to the marriage settlement agreement in this case, we hold that it satisfies the procedural requirements of section 32-917, and is therefore, procedurally valid. First, the Covenant satisfies the requirement that it be in writing. Second, the Covenant satisfies the requirement that it be signed by the grantor spouse. The Covenant was signed by Veronika (as well as Adam Davis) and notarized by a notary public. Veronika is the grantor because she is the one conveying property-i.e., any interest she may have in Straight Line. Thus, as between Veronika and Jerry, only Veronika's signature is required under section 32-917. Finally, because the only property that is being conveyed is the interest Veronika may have in Straight Line- which did not include any real property-Jerry's mailing address, as the grantee, was not required. Therefore, the Covenant satisfies all of the procedural requirements of section 32-917. Accordingly, the district court erred in affirming the magistrate court's finding that the Covenant was procedurally invalid on the alternative grounds that it lacked the grantee's mailing address.

         iii. The Covenant is not a valid marriage agreement between Jerry and Veronika agreement because it lacks consideration.

         The issue of consideration for the Covenant is difficult to analyze on appeal because both lower courts considered the issue as between Veronika and Adam Davis, the two signatories to the Covenant, rather than as between Veronika and Jerry. The magistrate court held that the Covenant was invalid due to the lack of consideration.[2] The district court upheld the magistrate court's holding, explaining that "[n]o ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.