VERONIKA O. PAPIN, Plaintiff-Respondent,
JERRY A. PAPIN, Defendant-Appellant.
from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of
the State of Idaho, Bonneville County. Dane H. Watkins, Jr.,
decision of the district court is affirmed in part and
reversed in part and remanded for further proceedings.
Woolf Anderson & Wilkinson, PLLC, Idaho Falls, for
Appellant. Marty Anderson argued.
Gaffney & McNally, Idaho Falls, for Respondent. John E.
an appeal originating from a complex divorce between Jerry
and Veronika Papin. Jerry appeals from the Bonneville County
district court's decision, which affirmed in part the
judgment of the magistrate court dividing the marital estate.
On appeal, Jerry argues that the district court erred in
affirming several of the magistrate court's rulings,
including: (1) its holding that the marriage settlement
agreement was invalid; (2) its holding that the community was
entitled to reimbursement for the funds expended towards the
mortgage and property taxes on Jerry's separate property
home; (3) its characterization of certain property as either
separate or community; (4) its valuation of certain property;
(5) its award of spousal maintenance to Veronika; and (6) its
award of attorney fees to Veronika. For the reasons stated
below, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
and Veronika were married on June 3, 2003, when they were
thirty-seven and twenty-nine years old, respectively.
Throughout the marriage, the parties resided in Jerry's
separate property home in Idaho Falls, Idaho. The parties
have one child together, J.P., born on April 11, 2010.
was born in the Czech Republic and moved to Idaho Falls in
2003 after having visited a few times. Czech is
Veronika's first language, but she understands four other
languages, including English. While married to Jerry,
Veronika worked part time at an art gallery in Idaho Falls
making minimum wage.
was born in the United States and has lived in Idaho Falls
since 1986. After leaving the Navy in 1991, Jerry began his
career as an investment manager. Jerry affiliated his
business with IDS Financial Services Inc. (IDS Financial),
becoming an independent contractor with the firm. In 1995,
IDS Financial changed its name to American Express Financial
Advisors (American Express), and in 2005, American Express
changed its name to Ameriprise Financial Services, Inc.
(Ameriprise). Following the name change, Ameriprise updated
its tax policy, thereby allowing Ameriprise affiliated
investment managers, such as Jerry, to have their own
distinct tax identity. In response, Jerry created Jerry Papin
Support Services, LLC (JPSS).
August 31, 2011, Jerry sold his "Business and
Assets" to Brinton Webb, another Ameriprise affiliated
investment manager. Jerry and Webb executed an Agreement for
Purchase and Sale of the Ameriprise Franchise of Jerry A.
Papin, Jr. (Purchase and Sale Agreement) to document the
terms of the sale to Webb. The Purchase and Sale Agreement
provided that Jerry would sell to Webb his "Business and
Assets, as they exist," for $504, 000. The
"Assets" included Jerry's "client
base," which consisted of approximately 250 clients with
approximately $45, 000, 000 in total assets under management
same day, Jerry and Webb executed the Amendment to the
Agreement for Purchase and Sale of Practice (the Amendment).
The Amendment explained that Jerry could "solicit
clients of the Business . . . to move some or all of their
accounts from [Webb's] Ameriprise [business] to
[Jerry]'s new Industry business." The parties agreed
that Jerry would limit the amount of AUM leaving Webb's
Ameriprise business to no more than $12, 500, 000. Should
Jerry procure more than that, he would have to reduce the
purchase price by five percent for each increment of $1, 000,
000 in excess of $12, 500, 000.
very next day, Jerry executed an operating agreement with
Melissa Davis, forming Straight Line Investment Group, LLC
(Straight Line), a Nevada corporation. Jerry and Melissa each
owned a fifty percent interest in Straight Line. One month
later, Jerry amended the Certificate of Organization for
JPSS, changing the name to Straight Line Investment Group,
LLC (Straight Line (Idaho)).
November 16, 2011, Jerry informed Webb that he would be
transferring $16, 900, 000 in AUM-i.e., $4, 400, 000
above the permitted $12, 500, 000-to his new business,
Straight Line. As a result, Jerry reduced the purchase price
of $504, 000 by twenty five percent. Accordingly, Webb was
only required to pay Jerry $378, 000 for the sale of the
years later, Jerry prepared a document entitled: A Covenant
Affirming the Separate Business Property of Melissa Davis and
Jerry A. Papin, Jr. (the Covenant). The Covenant provides in
Straight Line Investment Group, LLC, a business
formed under the laws of the state of Nevada, as an evolution
and continuation of the Investment management and financial
advisory business, established in 1991, previously owned by
Jerry A. Papin, Jr. exclusively, was contemplated, designed
and has thereafter operated as [Jerry and Melissa's]
separate property in proportion to their respective ownership
Covenant further provides that the spouses of Jerry and
Melissa affirm that Straight Line "has been and remains
the separate property of [Jerry and Melissa]"; that the
spouses do not have and never will have "any lawful
right or claim to the intellectual or real property, revenue,
proceeds, set-asides, investments, equity or any other thing
of value of [Straight Line]"; and that the spouses
forever disclaim and waive "all rights, title, and
interest which may be vested in either or both of us by
virtue of our respective marriages to the Partners in and to
all revenues, proceeds, property, assets and other things of
value of [Straight Line]" and "any subsequent
finding by a jurisdictional authority of any community
property or other joint interest." Melissa's
husband, Adam Davis, signed the Covenant on October 24, 2013,
and Veronika signed the Covenant on November 4, 2013. Neither
Jerry nor Melissa signed the Covenant.
August 13, 2014, after more than eleven years of marriage,
Veronika filed for divorce on the grounds of extreme cruelty
or, in the alternative, on the grounds of irreconcilable
differences. Jerry requested that the magistrate court grant
the divorce on the grounds of adultery or, in the
alternative, on the grounds of irreconcilable differences.
challenged the validity of the Covenant by moving for summary
judgment. Veronika argued that the Covenant is not a
"binding or valid premarital agreement pursuant to I.C.
§ 32-916, et seq. and in accordance with
leading Idaho case law." In response, Jerry filed a
cross-motion for summary judgment, arguing that the Covenant
is a "valid post marital agreement" and Veronika is
not entitled to claim any interest in Jerry's separate
property business. The magistrate court granted summary
judgment in favor of Veronika, holding that the Covenant was
not a valid marriage settlement agreement because (1) it was
signed by only one spouse when Idaho Code section 32-917
requires both spouse's signatures and (2) it is
unconscionable. The court also held that the Covenant was not
an "instrument of conveyance" because there was no
specific language of conveyance as required by Idaho Code
section 32-906(2). Finally, the court held that the Covenant
was not a valid agreement as between Veronika and Adam,
i.e., the signatories, for lack of consideration.
commenced on July 1, 2015, and on October 19, 2015, the
magistrate court entered its Memorandum Decision. Relevant to
this appeal, the court made the following findings: (1)
neither party met their burden of proving fault grounds for
divorce; (2) community funds were used to pay down the
mortgage and property taxes on Jerry's separate property
home in the amount of $70, 000 and $13, 797.80, respectively;
(3) the proceeds from the sale of the business are presumed
to be community property because Jerry could not trace his
separate property; (4) Straight Line is community property
because it was started during the marriage; (5) the MPCU
joint checking account and all investment accounts are
community property because the accounts consist of either the
proceeds from the sale of Jerry's business or community
income; (6) Veronika is entitled to an award of temporary
spousal maintenance; and (7) Veronika is entitled to
two-thirds of her requested attorney fees.
filed a motion for attorney fees and costs, requesting $89,
202.57 in attorney fees and $9, 787.94 in costs. The
magistrate court issued its Memorandum Decision Re:
Attorney's Fees, awarding Veronika all of her costs and
part of her fees. As for costs, the court awarded Veronika
$1, 714.19 as costs as a matter of right and $8, 073.75 as
discretionary costs. As for attorney fees, the court reduced
the requested amount by $5, 447.50 based on Jerry's
objections to which Veronika failed to respond. The court
also reduced the amount by $48, 372.60 for payments already
received from community funds. Finally, the court reduced the
amount by one-third, or $15, 056.80, because Veronika only
prevailed in part. Accordingly, the court held that Jerry was
required to pay Veronika a total of $30, 113.61 in attorney
fees and costs. The court entered the Final Decree of divorce
on January 29, 2016.
appealed both memorandum decisions and the Final Decree to
the district court. After oral argument, the district court
entered its Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Appeal. The
district court affirmed the magistrate court's decision
on a majority of the issues, but remanded the following
issues: (1) the determination of the appropriate allocation
and distribution of the Eastern Idaho Credit Union Account;
(2) the determination of the appropriate allocation and
distribution of the Ameritrade Account; (3) reconsideration
of certain evidence under the proper burden of proof to
determine the amount the community is entitled to for
reimbursement for the payment of principal and taxes on
Jerry's separate residence; (4) the determination of
whether any potential tax liability stemming from the 2011
sale of the business should be divided substantially equally;
and (5) the determination of expert witness fees as a
discretionary cost. Jerry timely appealed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
standard for reviewing a district court's decision when
it acts in its intermediate appellate capacity continues to
be the source of some confusion. See Losser v.
Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 672, 183 P.3d 758, 760
(2008). However, in Pelayo v. Pelayo, 154 Idaho 855,
303 P.3d 214 (2013), we clarified the standard:
When this Court reviews the decision of a district court
sitting in its capacity as an appellate court, the standard
of review is as follows:
The Supreme Court reviews the trial court (magistrate) record
to determine whether there is substantial and competent
evidence to support the magistrate's findings of fact and
whether the magistrate's conclusions of law follow from
those findings. If those findings are so supported and the
conclusions follow therefrom and if the district court
affirmed the magistrate's decision, we affirm the
district court's decision as a matter of procedure.
Bailey v. Bailey, 153 Idaho 526, 529, 284 P.3d 970,
973 (2012) (quoting Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho
670, 672, 183, P.3d 758, 760 (2008)). Thus, this Court does
not review the decision of the magistrate court. Id.
"Rather, we are 'procedurally bound to affirm or
reverse the decisions of the district court.'"
Id. (quoting State v. Korn, 148 Idaho 413,
514 n. 1, 224 P.3d 480, 482 n. 1 (2009)).
Prior to Losser, when this Court reviewed a district
court acting in its appellate capacity the standard of review
was: "when reviewing a decision of the district court
acting in its appellate capacity, this Court will review the
record and the magistrate court's decision independently
of, but with due regard for, the district court's
decision." Losser, 145 Idaho at 672, 183 P.3d
at 760. After Losser, this Court does not directly
review a magistrate court's decision. Id.
Rather, it is bound to affirm or reverse the district
court's decision. See Bailey, 153 Idaho at 529,
284 P.3d at 973; Korn, 148 Idaho at 415 n. 1, 224
P.3d at 482 n. 1.
Pelayo, 154 Idaho at 858-59, 303 P.3d at 217-18.
Accordingly, we will review the district court's decision
to determine whether it correctly addressed the issues raised
The marriage settlement agreement.
contends that the district court erred in affirming the
magistrate court's finding on summary judgment that the
Covenant was not a valid marriage settlement agreement.
According to Jerry, the Covenant is a valid marriage
settlement agreement because it was executed in accordance
with the law and properly conveys any interest Veronika may
have in Straight Line to Jerry, including all revenue.
Veronika contends that the Covenant is not a valid marriage
settlement agreement because Jerry is not a party to it, it
lacks "mutuality and consideration," and it was not
executed in accordance with the law.
appeal from the grant of a motion for summary judgment, this
Court employs the same standard as used by the [lower court]
originally ruling on the motion." Intermountain
Forest Mgmt., Inc. v. Louisiana Pacific Corp., 136
Idaho 233, 235, 31 P.3d 921, 923 (2001). Summary judgment is
proper "if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(a).
Where the parties have filed cross-motions for summary
judgment relying on the same facts, issues and theories, the
parties effectively stipulate that there is no genuine issue
of material fact that would preclude the district court from
entering summary judgment. Davis v. Peacock, 133
Idaho 637, 640, 991 P.2d 362, 365 (1999) (citations omitted).
However, the mere fact that both parties move for summary
judgment does not in and of itself establish that there is no
genuine issue of material fact. Kromrei v. AID Ins.
Co., 110 Idaho 549, 551, 716 P.2d 1321 (1986) (citing
Casey v. Highlands Ins. Co., 100 Idaho 505, 507, 600
P.2d 1387, 1389 (1979)). The fact that the parties have filed
cross-motions for summary judgment does not change the
applicable standard of review, and this Court must evaluate
each party's motion on its own merits. Stafford v.
Klosterman, 134 Idaho 205, 207, 998 P.2d 1118, 1119
(2000) (citing Bear Island Water Ass'n, Inc., v.
Brown, 125 Idaho 717, 721, 874 P.2d 528, 532 (1994)).
Intermountain Forest Mgmt., Inc., 136 Idaho at 235,
31 P.3d at 923.
The magistrate court did not err in raising the issue of
consideration sua sponte because it provided the parties with
adequate notice and an opportunity to respond.
contends that the magistrate court improperly raised sua
sponte several issues regarding the validity of the
Covenant during the hearing on the parties' motions for
summary judgment because he was not provided with adequate
notice and an opportunity to respond. Veronika contends that
the magistrate court did not raise any issues sua
sponte because Jerry placed the legitimacy of the
Covenant at issue when he filed a cross-motion for summary
judgment asserting its validity.
"[t]he [lower] court may not grant summary judgment on a
ground raised sua sponte." Sales
v. Peabody, 157 Idaho 195, 201, 335 P.3d 40, 46 (2014).
However, this is not a blanket rule:
We do not suggest that summary judgment may never be entered
by a court sua sponte or on grounds other than those
raised by the moving party. . . . [I]n such event, the party
against whom the judgment will be entered must be given
adequate advance notice and an opportunity to demonstrate why
summary judgment should not be entered.
Mason v. Tucker and Assoc., 125 Idaho 429, 432, 871
P.2d 846, 849 (Ct. App. 1994).
Veronika filed a motion for summary judgment seeking to
invalidate the Covenant. Veronika argued that the Covenant
was not a valid marriage settlement agreement because there
was no meeting of the minds and it is unconscionable. Jerry
objected and filed a cross-motion for summary judgment,
asking the magistrate court to find that the Covenant was a
"valid post marital agreement." During the hearing
on both motions, the magistrate court expressed its concern
that the parties had not addressed several issues relating to
the validity of the Covenant:
[Magistrate court]: And as I read through -- in preparation
for today, I read through a great deal of the information
with regards to the summary judgment motion. And I had some
screaming issues that neither of you have addressed.
[Magistrate court]: And so what I have in the -- in the
briefing and in the documents doesn't begin to cover the
issues that at least seem to me -- for example, it's
referred to as a marital settlement agreement by -- at least
by Ms. Gaffney.
I know she referred to it as that, and I think that
that's probably a description that is not uncomfortable
for you, Mr. Anderson, in talking about it in those terms.
And yet it's not a marital settlement agreement because
it's not an agreement between these parties. It's an
agreement ostensibly between Mrs. Papin and the husband of
Mr. Papin's business partner.
So it's not a marital settlement agreement. He's not
a party to it.
[Magistrate court]: Whether she understood the agreement,
that's a question of fact. But those aren't the only
issues. And especially when it's -- it's an agreement
between Mrs. Papin and somebody else who isn't a party to
[A]nd where is the consideration to make that agreement
voicing its concerns, the magistrate court continued the
hearing to allow the parties an opportunity to brief any
additional issues relating to the validity of the Covenant.
The parties had approximately one month to supplement their
motions, and both took the opportunity to do so. In her
supplemental memorandum, Veronika alleged that the Covenant
was not a valid marriage settlement agreement because it was
not signed by both spouses and it does not convey anything to
Jerry, but merely attempts to affirm the separate nature of
decision on summary judgment, the magistrate court ultimately
found that the Covenant was not a valid marriage settlement
agreement because it was not signed by both spouses and it
was unconscionable. The court also found that the Covenant
was not an "instrument of conveyance" because it
did not contain specific language of conveyance. Finally, the
court found that the Covenant was not a valid agreement as
between Veronika and Adam because it lacked consideration.
intermediate appeal, Jerry argued that the magistrate court
improperly raised several issues sua sponte,
including the issues that were addressed in Veronika's
supplemental memorandum as well as the additional issues of
consideration, conveyance, and disclosure that were never
raised by Veronika. The district court held that the only
issue that was raised sua sponte was the issue
regarding consideration, but it was not improper for the
magistrate court to do so because the parties had notice and
an opportunity to brief the issue. We agree with the district
the issue of disclosure, we hold that Jerry raised the issue
himself when he filed a cross-motion for summary judgment
asking the court to find that the Covenant was a "valid
post marital agreement." To have a "valid post
marital agreement," the Covenant would have to be
valid, which includes disclosing all pertinent
information within each party's knowledge. "The
marital relationship imposes the high duty of care of a
fiduciary on each of the parties. This duty continues until
the moment of the marriage's termination."
Golder v. Golder, 110 Idaho 57, 60, 714 P.2d 26, 29
This fiduciary duty extends to the parties' negotiations
leading to the formation of the property settlement agreement
during marriage, and requires, at least, a
disclosure by both parties of all information within
their knowledge regarding the existence of community property
and of pertinent facts necessary to arrive at a reasonable
valuation of the property. Like a business partner, each
spouse is free to adopt a position favorable to himself or
herself regarding the property's valuation, its inclusion
in the community, or other such issues. They are not free,
however, to resolve such issues unilaterally by concealing
the very existence of particular items or amounts of
Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Compton v.
Compton, 101 Idaho 328, 336, 612 P.2d 1175, 7783
(1980)). "When such an agreement is attacked the husband
has the burden of clearly showing that it was fair in every
particular." Sande v. Sande, 83 Idaho 233, 238,
360 P.2d 998, 1001 (1961) (quoting Hay v. Hay, 40
Idaho 159, 169, 232 P. 895, 897 (1924)). Accordingly, because
Jerry himself asked the magistrate court to uphold the
validity of the Covenant, the court did not raise the issue
of disclosure sua sponte.
the issue of conveyance, we similarly hold that Jerry raised
the issue himself. In his supplemental reply to his
cross-motion for summary judgment, Jerry cited to section
32-906(2) and asserted that "the Covenant
property [sic] conveys Veronika's interest, if she had
one, to Jerry in the business enterprises together with all
revenue derived therefrom." During the continued hearing
on the motions for summary judgment, Veronika asserted that
section 32-906(2) is inapplicable because, according to the
Covenant itself, Veronika is not conveying anything; both the
title and language of the Covenant explain that Veronika is
merely affirming the separate nature of the
business. Jerry rebutted Veronika's argument by asserting
that the Covenant "is clearly a conveyance."
Accordingly, the magistrate court did not raise the issue of
conveyance sua sponte.
as to the issue of consideration, we hold that the magistrate
court did in fact raise that issue sua sponte.
Nevertheless, it was not error for the court to do so because
it provided the parties with both notice-by identifying the
issue during the hearing on the motions for summary
judgment-and an opportunity to address the issue-by offering
the parties additional time to supplement their briefing.
Therefore, although the magistrate court sua sponte
raised the issue of consideration, it was not error for the
court to do so. Accordingly, we affirm the district court on
The district court erred in affirming the magistrate
court's finding that the Covenant was procedurally
invalid on the alternate grounds that it did not contain the
grantee's mailing address.
magistrate court found that the Covenant was not a valid
marriage settlement agreement because it was signed only by
Veronika, thereby failing to satisfy the requirements of
Idaho Code section 32-917. On intermediate appeal, the
district court upheld the magistrate court's finding on
alternative grounds. The district court held that, although
section 32-917 only requires the grantor's signature, it
further requires the inclusion of the grantee's mailing
address, which the Covenant lacks.
intermediate appeal, the district court may affirm a
magistrate court's decision that is based upon an
erroneous legal theory if an alternative legal basis can be
found to support the decision. See, e.g., Campbell v.
Parkway Surgery Ctr., LLC, 158 Idaho 957, 966, 354 P.3d
1172, 1181 (2015) ("The district court was permitted to
affirm the magistrate court's judgment on the correct
legal theory if the magistrate's legal basis for
supporting its judgment was incorrect."). Thus, we must
initially determine whether the district court correctly
determined that section 32-917 only requires the
grantor's signature and the grantee's mailing
interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which
this Court exercises free review." Webb v.
Webb, 143 Idaho 521, 525, 148 P.3d 1267, 1271 (2006). In
Idaho, property rights of husband and wife are governed by
Chapter 9, Title 32, Idaho Code, "unless there is a
marriage settlement agreement entered into during the
marriage containing stipulations contrary thereto." I.C.
§ 32-916. Section 32-917 provides that "[a]ll
contracts for marriage settlements must be in writing, and
executed and acknowledged or proved in like manner as
conveyances of land are required to be executed and
acknowledged or proved." Idaho Code section 55-601
addresses how conveyances of land are to be executed and
acknowledged or proved: "A conveyance of an estate in
real property may be made by an instrument in writing,
subscribed by the party disposing of the same, or by his
agent thereunto authorized by writing. The name of the
grantee and his complete mailing address must appear on such
Chavez v. Barrus, we addressed the issue of whether
a marital property settlement agreement is required to
contain formalized language of conveyance to be a valid
settlement agreement. 146 Idaho 212, 220, 192 P.3d 1036, 1044
(2008). In doing so, we began by recognizing that certain
minimum requirements must be met when assigning the interests
in the marital homestead through a settlement agreement:
"All contracts for marriage settlements must be in
writing, and executed and acknowledged or proved in like
manner as conveyances of land are required to be executed and
acknowledged or proved." I.C. § 32-917. The general
rule for conveyances of land states: "A conveyance of an
estate in real property may be made by an instrument in
writing, subscribed by the party disposing of the same, or by
his agent thereunto authorized by writing. The name of the
grantee and his complete mailing address must appear on such
instrument." I.C. § 55-601; see also I.C.
§ 9-503 (stating that transfers of real property must be
Id. We held that the agreement between the husband
and wife satisfied the requirements of section 32-917 without
specifying which of the requirements had been satisfied. We
now take the opportunity to do so.
it is an absolute requirement that the marriage settlement
agreement be in writing. See I.C. § 32-917
("All contracts for marriage settlements must be in
writing . . . ."); I.C. § 55-601 ("A
conveyance of an estate in real property may be made by an
instrument in writing . . . ."). Second, only the
grantor, i.e., the conveying spouse, is required to
sign the settlement agreement. See I.C. §
55-601 (explaining that the instrument of conveyance need
only be "subscribed by the party disposing of the
same."). Third, the settlement agreement must contain
the mailing address of the grantee spouse, but only
if the property that is being conveyed is real property. This
requirement, found in section 55-601, is only necessary for
conveyances of real property because the address of the
grantee is needed for property tax purposes. This holding is
also supported by the language found in section 32-917, which
provides that marriage settlement agreements need only be
"executed and acknowledged or proved in like
manner as conveyances of land are required to be
executed and acknowledged or
proved." (Emphasis added). "Like" is
defined as "[e]qual in quantity, quality, or degree;
corresponding exactly" or "[s]imilar or
substantially similar; of much the same nature." LIKE,
Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). We interpret the
Legislature's use of the phrase, "in like manner as
conveyances of land," to only refer to the acts of
executing, acknowledging, and proving the agreement. The
address requirement would only apply to "conveyances of
land." Thus, the grantee's mailing address is only
necessary in a marriage settlement agreement when title to
real property is being conveyed or modified.
to the marriage settlement agreement in this case, we hold
that it satisfies the procedural requirements of section
32-917, and is therefore, procedurally valid. First, the
Covenant satisfies the requirement that it be in writing.
Second, the Covenant satisfies the requirement that it be
signed by the grantor spouse. The Covenant was signed by
Veronika (as well as Adam Davis) and notarized by a notary
public. Veronika is the grantor because she is the one
conveying property-i.e., any interest she may have
in Straight Line. Thus, as between Veronika and Jerry, only
Veronika's signature is required under section 32-917.
Finally, because the only property that is being conveyed is
the interest Veronika may have in Straight Line- which did
not include any real property-Jerry's mailing address, as
the grantee, was not required. Therefore, the Covenant
satisfies all of the procedural requirements of section
32-917. Accordingly, the district court erred in affirming
the magistrate court's finding that the Covenant was
procedurally invalid on the alternative grounds that it
lacked the grantee's mailing address.
The Covenant is not a valid marriage agreement between
Jerry and Veronika agreement because it lacks
issue of consideration for the Covenant is difficult to
analyze on appeal because both lower courts considered the
issue as between Veronika and Adam Davis, the two
signatories to the Covenant, rather than as between Veronika
and Jerry. The magistrate court held that the
Covenant was invalid due to the lack of
consideration. The district court upheld the magistrate
court's holding, explaining that "[n]o ...