United States District Court, D. Idaho
INITIAL REVIEW ORDER
E. Bush Chief U.S. Magistrate Judge.
Jimmie O'Neal has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus challenging Petitioner's state court conviction.
See Dkt. 3. The Court now reviews the Petition to
determine whether it is subject to summary dismissal pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 2243 and Rule 4 of the Rules Governing
Section 2254 Cases (“Habeas Rules”).
Standard of Law for Review of Petition
habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 is available
to petitioners who show that they are held in custody under a
state court judgment and that such custody violates the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). The Court must review
a habeas corpus petition upon receipt to determine whether it
is subject to summary dismissal. Habeas Rule 4. Summary
dismissal is appropriate where “it plainly appears from
the face of the petition and any attached exhibits that the
petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district
Fifth Judicial District Court in Gooding County, Idaho,
Petitioner pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter. The
judgment of conviction was entered on May 2, 2017. Petitioner
received a unified sentence of twelve years in prison with
six years fixed. Petitioner pursued a direct appeal as well
as state post-conviction relief. Dkt. 3 at 1-3.
instant Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Petitioner brings
four claims, all of which appear to be based on an allegedly
“tainted” presentence investigation report
(“PSI”). Claim 1 alleges that, in violation of
due process, the trial court relied on an unconstitutionally
obtained PSI and, as a result, lacked jurisdiction to
asserts ineffective assistance of trial counsel, in violation
of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, based on
counsel's “allow[ing] [the] [court to proceed
knowingly with sentencing when court would use reliance on
a[n] unconstitutionally obtained and tainted
PSI.” Id. at 7. In this claim,
Petitioner seems to allege that counsel failed to invoke
Petitioner's right to remain silent with respect to the
PSI. Id. (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966)).
Claim 3, Petitioner appears to assert that his Fifth
Amendment right to be free from compelled self-incrimination
was violated when the sentencing judge relied on the PSI.
Id. at 8.
alleges that various Idaho state courts “abused [their]
authority” by continuously “fail[ing] to
correct” violations of Petitioner's rights.
Id. at 9. This claim is subject to dismissal because
it does not assert a violation of a specific federal right.
Petitioner's generalized reference to “basic
protections” and his citation to United States Supreme
Court cases are insufficient to place Respondent or the Court
on notice of the specific federal violation asserted in Claim
4. See Id. Therefore, Claim 4 will be dismissed.
may proceed on Claims 1 through 3 of the Petition to the
extent that those claims (1) are cognizable in a federal
habeas corpus action, (2) were timely filed in this Court,
and (3) were either properly exhausted in state court or are
subject to a legal excuse for any failure to exhaust in a
proper manner. It is necessary for the Court to review
portions of the state court record to resolve preliminary
procedural issues, and it would also be helpful to receive
briefing from Respondent. Therefore, the Court will order the
Clerk to serve a copy of the Petition on counsel for
Respondent, who may respond either by answer or pre-answer
motion and who will provide relevant portions of the state
court record to this Court.
Potentially Applicable Standards of Law
Petitioner is pro se and because the Court finds that focused
briefing from the parties would be beneficial in this case,
the Court provides the following standards of law that might,
or might not, be applicable to the Petition.
Statute of Limitations
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
(“AEDPA”) generally requires a petitioner to seek
federal habeas corpus relief within one year from “the
date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of
direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such
review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). However, the
one-year statute of limitations can be tolled (or suspended)
under certain circumstances. AEDPA provides for tolling for
all of “[t]he time during which a properly filed
application for State post-conviction or other collateral
review ... is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). A
motion to reduce a sentence that is not a part of the direct
review process and that requires re-examination of the
sentence qualifies as a collateral review application that
tolls the one-year statute of limitations. Wall v.
Kholi, 562 U.S. 545, 555-56 (2011). Thus, to the extent
that a ...